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In recent years, a number of European countries have undergone important processes of 
territorial reconfiguration in the administration and delivery of social services. This has 
produced substantial divergences in the levels and types of welfare development across 
regions belonging to the same country. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to talk 
about ‘national welfare systems’ or ‘national social models’ – although most of the 
mainstream welfare literature continues to do so. The aim of this study is to explore the 
political factors that explain cross-regional variation in the development of health care and 
social assistance policies in three countries that have witnessed the gradual strengthening of 
regions as arenas of social policy making: Italy, Spain and Great Britain. The research focus 
is on the effects of two political cleavages, centre-periphery and left-right, on sub-national 
social policy.  
The findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses presented throughout this 
research suggest that the main driving force in the construction of sub-state welfare systems is 
the political mobilisation of territorial identities through the creation and electoral 
consolidation of regionalist parties. Indeed, such parties may use regional social policy to 
reinforce the sense of distinctiveness and territorial solidarity that exists in the communities 
they represent, thus further strengthening and legitimising their political role. Additionally, 
the centre-periphery cleavage may also affect relations across different organisational levels 
of ‘statewide’ parties and further increase the relevance of territoriality in welfare politics at 
the regional level. 
 On the other hand, traditional left-right politics does not seem to play the central role 
that welfare theories focusing on ‘nation-states’ might lead us to expect. For left-wing parties, 
the regionalisation of social governance may present either an opportunity or a challenge 
depending on the role they play in national politics and on the characteristics of sub-national 
electoral competitors. Generally, mainstream centre-left parties are torn by the dilemma of 
maintaining uniformity and cohesion in social protection across the national territory and 
addressing the demands for more extensive and distinctive social services coming from 
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The welfare state played a very important role in the process of state- and nation-
building. Indeed it emerged in a period of structuring and closure of national 
boundaries, which framed the struggles between cross-local, ‘functional’ alliances. 
According to Rokkan, the ultimate last task of central political elites in the 
construction of nation-states was ‘the creation of territorial economic solidarity 
through measures to equalize benefits and opportunities both across regions and 
across strata of the population’ (quoted in Flora, 1999: 58). T. H. Marshall, the theorist 
of ‘citizenship’, has also evoked an image of how, over centuries, the functions of 
government and the rights of citizenship – among which social rights were central – 
‘accumulated at the scale and within the institutions of the democratic “nation-state”’ 
(Jeffrey, 2009: 74). Again, as shown in Jeffrey’s summary of the evolution of ‘national 
rights’, ‘social citizenship’ was the last type of citizenship to emerge and consolidate 
in the first half of the 20th century2 (Table 1). 
Table 1. The processes of state building and nationalisation of citizenship in the 
Western World 
 18th century 19th century 20th century 
Civil Rights Yes Yes Yes 
Political Rights  Yes Yes 
Social Rights   Yes 
Source: Jeffrey (2009: 74) 
Generally, the development of state welfare enhanced the capacity of central states to 
intervene in and shape the lives of their citizens. As pointed out by Ferrera (2005: 
168): 
                                                          
2
 Yet it should be underlined that in some countries social rights preceded political rights. The case of Germany, 
well illustrated by Alber (1986), is emblematic of a welfare system that started to emerge before the process of 
democratisation. This, however, does not contradict the fact that civil, political and social rights have all played 
a very important role in the process of nation building. 
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[W]ith the advent of public compulsory insurance, social rights acquired both a 
standardized content and an individualized nature, as subjective entitlements to 
certain forms of public protection – originally and typically cash transfers. The 
source of such new rights was the nation state, even in those countries which 
opted for an occupationalist rather than universalist approach. 
This process of centralisation and standardisation encouraged the creation of ‘cross-
local alliances of a functional nature’ (Bartolini 2005). Indeed, since the strengthening 
of central governments made ‘exit options’ increasingly costly for peripheral 
territorial actors, political requests could be constructed and communicated more 
effectively through statewide networks of apparatuses and institutions (Moreno and 
McEwen, 2005: 3). The interaction among statewide, cross-territorial organisations 
representing different interests (parties, employers’ organisations, trade unions) had 
an important impact on the structure of welfare states. Thus, as underlined by 
Esping-Andersen (1990), the emergence of different national welfare states depended 
on the level of political mobilisation of some statewide political or social bodies 
(social-democratic parties and trade unions), which in turn interacted with other 
statewide organisations (agrarian and bourgeois parties and employers’ 
organisations). Territorial issues did not play any role in this game since they were 
incorporated within each of these vertically integrated organisations. Only in ‘classic’ 
federal systems characterised by inter-regional competition, such as Canada, the US 
and Australia, has territoriality seemed to play a (negative) role in the evolution of 
welfare systems (Obinger et al., 2005).   
However, since the mid-1970s welfare states across Europe have undergone a 
process of retrenchment and restructuring. This last phase is not only characterised 
by the functional fragmentation and ‘privatisation’ of national social protection but 
also by its increasing ‘territorialisation’. Indeed, in some countries regional 
governments have become important, sometimes central, actors in the elaboration 
and implementation of social policies (Ferrera, 2005; McEwen and Moreno, 2005; 
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Kazepov 2010). Thus in many post-industrial societies the ‘new politics of welfare’ is 
increasingly shaped by territorial, region-specific factors rather than ‘statewide’ 
political struggles.  
In this context, new territorial and regionalist political forces may have played 
an increasingly important role in the elaboration and implementation of social 
policies. As happened in the process of state-building, new social policies promoted 
at the sub-state level may become an instrument of region-building, which further 
strengthens the saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage. At the same time, the 
traditional promoters of welfare expansion, centre-left political parties, may have 
adapted in different ways to processes of decentralisation. Some of them may have 
seen the increasing importance of the regional arena as an opportunity to invest 
additional resources in the construction of new systems of social protection that 
complement the national one. Yet other centre-left parties may have been less 
inclined to promote the development of region-specific social policies, which may in 
turn produce increasing territorial fragmentation and inequality in the structure and 
effectiveness of welfare governance across the national territory. 
The general aim of this study is to see to what extent the politics of welfare in 
decentralised systems is affected by the mobilisation – through regionalist parties – 
of the centre-periphery cleavage and by regional support for socially progressive 
political forces, which instead emerged from the mobilisation of the left-right 
‘functional’ cleavage (Caramani, 2004: 248). The following analysis does not only 
consider these two aspects of political competition separately but also tries to assess 
the effects produced by their intersection.  
Chapter 1 provides a review of the past and current debates on old and new 
welfare politics and territoriality. It also presents the main hypotheses of this study 
focusing on the role played by regionalist and left-wing parties in sub-state welfare 
building. Finally, it clarifies the case selection criteria and methodologies that are 
adopted to test the hypothesis. 
4 
 
The core of this study is formed of three sections, each focusing on the 
territorial politics of welfare in three countries: Italy, Spain, and Great Britain. In the 
case of the first two countries, preliminary quantitative chapters (chapters 2 and 5) 
are followed by two more qualitative chapters, which separately assess the effects of 
territorial and left-wing mobilisations on welfare development (chapters 3-4 and 6-7 
respectively). The section on Great Britain has a different structure. An introductory 
chapter focuses on the transformations and territorialisation of the British welfare 
state and presents a general assessment of the different levels of development of 
regional welfare systems in Scotland, Wales, and England (Chapter 8). The two 
qualitative chapters provide a more in-depth analysis of the processes of welfare 
building promoted by the newly devolved administrations of Scotland (Chapter 9) 
and Wales (Chapter 10).  
The conclusion (Chapter 11) tries to sum up the main results of this research 
by combining both cross-regional and cross-country comparisons. Moreover, it 
considers the possible effects of territorial politics on the welfare systems of other 
European countries, such as Germany, France, and Belgium, which have not been 
considered in this study. It also tries to assess the more recent developments in 
regional welfare governance in the post-crisis period (since 2009) in Italy, Spain, and 
Great Britain. Finally, possible developments of this research are discussed.  
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Chapter  1.   
Theoretical Framework, Research Hypotheses, Case Selection and Methodology. 
 
The transformation of European Welfare Systems: a brief literature review 
In the last three decades, the welfare systems of European countries have been 
subject to increasing pressures that have not only produced a general retrenchment 
of the generosity of social programmes but have also resulted in their qualitative 
transformation. In an age of austerity, therefore, it is not only important to assess and 
explain the level of resilience of the welfare systems that emerged in the so called 
‘Golden Age’ (Pierson, 2001) but it is also crucial to understand whether new social 
policies have replaced old ones.  
As underlined by Bonoli and Natali (2012: 11—12), ‘over the last two decades, 
together with some undeniable instances of retrenchment, we have also seen the 
expansion of some social policies, mostly in the fields of active labour market 
policies, publicly subsidized childcare and paid parental leave’. Scholars have 
underlined that in the last decades social policies have become ‘social investment 
policies’, which try ‘to increase social inclusion and minimise the intergenerational 
transfer of poverty as well as to ensure that the population is well-prepared for the 
likely employment conditions (less job security; more precarious forms of 
employment) of contemporary economies’ (Jenson, 2012: 28). This can be achieved 
through the development of ‘enabling and capacitating’ social plans that combine 
different welfare areas such as social assistance, health care, education, and 
employment policies. 
Additionally, it has been underlined that in the early and mid-20th century 
national welfare states emerged as ‘insurance-based’, ‘transfer-oriented’ systems 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990) whereas today, as a result of the increasing importance of 
‘social investment’ policies, they are increasingly ‘service-oriented’. Therefore studies 
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that focus on pension and insurance schemes and cash benefits often overlook the 
increasing importance that social services play as new means of social protection 
(Hemerijck, 2013: 32). As underlined by Ferrera (2005a: 171), ‘even though transfers 
(and especially pensions) were indeed the most dynamic component of social 
expenditure, from the 1960s social services also began to grow significantly in terms 
of spending, infrastructures, staff, and users’. 
The 1950s and 1960s have often been described as the ‘golden age’ of the 
welfare state, when the nationalisation of social protection and its massive expansion 
had significant implications for territorial redistribution. Keynesian territorial 
management introduced a variety of spatial policies intended to alleviate intra-
national territorial inequalities and local authorities operated solely as the agents of 
(centralised) welfare state provision (Brenner 2009). However, ‘the parabola of 
welfare state nationalization started to slow down during the 1960s, with a renewed 
emphasis on local government in the sphere of social services’ (Ferrera, 2005: 169). 
The emergence of the urbanised, affluent, unitary welfare state ‘had transformed the 
public sector such that the traditional basis for the distribution of state functions 
between centre and locality was no longer satisfactory’ (Sharpe 1993: 14). Therefore, 
factors that are endogenous to national welfare states partly explain the processes of 
decentralisation that started in the early 1970s. 
Of course, external factors, such as the global economic crisis started in the 1970s and 
the process of Europeanisation, have also put centralised welfare states under 
increasing pressure. Stephens et al. (1999) have underlined that after the oil shock in 
1973, ‘societies still have political choices regarding the types of welfare states they 
want to maintain, though these choices are more constrained than in the golden age’ 
(193). Given these constraints, central governments have been increasingly unable to 
provide solutions for regional crises and implement Keynesian territorial policies. In 
the 1970s this was shown by a double movement in the political-economic sphere. 
On the one hand, the global crisis seemed to overlay and standardise regional crises. 
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Everyone was similarly affected by unemployment and austerity. But at the same 
time, and precisely because there was a global crisis, the system tended to lose 
control of regional crises (Damette and Poncet, 1980: 114–115). In the era of austerity, 
decentralization also became a ‘top-down’ strategy of central authorities aimed at 
delegating difficult decisions, including those concerning the provision of social 
services, to lower levels of the decision-making process (Thorslund et al., 1997). This 
form of political manoeuvring and ‘politics of blame avoidance’ (Weaver, 1986)  is 
often known as ‘passing the buck or hot potato’ (Throslund et al, 1997: 204).  
The transformation of welfare systems is therefore affected by the changing 
role that national governments play in advanced democracies. In fact, today the term 
‘governance’ often replaces the term ‘government’ (Pierre, 2000; John, 2001). 
Generally, scholars have pointed to the central state’s ‘inability to maintain some 
degree of control over its external environment and to impose its will on society’ 
(Ibid: 2). Public policy and the administration of services are less and less the 
outcome of hierarchical interactions between the state and its individual citizens 
(Kooiman, 2000). Rather, they seem to be increasingly shaped by ‘policy networks’ 
involving public institutions at different territorial levels, private actors and social 
organisations (Pierre, 2000: 3). Therefore today the term ‘welfare state’ is often 
replaced by the term ‘welfare community’, which indicates the increasingly 
‘inclusive’ character of welfare governance (Ciarini, 2012: 29—33). 
Additionally, the term ‘multi-level governance’ has underlined the increasing 
importance of territoriality in the elaboration and implementation of social and 
economic policies in European countries (Biela et al. 2013). More generally, it seems 
that the strengthening of supra-national and sub-national actors and institutions has 
significantly challenged the primacy of nation-states. For instance, the construction of 
the European Union has also contributed to the constraining and ‘destructuring’ of 
national welfare regimes but has not resulted in a recentralisation and restructuring 
at a higher, European level (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Ferrera 2005; Bartolini 2004, 
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2005; Colomer 2007; Greer, 2009). Given the absence of strong institutional and 
political competitors at the national and supranational level, it is not so surprising 
that in some countries regional governments have gradually become focal points in 
the establishment of sub-national policy networks. Such networks may in turn play a 
primary role in the development of social services that better respond to the needs of 
local communities. 
As a consequence of these important transformations, scholarly interest in the 
territorial politics of welfare has grown only in recent years. Kazepov (2010) has 
argued that ‘the territorial dimension of social policies has long been a neglected 
perspective in comparative social analysis’. Indeed, ‘mainstream’ literature on 
welfare systems (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hemerijck, 2013) is still heavily influenced 
by what has been defined as methodological nationalism (Jeffrey, 2008; Jeffrey and 
Wincott, 2010; Amelina et al., 2012), which assumes that the national state or national 
society is ‘the natural social and political form of the modern world’ (Wimmer and 
Glick Schiller, 2002: 302). This has strongly influenced classifications of welfare 
systems, which not only neglect variations in welfare structures that go beyond ‘the 
stateness-fragmentation and state-market dichotomies’ (Flora 1986: XXI) but also 
assume that welfare governance is totally homogeneous across the territory of each 
nation-state analysed.  
Generally, ‘neither the comparative study of the welfare state nor the study of 
citizenship has been particularly friendly to territorial politics, stateless nations and 
federalism’ (Greer, 2009: 9). At the same time, the literature on territorial politics has 
paid scarce attention to the concept of ‘social citizenship’ – despite the fact that ‘social 
citizenship rights are, among other things, territorial’ (Ibid: 7). One exception is the 
seminal work by Alber (1995) that, while underlining the need to go beyond ‘social 
transfer payments of the state’, stresses the importance of territorial dynamics in 
welfare systems that are increasingly service-oriented.  In his view, it is no longer 
sufficient to look at ‘functional’ class struggles when assessing the development of 
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social policies and one should also consider the ‘centre-periphery cleavage’ in a 
context of increasing demands for social services (particularly elderly care and child 
care). This point is central in this study and will be further developed in the next 
sections. 
The study by Luis Moreno and Nicola McEwen (2005) can be considered as 
the first attempt to provide a systematic and comparative picture of the relationship 
between territorial politics and welfare development. Their study focuses on 
important aspects such as ‘state formation, the welfare state and nationhood, and the 
influence of state structure on welfare development in the light of the internal quest 
for decentralization and the external constraints of globalization’ (Ibid.: 32). In the 
same year, another important book, The Boundaries of Welfare by Maurizio Ferrera, 
also marked a breakthrough in the study of welfare and territoriality. In a chapter 
focusing on the emergence of ‘welfare regions’, Ferrera (2005: 174—175) argues that: 
The twenty‐first century has […] begun with a marked revival of ‘peripheries’ 
within European nation states and with visible symptoms of a regionalization of 
social protection, especially of policies targeted at new social needs [italics 
added]. Regions have increasingly become the spatial units of reference for 
organizing a collective response to such needs. Regional governments have 
become important political and institutional actors and have increasingly engaged 
themselves in voice activities, both horizontally (vis‐à‐vis other regions) and 
vertically (vis‐à‐vis local governments below them and national governments 
above them). They are also protagonists in, and focal points for, the emergence 
and functioning of those governance networks, extended to non‐public actors, 
which are becoming more and more important for the design and implementation 
of many social and economic programmes aimed at territorial growth and 
development. 
  
Keating (2009b: 102) has also underlined that ‘devolution is about shifting the 
territorial boundaries for communities and services’ and therefore it is ‘part of a 
general process of unbundling of the territory across European states’ (italics added). 
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As a result, ‘policy communities have been rebuilt at different territorial levels […] 
and new social compromises are being sought’ (Ibid: 103). More recently, Keating 
(2013: 146) has argued that regions may play an important role in the ‘distributive’ 
field of policy making, that is, the shifting of resources or other goods among 
individuals or groups.  
 
Traditionally redistribution has been a task for nation-states, through income 
taxes and social welfare payments aimed at categories defined by income, 
employment status, age, capacity, or family status. Regional governments have 
less control over these instruments of income redistribution but can influence the 
balance of opportunities through the allocation of public services. They also have 
substantial planning, land use, and infrastructure powers, which can affect the 
spatial distribution of opportunities. (Ibid. Italics added). 
 
In summary, this study can be placed in a very recent line of analysis that has linked 
qualitative and quantitative transformations of social governance to processes of 
territorial reconfiguration of authority, citizenship and solidarity in advanced 
democracies. However, so far the literature on territorial welfare has mainly aimed at 
demonstrating that, in many post-industrial democracies, there is increasing cross-
regional (quantitative and qualitative) variation in the elaboration and 
implementation of social policies (Fargion, 1997; Ferrera 2005; Greer, 2009; Costa-
Font and Greer, 2013). At the same time, a theoretical understanding of the political 
dynamics that favour the emergence of region-specific welfare models, which in turn 
determine the territorial fragmentation of ‘social citizenship’, has not yet been fully 
developed3. For instance, one aspect that has not been sufficiently considered by the 
literature is the impact that the mobilisation of different political cleavages, 
particularly the centre-periphery and left-right cleavages, has had on the development of 
sub-state systems of social protection. Indeed, besides socio-economic and 
                                                          
3
 One exception is the book on the territorial politics of health policy in the UK by Greer (2004).  
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demographic characteristics of regions, differences in their political spectrums may also 
explain why, in a context of decentralisation, some regions are more active and 
successful than others in their promotion of strong models of welfare. In order to 
address these questions, the next sections provide some theoretical insights on the 
relationship between sub-national social policy and two important aspects of party 
politics, namely territorial and left-wing mobilisations. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
As mentioned above, the general aim of this research is to understand 
whether and why, in decentralised countries, some regions are more successful than 
others in establishing sub-national or sub-state4 models of welfare that may 
complement, compete and even aspire to replace the national one. I call them strong 
models of regional welfare. Thus, contrary to the idea of a ‘race to the bottom’ 
(Cameron, 1978; Mishra 1999) that has also inspired neoliberal supporters of 
decentralisation, I expect to see substantial variation in the level of welfare 
development across the regions of a decentralised country. Indeed, whereas some 
regions may become real promoters of welfare (re)building (Moreno, 2011), others 
may be totally unable to play this role. As underlined by Keating (2013: 153), 
‘rescaling and regional devolution have encouraged varied forms of adaptation to 
global and European economic and social trends, mediated by politics and 
institutions and often marked by a historic path dependence’ (italics added).  
The main questions that will be addressed in the following chapters focus on 
the impact of two political factors on the emergence of region-specific welfare systems. 
                                                          
4
 The terms sub-state and sub-national are used interchangeably in this study and in territorial literature in 
general. However, the use of the term ‘sub-state’ is preferable since it has a more institutional connotation and 
refers to arenas of policy making that, spatially, are below the institutional level occupied by the traditional 
nation-state. The term sub-national may be more ambiguous since the concept of nationality may also refer to 




The first factor is the mobilisation of the centre-periphery cleavage through the creation 
and electoral consolidation of regionalist parties, which may use social policy to 
strengthen regional distinctiveness. So far, only Béland and Lecours (2008) have 
systematically focused on the link between territorial mobilisation and sub-state 
welfare development. However, their qualitative study is limited to three regional 
cases (Flanders, Quebec, and Scotland) and, with the exception of the British case, 
they refer mainly to secessionist mobilisation in multi-ethnic countries which are 
split into two national groups (e.g. in Canada and Belgium). Therefore, the inclusion 
of a larger number of regional cases in different countries may broaden the scope of 
research on the interaction between regionalist mobilisation, decentralisation and 
social policy.    
The second factor is the role played by centre-left political parties as promoters 
of welfare building in the regional arena. A new ‘territorial’ perspective is therefore 
added to well-established power resource theories, which have linked welfare 
expansion and resilience to the strength of the Left but have mainly focused on the 
national level.  
Of course, the centre-periphery and left-right cleavages are not mutually 
exclusive and in fact they can be two intersecting dimensions of party competition at 
the sub-state level. Indeed, as highlighted by Greer (2004: 9), voters and parties in 
many regions with strong identities ‘will align themselves in two-dimensional space 
along not just left-right axes but also according to their view of the appropriate 
relationship between their people and the central state’.  
Before presenting the main hypotheses of this research it is important to 
provide a clear definition and operationalisation of regional welfare development. 






The dependent variable: development of regional welfare system 
The dependent variable of this study is the level of development of a welfare system at the 
sub-state level. Highly developed models of sub-state welfare can be detected when 
regional institutions and actors play a central role in the elaboration and 
implementation of well-functioning social programmes.  
Political economists often use aggregate spending figures as indicators of 
welfare effort (Swank, 2002). One could therefore argue that the more a regional 
government spends on health care, social assistance, employment policies and 
education etc., the stronger is the role it plays as provider of social protection. Of 
course, spending represents an important aspect of the government’s degree of 
activism in a specific policy sector. Indeed, as underlined by Costa-Font and Greer 
(2013: 17) ‘no money equates to no policy’. However, it is not sufficient to know how 
much a government spends if we want to explain the development of policies, such 
as health care and important sectors of social assistance, which are increasingly 
service-oriented (Hemerjick, 2013) and not just based on cash benefits. Indeed, it 
would be equally important to know to what extent regional governments try to plan 
services in an integrated way and promote their innovation through extensive 
legislation. For instance, talking about health care services, Rothgang (2010: 11) 
underlines that financing can be regarded as a ‘basic function’ of the system but 
‘regulation’ is also very important because it is used by public institutions to mediate 
between ‘funding agencies, service providers and (potential) beneficiaries’.  
Both spending and legislation/regulation can be seen as the ‘input’ side of the 
system of welfare governance. In order to have a full picture, however, one should 
also consider the ‘output’ side, that is, the level of effective implementation and coverage 
of social schemes once they have been established (Pavolini, 2008). For example, in 
their assessment of the role played by territorial levels in the governance of social 
policies, Barberis et al. (2010: 373) consider three areas of responsibility: 
planning/programming, financing and administering/managing/delivering. Again, this 
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latter factor is clearly more important in the case of social services than in the case of 
cash benefits. Since regions provide social protection mainly in the form of service-
oriented programmes (Fargion, 1997; Ferrera, 2005; Kazepov, 2010), it is crucial to 
include this aspect in our definition. 
To sum up, we have a highly developed model of welfare at the regional level 
when sub-national institutions simultaneously play an important and active role in 1) 
financing and 2) planning social programmes (input) and when 3) these social 
programmes are effectively implemented and administered (output). All these three 
aspects should coexist in order to consider regions as real centres of welfare 
development. High spending alone does not make a regional welfare system ‘strong’ 
unless it is combined with extensive local planning and the effective implementation 
of social services. At the same time, focusing on the adequate functioning of social 
services to detect the existence of region-specific models of welfare does not make a 
lot of sense if the financial and legislative or regulatory input of sub-national political 
actors is null or very weak. Indeed, even the provision of ‘nationalised’ services may 
vary from place to place, although this is not necessarily the result of active efforts to 
build region-specific welfare models but may just reflect geographical, demographic 
and socio-economic differences across regions (Powell, 2009). Lastly, extensive social 
legislation can be considered as an indicator of regional welfare development only 
when it is supported by concrete actions of regional governments (i.e. spending or 
some kind of financial control) and results in social services that are effectively 
implemented. Therefore rather than adding the three factors, it would be more 
correct to multiply them since all three are considered essential for detecting a strong 
model of welfare and, therefore, need to coexist. This approach is suggested by 
Goerz (2006: 95–127), who underlines the importance of ‘concept-measure 
consistency’. The resulting formula would therefore be: 
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Development of regional welfare= (spending*planning/legislation*effective 
implementation)5 
This multiplicative formula ‘rewards’ those regions that score consistently high on all 
three dimensions and ‘punishes’ those with low or inconsistent scores.  
Before moving to the next section focusing on the two main political factors 
that might explain cross-regional variation in the level of welfare development, it 
should be underlined that the formula presented above does not tell us anything 
about qualitative differences that may exist across equally developed models of sub-
state welfare. At the same time, the analysis of such qualitative differences, which are 
briefly discussed at the end of this chapter, is possible only for those regions where 
social governance has developed to such a level that its characteristics are sufficiently 
recognisable. Indeed, does it make sense to study the characteristics of the welfare 
model of a region where sub-state institutions and political actors have no (or 
insufficient) control on legislation and financial resources or they fail (or are 
unwilling) to effectively implement and administer social services (i.e. they need the 
constant support of central authorities)? In this case, can we actually talk about a sub-
state welfare model in the first place? Therefore, a quantitative assessment (based on the 
three-dimensional index presented above) is a prerequisite for any qualitative analysis 
that aims to describe and compare highly developed and recognisable models of welfare at the 





                                                          
5
 In the country-specific chapters I go into more detail about the indicators used to assess the level of 
development of each dimension. Here it should be said that, since I am interested in ‘within-country’ variation 
in the level of development of regional welfare, I will use homogeneous indicators across the regions of the 
same country. This, however, does not mean that I will use exactly the same indicators cross-nationally (see 
also p. 157, when I talk of indicators for Spanish Autonomous Communities).  
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The impact of territorial mobilisation on the level of sub-state welfare development 
The literature on multi-level party politics has paid increasing attention to the 
emergence of regionalist political parties (De Winter and Türstan 1998). Such parties 
are often seen as the expression of ‘sub-state nationalism’ highlighting the ethnic or 
civic (but also socio-economic) diversity of a ‘peripheral’ region (Keating, 2001) and 
challenging the main statewide parties (Hino, 2012: 60). This type of political 
mobilisation is linked to the ‘centre-periphery’ cleavage, which has been defined by 
Lipset and Rokkan as: 
 
[L]ocal oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national 
elites and their bureaucracies: the typical reactions of peripheral regions, linguistic 
minorities, and culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the 
centralizing, standardizing, and ‘rationalizing’ machinery of the nation-state. 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 14) 
 
In the already mentioned paper by Alber (1995: 146), it is argued that in a context of 
increasingly service-oriented welfare systems,  
 
the centre-periphery relations between various levels of government become a 
crucial dimension of social service policies, because state interests in fiscal 
solvency collide with the growing demand for services among the population. 
 
The author explicitly refers to the Rokkan-Lipset scheme as a useful one for 
understanding tha political dynamics affecting welfare development in more recent 
years. Yet he does not explicitly mention regionalist and territorial parties as 
important political actors in this theoretical framework.  
By focusing on the centre-periphery cleavage, regionalist parties are likely to 
challenge welfare centralism and promote a system of social protection that is more 
distinctive and linked to the needs of local communities. As underlined by Béland 
and Lecours (2008), regional social policy may be used to foster sub-state solidarities 
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and identities that in turn reinforce the centre-periphery cleavage. This may also 
occur through the creation of regional ‘developmental coalitions’, which Keating 
(1997: 32–34) defines as ‘place-based inter-class coalitions of political, economic and 
social actors devoted to the economic development in a specific location’. Thus the 
political mobilisation of regional identities may have a positive impact on the 
development of region-specific economic and social policies in decentralised systems. 
On the contrary, in those regions dominated by statewide parties the construction of 
sub-state networks of solidarity is not a salient issue, since such networks may 
undermine the territorial integrity of the nation-state. One may therefore hypothesise 
that:  
 
H1. In a decentralised country, the political mobilisation of regional identities (generally 
defined as territorial or regionalist mobilisation) has a positive impact on the construction of a 
regional model of welfare. 
 
However, territorial mobilisation does not just have a direct effect on the 
development of regional welfare systems but it may also have an indirect impact 
through the promotion of asymmetries in the formal autonomy of regional 
institutions (Henders, 2010). Indeed, regionalist parties may demand and obtain 
more powers for the region that they represent and this may in turn result in 
important differences in de jure self-ruling authority across regions belonging to the 
same country. This means that due to the existence of politically mobilised territorial 
identities, some regions may rely on more extensive fiscal and/or decision-making 
autonomy than others and may therefore be in a more privileged position when 




H2. In decentralised countries, regionalist mobilisation may have an indirect positive impact 
on the development of regional welfare systems through the promotion and establishment of 
asymmetries in the formal autonomy of regional institutions.  
 
Of course, regionalist movements may obtain special powers for their regions only in 
countries where constitutional arrangements concerning the autonomy of sub-
national authorities are flexible and regional political elites may directly engage in 
bilateral bargaining with the central government (Requejo and Nagel, 2010). In the 
absence of this ‘constitutional flexibility’, the intervening effect of formal institutional 
asymmetries is irrelevant and what really matters is the fact that regionalist parties 
may ‘use standard self-governing authority in distinctive ways’ (Henders, 2010: 13). 
In this latter case, de facto, rather than de jure, territorial asymmetries can emerge and 
regionalist mobilisation has a more direct effect on the development of region-specific 
social policies. Therefore: 
 
H3. The indirect effect presented in H2 is more important in countries with flexible 
constitutional arrangements where de jure institutional asymmetries are more likely to result 
from different levels of territorial mobilisation across the regions. On the contrary, the direct 
effect presented in H1 is more visible in ‘constitutionally rigid’ systems where regionalist 
parties cannot obtain special institutional autonomy to advance their project but have to use 
standard institutional tools in a distinctive and ‘creative’ way.  
 
Figure 1.1 shows the causal mechanisms illustrated in this section and summarises 
the three hypotheses regarding the impact of regionalist mobilisation on the 
construction of regional welfare systems. The H1 arrow represents the direct effect of 
regional mobilisation whereas H2 represents the indirect effect through the 
establishment of de jure asymmetries. Finally H3 shows that the relevance of H1 and 
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Figure 1.1 Summary of the hypotheses about the impact of regionalist mobilisation 
















To be sure, the territorial cleavage is often combined with left-right party 
competition, which is analysed in the next section. Thus territorial movements may 
have a more progressive or conservative political position or establish alliances with 
left-wing or right-wing parties (Massetti 2011). However, in this study I aim to show 
that regardless of their position on the left-right axis and on the level of left-wing mobilisation 
in their regions, territorial parties will actively promote welfare development at the sub-state 
level. At the same time, it should be underlined that, whereas left-right politics does 
not seem to influence the effect of territorial mobilisation on the level of sub-state 
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welfare development (quantitative differences in the level of spending, legislation 
and effective implementation of social schemes), it may affect the types of social 
model promoted by territorial parties (qualitative differences in the structure of 
welfare governance). This is why in the last section of this chapter I stress the 
importance of combining quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
Lastly, as an addition to the hypotheses presented in this section, it should be 
noted that the emergence of politically organised territorial movements may also 
have an influence on the preferences and actions of the regional branches of 
‘statewide’ parties that were not primarily created on the basis of the centre-
periphery cleavage. This is even more evident in a context in which statewide 
political parties are increasingly characterised by ‘stratarchical’ organisational 
structures (Carty, 2004; Katz and Mair, 2009). The ‘territorialisation’ and 
‘stratarchization’ of statewide parties has a number of dimensions. These include the 
adoption of stronger territorial party identities and rhetoric, calls for greater 
organisational and programmatic differentiation from the centre, and the 
development of alternative constitutional goals. In territorialising party 
organisations, power and authority no longer rest in one single place, but rather 
different organisational units within parties possess different powers and 
autonomous functions (Hepburn, 2010). The literature has also underlined more 
systemic transformations that go beyond the organisation of statewide parties and 
refer to the regionalisation of party systems and to the increasingly multi-level 
character of party competition (Hough and Jeffery 2006; Swenden and Maddens 







The Left and the challenge of regionalism: a new arena of welfare development? 
Competition between left- and right-wing parties, which Lipset (1983: 230) defines as 
the ‘democratic translation of the class struggle’, has long been considered the most 
important determinant of policy outcomes in democratic regimes. The ‘power-
resource’ literature has linked the development of welfare systems to the strength of 
left-wing (especially social-democratic) parties (Hicks and Swank 1984; Esping-
Andersen 1984; Korpi 1989; Garrett 1998). According to this literature, even when 
conservative governments have established new social schemes, they have done so 
mainly in reaction to the increasing mobilisation of centre-left parties. Indeed, as 
underlined by Korpi and Palme (2003: 429), ‘it is difficult to find evidence for major 
social policy reforms where business interests [and parties close to them] have been 
the main originators and protagonists’. 
More recent literature has also tried to study the impact of left-right politics on 
‘new social policies’ (i.e. activation and needs-based social policies’). For instance, 
Häusermann (2012) has shown that the Left, particularly ‘new left’ parties, may 
support the expansion of ‘activating’ social services and, at the same time, oppose the 
retrenchment of old welfare schemes, whereas conservative and Christian 
democratic parties tend to favour retrenchment of both old and new social policies. If 
we stick to the traditional left-right dichotomy, the priority in regions ruled by 
centre-right parties should not be the construction of a highly developed and 
extensive system of social services but the creation of a pro-business environment 
through cuts in taxation and, consequently, in public spending. This can be obtained 
by reducing the scope of social protection to residual, means-tested programmes6. 
                                                          
6
 It should be mentioned that a recently published book by Jensen (2014) has argued against the conventional 
wisdom that centre-right parties have been nothing but the welfare-sceptical flip-side of the Left. According to 
the author, the policy goals of centre-right parties - and the political means by which they pursue them - are a 
lot less straightforward than simply "pro" or "con" the welfare state. This does not necessarily go against the 
findings of this study, which analyses the challenges faced by centre-left parties in decentralized systems but 
also accounts for the existence of centre-right regionalist parties. In fact this study goes beyond the 
unidimensional idea of left-right party competition but tries to combine it to the centre-periphery cleavage.  
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Welfare literature has underlined that Christian democratic parties are different from 
the conservative right and have in fact promoted welfare expansion, although in a 
less generous and more fragmented way than centre-left parties. Yet, it has also been 
noted that Christian democratic parties have paid more attention to the 
establishment of transfer benefits conditional on previous employment and income 
(Huber and Stephens, 2001: 42) than to the development of social services, which, as 
already stated, are particularly important at the regional level.  
 Generally, following the approach employed by power resource theories, 
because of their electoral constituencies, parties that are located on the centre-left are 
expected to pay more attention to welfare-related policies than other parties 
positioned on the centre or centre-right of the political spectrum. The former may 
therefore also be more active in the promotion of sub-national social programmes. 
The literature on regionalism and decentralisation has also underlined the fact that 
social democratic parties may try to set out a new level of welfare provision at the 
regional level that complements national welfare systems (Keating, 2007; Greer, 
2010). Additionally, in his qualitative analysis of social and education policies in the 
German Länder, Ed Turner (2011) underlines that the political orientation of 
governments on the left-right continuum may make a difference at the sub-national 
level. One may therefore expect that: 
 
H4. Regions in which centre-left parties are politically stronger will have a more developed 
system of welfare.  
 
However, territorial aspects, so far neglected by the power-resource literature, 
should be added to this general hypothesis. Generally, social democratic and left-
wing parties emerged in the context of an increasing ‘nationalisation’ and ‘de-
territorialisation’ of politics at the beginning of the 20th century (Caramani, 2004), 
when regional differences were ironed out by strengthening cross-territorial 
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networks of social solidarity based on class identity (Bartolini, 2005: 250—251). 
According to Przeworski (1985: 28), the class-based appeal of social-democratic 
parties was substantially weakened by, or even incompatible with, sub-state regional 
identities. Processes of political centralisation, state consolidation and nation 
building were important preconditions for the emergence and structuring of the class 
cleavage (Bartolini, 2000: 548–554). Therefore, one could argue that in a reverse 
process of territorial fragmentation like the one that has occurred in some European 
countries over the last decades, a social democratic dilemma may have emerged. 
Indeed, Keating (2004) has underlined that the relationship between socialism and 
territoriality may be full of contradictions. He argues that social democratic parties 
face:  
 
[T]he challenge of reconciling class, ideology and territorial demands […]. This is 
the dilemma of contemporary social democracy, founded as it is on a modern, 
integrated welfare state, that it can no longer take for granted. Yet breaking with 
the paradigm of the nation-state has proved difficult everywhere. (Keating, 2004: 
233) 
 
In this study I argue that the effect that left-wing mobilisation has on the construction 
of region-specific welfare systems, strongly depends on the role that left-wing parties 
play in policy making at the central state level. As underlined by Swenden and 
Maddens (2009: 22-23) regional branches of a statewide party will have fewer 
opportunities to unilaterally promote and implement autonomous policies if the 
central party leadership controls the national government. This seems to be 
particularly valid in the case of centre-left parties when elaborating and 
implementing social policies. Indeed, when core centre-left parties control the central 
government, they will focus more on the construction of statewide social 
programmes and will actually oppose excessive differentiation in the levels of 
development of regional welfare systems that risk undermining cross-territorial 
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solidarity. Thus they will act as a centralising and standardising political force 
(Bogdanor, 2007). On the other hand, when centre-left political forces are constantly 
excluded from (or play a marginal role in) central government, they will regard 
regions as important arenas of welfare building and will therefore contribute to the 
construction of region-specific welfare systems. The following hypothesis may thus 
be formulated:  
 
H5. The impact of left-wing mobilisation on the level of regional welfare development will be 
conditional on the role that centre-left parties play in central government. This impact will be 
positive when left-wing parties are not able to control (or play a marginal role in) central 
government.  
 
Additionally, left-wing mobilisation may be ‘contaminated’ or challenged by 
territorial mobilisation (Alonso, 2012; Keating, 2004) and, as a result, it may become a 
source of regional welfare building regardless of the role that centre-left parties play 
in central government. Indeed, in some regions class and territorial politics may be 
closely linked and this may heavily influence the political preferences of regional 
party elites of centre-left parties. More generally:  
 
H6. Left-wing mobilisation will have a positive impact on the construction of regional welfare 
systems in those regions where it is combined with or challenged by regionalist mobilisation. 
 
The positive impact of centre-left mobilisation on regional social governance may 
therefore be less consistent than expected by power-resource theories, which, in any 
case, have seldom adopted a multi-level approach to the study of welfare 
governance. As shown in Figure 1.2, one has to consider the mediating impact of 
variables concerning the role of centre-left parties in national decision making (H5) 
and their relationship with regionalist mobilisation (H6). 
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Figure 1.2. Summary of the hypotheses about the impact of left-wing mobilisation on 












Other region-specific control variables that may affect sub-national welfare 
building 
After having presented the main hypotheses of this study, I now turn to some 
background variables that should also be taken into account when explaining cross-
regional variation in the development of regional welfare models. 
First of all, I include a variable that considers the level of economic 
development of regions. This may have had an effect on their ability to finance and 
independently administer social programmes. Indeed, economic inequality may 
become an even more important source of regional differentiation in a decentralised 
context in which the central government does not play a strong role in promoting 
equal standards of social protection (Costa-Font and Greer, 2013: 26). Beramendi 
(2012) has even argued that decentralisation may actually be endogenous to 
economic inequality and may become an institutional mechanism perpetuating and 
reinforcing pre-existing territorial differences in the level of wealth. On the other 
hand, other authors have argued that decentralisation is not detrimental to economic 
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cohesion and is disconnected from the evolution of regional disparities in high 
income countries (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010). 
It should also be added that, as underlined by Putnam (1993), economic 
development is strongly correlated with levels of ‘social capital’. Yet the debate on 
how these two variables are causally linked is not relevant for my argument. It is 
sufficient to know that they are very likely to coexist and have a combined positive 
effect on the development of effective systems of social protection at the regional 
level. 
Ageing, considered as an indicator of demographic vulnerability, may be another 
factor explaining the variations in the attention that sub-national administrations 
devote to social policies. Indeed, as underlined by Fésüs et al (2008: 3), this factor will 
lead to significant increases in public expenditure and will require more planning in 
the fields of health and long-term care. Moreover, ageing will require the 
development of an extended set of employment-related policies. Indeed, ‘policies to 
foster human capital by supporting lifelong learning should accompany labour 
market policies, taxes, benefit systems and pension schemes’ (Ibid.). In sum, ageing is 
a central element of the ‘demand’ for the creation of a welfare support network, as 
also argued by Lucchini et al. (2009).  
Welfare literature has also considered women’s labour force participation as 
an important factor of welfare development. As underlined by Huber and Stephens 
(2001: 47) ‘increasing women’s labour force participation can be expected to generate 
… pressures for an expansion of welfare state services’. In her book on social 
assistance policies in Italy, Madama (2010: 201–202) also mentions female 
employment rates as a ‘functional pressure’ on the welfare state, favouring the 
development of social assistance services, child care in particular. 
Finally, regions may differ quite substantially in terms of population size. For 
instance, the Spanish Autonomous Communities range from the 300,000 inhabitants 
of La Rioja to the more than 8 million inhabitants of Andalusia. In Italy, the 
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population of Lombardy is almost 100 times as large as the population of the Aosta 
Valley. Such radical differences may play a role in explaining cross-regional variation 
in welfare development. It may be hypothesised that it is easier for small regions to 
allocate public money, distribute resources and respond more quickly to the needs of 
the local population. On the other hand, governments of highly populated regions 
have to deal with problems of economic and territorial differentiation at the sub-
regional level, which may slow down the elaboration and implementation of policies, 
and their action is often mediated (or even challenged) by other sub-regional actors 
(e.g. provinces, associations of municipalities). Moreover, it is easier to monitor the 
collection of taxes in a smaller region than in a larger one and this may result in a 
greater availability of resources to spend. Yet, Newton (1982) has argued against the 
idea that ‘small is beautiful’ and he has shown that larger sub-national 
administrations may be better at providing extensive services and promoting real 
redistribution. Moreover, small regions may be subject to policy ‘externalities’ and 
‘spillover effects’ coming from larger regions (Keating 2012) and, therefore, they may 
be forced to adapt to policy changes imposed by ‘stronger’ external actors. Therefore, 
there are various and contrasting theories arguing that size matters and such theories 
should be taken into account in a multivariate model.  
Figure 1.3 summarises the theoretical framework of this study by including 









Figure 1.3. When regions become arenas of welfare building: summarising the 

















Another contextual variable, which should be taken into account, is the existence of 
policy/institutional (but also cultural) legacies and their influence on new policies. 
The concept of path-dependence is central in ‘historical institutionalist’ analyses of 
policy and institutional development (Thelen, 1999) and, of course, one may also 
apply this concept to the study of the emergence and evolution of region-specific 
welfare systems. Quantitative data for the regions considered in this study (see next 
section for case selection) are not available at this stage and, more generally, the 
operationalization and measurement of region-specific policy and cultural legacies is 
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cross-country comparisons. Yet qualitative, in-depth analyses of some regional cases 
may shed some light on how pre-existing institutions, policies, traditions influence 
the emergence of specific constellations of political and social actors that, in turn, 
shape the evolution regional social policy. Additionally, by summarising the findings 
of the empirical chapters, a section of the concluding chapter (Ch. 11) considers in 
more detail the impact of different legacies on the process of regional welfare 
development7.  
 
Case selection  
 
In order to assess the impact of territorial and left-wing mobilisations on sub-national 
welfare policies, I focus on the regions of three countries, Italy, Spain and Great 
Britain, which share some important characteristics but are different in relation to 
some of the hypotheses presented above. The focus on Great Britain rather than the 
United Kingdom as a whole is explained by the fact that I decided to exclude 
Northern Ireland from my analysis. Indeed, this region is very peculiar and, as 
underlined by Trench (2007: 10), this ‘creates problems’ when studying devolution. It 
is an internally divided political entity in which two territorial movements, each 
representing roughly 50 per cent of the population, have fought against each other 
for decades. Moreover, until very recently, its status has been the object of 
international disputes and agreements (between the Republic of Ireland and Great 
Britain), which have only been partly linked to the devolution process (Barton and 
Roche, 2009). Finally, the Assembly of Northern Ireland, re-established in 1999, was 
again suspended between 2002 and 2007 due to persisting party conflicts (Trench, 
2007: 10).  
                                                          
7
 This section also provides a quantitative analysis of the effect of policy legacy on regional welfare 
development is provided in chapter eleven.  
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In this research I combine two levels of comparison. The first one is across the 
regions of each country whereas the second one is across the three countries. This 
two-level comparison makes it possible to explain how the ‘welfare effect’ of region-
specific political dynamics changes depending on country-specific political and 
institutional factors.  
The policy areas on which this study mainly focuses are health care and social 
assistance, although other areas such as education and labour market policies are 
occasionally considered. The choice of health care and social assistance policies is 
justified by the fact that these two sectors are increasingly inter-linked and, in recent 
years, have become the object of ‘integrated’ programmes that consider ‘well-being’ 
as a concept embracing many aspects of people’s lives (physical, mental, socio-
economic, cultural etc.). For instance, in his analysis of social policies in Italian 
regions, Pavolini (2008: 164) clearly shows that health care and social assistance 
policies belong to the same welfare dimension (politiche socio-sanitarie) and, therefore, 
can be studied within the same analytical framework. Moreover, they have been 
more substantially affected by territorial dynamics (Ferrera, 2005; Costa-Font and 
Greer, 2013).   
 
Similarities 
Spain and Italy are very similar in terms of welfare legacy. Indeed both countries 
have been classified as Southern European welfare systems. As underlined by 
Ferrera (1996: 17), the main characteristics of this type of national welfare regime are 
a ‘highly fragmented and corporatist income maintenance system’, ‘a low degree of 
state penetration of the welfare sphere’ and the persistence of ‘clientelism’ and 
‘patronage’. On the other hand, Great Britain has been considered as a ‘liberal’ 
welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, with respect to health care 
governance, which is the core welfare sector considered in this study, all the three 
countries display very similar characteristics. Indeed, they have established National 
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Health Systems (NHS) that are mainly financed through taxation (Ferrera, 1996; 
Costa-Font and Greer, 2013). This makes the regional dimension quite important in 
these countries since, as argued by Maino and Pavolini (2008), taxation-based 
systems have been more subject to territorial restructuring than insurance-based 
systems, such as Germany and France. Also Costa-Font and Greer (2013: 5—6) 
explain that: 
 
National Health Service systems in decentralized countries, such as Italy, 
Spain, Norway, and the UK, tend to be decentralized to the major level of 
local or regional government (e.g. regional in Italy, Spain and the UK, or 
local government in Scandinavia). In social insurance systems, whether 
centralized or decentralized, the health finance system and the 
organization of health care are separated from regional governments, as in 
France where the state’s use of regional health agencies is quite separate 
from elected regional governments, or in federal Germany, whose 
constitutional court went so far as to declare the logic of territory alien to 
the logic of social insurance. 
 
Additionally, in the three selected countries regions have become important arenas 
of policy making only in the last three decades. Italy, Spain and Great Britain have 
shifted from a highly centralised system of government to a relatively decentralised 
one. Moreover, regional institutions have been mainly strengthened in terms of self-
rule, that is, in their ability to elaborate and implement region specific policies. On 
the contrary, their participation in the policy-making process at the central level 
(shared-rule) has remained very weak. The Regional Authority Index (RAI) elaborated 
by Hooghe et al. (2010) clearly shows this trend. By considering policy making, 
administrative and fiscal autonomy of the regions, the authors calculate self rule on a 
scale ranging from 0 to 15 and shared rule on a scale ranging from 0 to 9. Table 1.1 
compares the self-rule and shared-rule of Italy, Spain and Scotland/Wales with the 
average of the other European countries over the period from 1960 to 2010. I 
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considered only the largest regional units in countries with more than one regional 
layer. It can be noted that in recent decades the level of self-rule of the regions of the 
countries analysed in this study has increased substantially and at faster rates than in 
the rest of Europe. Whereas in the 1960s Spain, Italy and Great Britain were still 
among the most centralised European countries, today their regions enjoy higher 
levels of self-rule than many other regions in Europe. On the other hand, the level of 
shared-rule has remained rather stable at very low values.  
Furthermore, in Scandinavian countries and continental countries like France, 
processes of decentralisation have mainly resulted in the strengthening of lower-level 
authorities such as municipalities and departments (Barberis et al., 2010: 379). Unlike 
Spanish and Italian regions or British devolved governments, these political entities 
are too small to aspire to compete with the central government in the policy making 
process and lack the resources to build a distinctive model of social protection. 
Moreover, in a context of multiple and fragmented levels of local autonomy, which 
compete against each other, like the French one (Cole and John, 2007), it has been 
easier for central authorities to control and constrain the actions of territorial actors. 
Central control over local and regional authorities has also been facilitated by the 
phenomenon of the cumul des mandats, that is, the practice among French national 
politicians of holding multiple offices at different levels of government.  
 
Table 1.1. The rise of regional ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared-rule’ in Italy, Spain and Great Britain 
compared to the rest of Europe (most powerful regional level considered) 
 Self-Rule 
(ranging from 0 to 15) 
Shared-Rule 
(ranging from 0 to 9) 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Italy 2.5 6.8 8.3 9.6 12.8 0.6 0.6 1.6 1.6 2.1 
Spain 0 0.1 9.8 12.5 13.1 0 0.02 1.2 1.5 1.5 




5 6.1 6.9 8.5 9.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 




If we consider the two dimensions ‘shared rule’ and ‘self rule’ we can detect 
four types of institutional arrangements that regulate the relationship between the 
centre and the regions. These four arrangements are summarised in Table 1.2, which 
also provides an interpretation of Figure 1.4. When self-rule is high but shared rule is 
low we have a ‘competitive’ regionalised system, in which regions enjoy high 
autonomy but are not encouraged to cooperate and coordinate at the central level. If 
both self-rule and shared-rule are high we have a ‘classic’ federal system in which 
regions are very powerful but at the same time are encouraged to bargain and 
coordinate in decision-making arenas that are supervised by the central government. 
When, on the other hand, both self-rule and shared-rule are low or totally absent, we 
can talk about a ‘unitary system’. Finally, low self-rule and high shared-rule is typical 
of highly integrated (or centralised) federal systems.  
Figure 1.4 compares medium-sized and large countries and shows that Italy, 
Spain and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain have evolved in the direction of 
‘competitive regionalism’. Therefore, they are different from classic federations such 
as Germany and Austria, unitary systems like France and centralised federal systems 














Table 1.2. Types of institutional arrangements regulating relations between centre 
and regions (interpretation of Figure 1.4).  
High self -rule  Competitive Regionalised system Classic or ‘cooperative’ federal 
system  
Low self-rule  Unitary state  Centralised or integrated federal 
system  
 Low shared-rule  High shared-rule  
 
 
Figure 1.4. Locating Spain, Italy and Great Britain on the two-dimensional map 






























Finally, territorial and left-wing mobilisations have been important in all the three 
cases. Indeed, in Spain, Italy and Great Britain we can find old and new regionalist 
parties that since 1980 have won on average more than 10 per cent of the vote within 
their territorial constituencies. At the same time, in each country the Left has been 
dominated by a large statewide party (controlling more than 50 per cent of the left-
wing vote) that has also competed in the regional arena. To be sure, the strength of 
regionalist and left wing parties varies substantially across the regions of each case 
and, thanks to this variation, it will be possible to test the hypotheses presented in 
this study.   
 
Differences 
Having outlined the similarities existing across the three countries, I now 
consider some differences that, as expected by H3, H5 and H6, might affect the way 
regionalist and left-wing parties promote sub-national welfare building. Although 
Italy, Spain and Great Britain all show asymmetries in the formal powers delegated 
to the regions (Keating, 1998), they differ quite substantially in the way such 
asymmetries have been established.  
Italy has a rather rigid system of territorial asymmetry that divides regions 
into two broad categories: ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ status regions. This distinction was 
established in the post-war period and has only started to change in the late 1990s, 
when a process of ‘re-symmetrization’ started (Amoretti, 2011). More generally, the 
asymmetry in regional authority has not been decided on the basis of different, and 
changing, demands for political autonomy coming from individual regions, but, 
rather, has been mainly determined by central authorities on the basis of ‘geo-
political’ considerations after the Second World War. Indeed among the regions with 
special autonomy we can find regions such as South Tyrol and the Aosta Valley, 
where territorial mobilisation has traditionally been very high, a region like Sardinia, 
where regionalist parties have been relatively weak, and a region like Sicily, where 
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they were almost completely absent until the late 2000s (Sberna, 2013). Other ‘special 
status’ regions, such as Friuli Venetia Giulia and Trento, were assigned special status 
well before they experienced the emergence of electorally relevant territorial 
movements. On the other hand, among the ‘ordinary status’ regions we find 
Lombardy and the Veneto, where the salience of the centre-periphery cleavage has 
substantially strengthened in the last decades, and other regions, mostly central and 
southern regions, where it is completely absent. In sum, given the rigidity of the 
system, regional political elites have not played an important role in the 
establishment of institutional asymmetries, which, as a consequence, do not clearly 
reflect different levels of territorial mobilisation. 
In Spain the situation is quite different, since the powers of the Autonomous 
Communities (AC or AACC) are not clearly defined by the constitution and regions 
have the right to determine their autonomy in a bilateral bargaining process with the 
central government (Henders, 2010). This model has been defined as flexible and 
dynamic, since it is based on the willingness of individual regions to demand higher 
levels of autonomy (Morata, 2001). At the same time, central authorities have tried to 
balance regionalist demands by also establishing and empowering regional 
institutions where regional identities are weak or absent. Moreover the Spanish 
government has often opposed radical demands for further fiscal and decision-
making autonomy advanced by territorially mobilised AACC such as Catalonia and 
the Basque Country. Therefore, the Spanish system can be considered as moderately 
flexible. It allows for the existence of some formal asymmetries in regional authority 
that depend on the intensity of territorial mobilisation but, at the same time, it tries to 
limit and counter-balance any demands for autonomy that are deemed too radical. 
Finally, in Great Britain, asymmetries have had very strong links to territorial 
demands for self-government, at least since the late 1990s. Indeed, democratically 
elected regional governments have been established only where regionalist and sub-
state nationalist movements have been traditionally strong, that is, in Scotland and 
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Wales. Additionally, regional authorities of Scotland enjoy more powers than those 
of Wales because the strength of territorial mobilisation has been higher in the former 
region than in the latter. On the other hand, attempts to establish regions in England, 
where territorial cleavages are almost completely absent, have not succeeded 
(Keating, 2009).  
These differences can be useful to understand if, as illustrated in H3, varying 
institutional contexts in which territorial movements emerge and compete are likely 
to change the way such movements favour the construction of regional welfare 
systems. The general expectation is that in Italy regionalist parties have mainly had a 
direct effect on welfare development since they have not been able to obtain special 
powers for individual regions through bilateral bargaining with central authorities. 
Therefore they might have promoted region-specific social models by using standard 
regional authority in a ‘creative’ way. On the other hand, regionalist movements in 
Spain and, even more so, in Great Britain might have also had an indirect positive 
effect on sub-national welfare development by contributing to the establishment of 
formal institutional asymmetries. 
The second important difference across the three countries is the role that 
mainstream centre-left parties have played in central government and their 
relationship with regionalist movements. In Italy, the largest party of the Left did not 
control the central government for most of the post-war period. Between 1948 and 
2013, the Left has been the main governmental force for only seven years (from 1996 
to 2001 and from 2006 to 2008). On the other hand, it has been the dominant political 
actor in some regions (particularly in Emilia Romagna and Tuscany) where territorial 
mobilisation has been absent or relatively weak.  
In Spain, the largest centre-left party, the Socialist Party (PSOE), has controlled 
the government for more than 20 years since 1980. The relationship between 
regionalist and left-wing mobilisations has been generally rather weak and, despite 
the existence of small, left-wing regionalist parties in Catalonia, Galicia and the 
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Basque Country, the Left has obtained better results in those regions in which 
territorial mobilisation has been relatively weak (e.g. Andalusia, Castile La Mancha, 
Extremadura).  
Finally in Great Britain, the Labour Party has been the dominant party in 
central government for most of the post-devolution period (from 1997 to 2010). 
However, left-wing mobilisation has been strongly linked to territorial mobilisation 
in devolved Scotland and Wales, where the Labour party has had to compete with 
strong centre-left regionalist parties. At the same time, in other ‘regions’ of England, 
like the North-East, left-wing mobilisation has not been influenced by territorial 
issues.  
These differences in the ‘territoriality’ of left-wing strength are useful to test 
H5 and H6. I expect to find very different effects of left-wing mobilisation in the 
regions of Italy, Spain and Great Britain. In the former country, long-term exclusion 
from (or the marginal role played in) central government is expected to have made 
the Italian Left more sensitive to the construction of distinctive models of welfare at 
the regional level. This has occurred regardless of the existence of regionalist parties. 
In Spain, the opposite may have happened. By controlling central policy-making, the 
Spanish Left may not have played an active role in (or may even have opposed) the 
construction of region-specific welfare systems. Finally, the pressures coming from 
centre-left territorial movements in Wales and Scotland may have prompted local 
Labour leaders to support sub-state welfare development in these two regions even 
though the Party also controlled the central government. Table 1.3 summarises the 









Table 1.3. Summary of main characteristics of countries analysed in this study 
 Italy Spain Great Britain 





Health care System National Health care 
System (Taxation-
based) 
National Health care 
System (Taxation-
based) 




From centralised to 
decentralised (high 
‘self rule’, weak 
‘shared rule’) 
From centralised to 
decentralised (high 
‘self rule’, weak 
‘shared rule’) 
From centralised to 
decentralised (high ‘self 
rule’, weak ‘shared rule’) 
Territorial 
mobilisation (above 
10% of regional vote) 
Yes 
Main Parties: SVP, UV, 
Northern League 
Yes 
Main Parties: CiU, PNV, 
UPN, BNG, CC 
Yes 
Main Parties: SNP, PC 
Statewide centre-left 
parties controlling 













Rigid dual system 
(Ordinary vs Special 




Flexible system (since 
1997) reflecting different 
levels of territorial 
mobilisation 
Role of centre-left 
parties in central 
government (1980—
2010)  
Mainly in opposition 
(exception 1996—2001  
and 2006—2008) 
Mainly in government 
(exception 1996—
2004) 
In opposition before 
devolution (1979-1997). 





Absent Generally weak Strong in Scotland and 
(less so) in Wales. Absent 







Combining quantitative and qualitative analyses 
In the study of the Italian and Spanish cases I adopt what Lieberman (2005) defines 
as a ‘nested analysis’, combining both quantitative and qualitative methods. Since 
both countries have a relatively large number of regions it is possible to 
quantitatively assess the impact of territorial and left-wing mobilisations across the 
whole national territory. This can be done by collecting a large amount of data on 
regional social spending, legislation and implementation and assessing their 
correlation with region-specific political, socio-economic, institutional and 
demographic factors. After this preliminary and general analysis, one can then refer 
to a small number of relevant regional cases to gain a better understanding of causal 
mechanisms that cannot be quantitatively detected. This also implies a shift from a 
‘macro-’ to a ‘micro-’ model of analysis, which takes into account different 
interactions between relevant policy making actors (Kreppel 2002). The combination 
of both quantitative and qualitative methods is strongly encouraged in the study of 
social and political phenomena (Keohane, 2004: 44), as it is considered a good 
practice to maximise the validity of inferences. In the case of Great Britain, the focus 
is on Scotland, Wales and England and, therefore, I mainly rely on case study 
analysis. 
In addition, in-depth case study analysis may provide some additional 
information on qualitative differences that exist among equally strong models of 
regional welfare and cannot be detected by relying only on quantitative analysis. 
Indeed, so far I have focused on the existence of cross-regional differences in the level 
of welfare development. Yet it should be underlined that equally strong models of 
regional welfare, in which sub-state institutions and actors play a central role in 
financing, planning and implementing social services, may differ quite substantially 
in qualitative terms. For instance, one important difference in the type of governance 
can be found in the interaction between private and public actors in welfare 
provision. Public institutions may still regulate and finance social programmes but, 
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at the same time, they may delegate policy implementation to private actors. The 
result is a clear division of competences between (public) ‘regulator-financier’ and 
(private) ‘provider’. This horizontal subsidiarity is thought to increase competitiveness 
among welfare providers and, consequently, boost efficiency (Pavolini, 2008; Ciarini 
2012). Furthermore, there might be variation in the participation of social partners, 
such as trade unions and employers’ organisations, in welfare governance. Strong 
welfare models may also differ in the role played by municipalities and local 
authorities in planning and implementing social schemes.  
Lastly, differences across welfare systems may be detected by considering 
what kind of socio-political equilibrium each model ultimately promotes. The early 
welfare literature (Esping-Andersen, 1990) suggests that the welfare state is ‘an active 
force in the ordering of social relations’ (Ibid.: 23). Also, Birrell has argued that highly 
developed welfare models may be characterised by different principles of allocation 
(universalism vs selectivity) and different underpinning values (i.e. different visions of 
social justice and different emphasis on equality, collectivism and individualism). 
Thus it can be argued that region-specific ‘systems of social stratification’ may 
qualitatively vary depending on whether regional social programmes suffer from 
some ‘social bias’ and focus on particular sectors of society or promote a specific idea 
of social justice. For instance, individual citizens can be seen as customers, who are 
free to choose among competing welfare providers, or as beneficiaries of a universal 
and homogeneous system of social protection. Regional governments can also decide to 
invest resources in the development of social programmes that are tailored to the 
needs of specific socio-economic groups and/or actively support the role of traditional 
families as the keystone of social cohesion. At the same time, some social schemes 
may stigmatise or even exclude ‘marginal’ social groups (i.e. immigrants or 
linguistic/ethnic minorities).  
Variation in the type of welfare governance can be explained by the fact that 
political actors do not act in a ‘vacuum’ but, as underlined by Greer (2004), they are 
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part of a broader political and social system (‘policy community’), which may 
influence their preferences and decisions in the policy making process. For instance, 
in order to advance their project of region-building, territorial movements need to 
establish alliances with other political parties, social movements and interest groups. 
These territorial alliances may also be called regional ‘developmental coalitions’ 
(Keating 1997). Therefore, whereas quantitative differences in the strength of regional 
welfare models may be explained by variation in the level of mobilisation of 
territorial or left-wing political forces, qualitative differences may depend on the way 
such forces interact with other social, institutional and political actors. Case study 
analysis may therefore be more useful than quantitative analysis to shed light on 
regional coalition building and its effects on the structure of welfare governance. 
Table 1.4 summarises the two-step analysis combining quantitative and 













Table 1.4. Summary: A two-step analysis of sub-state welfare development 
Step 1. Assessing and explaining the 
level of regional welfare 
development  





Once ‘strong’ models 
of regional welfare 
have been detected 
 
Step 2. Assessing and explaining 
the type of sub-state welfare 
development  
Method: Case Study Analysis  
Indicators: 
- Spending: aggregate social 
spending 
- Legislation: extensiveness 
and innovation of regional 
social legislation 
- Implementation: coverage, 
efficiency of social services, 
sustainability 
Indicators: 
- Relationship between 
public and private actors 
- Involvement of social actors 
and/or municipalities in 
welfare governance 
- Principles/underpinning 
values of welfare model 
promoted 
Explanatory variables: 
- Political variables: Strength of 
territorial and left-wing 
political parties 
- Control variables: 
Demographic, socio-
economic and institutional 
characteristics of the region 
-  Explanatory variables: 
- Policy community: 
interaction between 
regional political, social and 
institutional actors.  








Addendum: Other social policies, the EU and the process of region building 
Beyond social assistance and health care 
As stated previously, this study mainly focuses on health care and social assistance 
policies, which are considered as the ‘core’ of new regional welfare systems. For 
instance, in most Italian regions between 60 and 70 per cent of public spending is 
allocated to these policy areas8. In Scotland, the devolved government spends one 
third of its total budget on ‘Health and Well Being’9. This figure does not include 
another 30 per cent of funding that is allocated to local governments, which in turn 
provide many social services10, often implementing the more general plans 
developed by the Scottish government.  A similar central role of health care and 
social assistance can be found in the case of Spanish Autonomous Communities11.  
 However, some studies have pointed to the fact that other social policies have 
been affected by processes of decentralisation. For instance, labour market policies 
have undergone both functional and territorial transformations. Indeed, as 
underlined by Ferrera (2005: 1999) ‘the shift from a passive to an active approach… 
has promoted an increasing territorial embedding of public policy in this sector’.  
Although systematic data for this policy sector are not analysed in the empirical part 
of this research, it is worth mentioning that labour market policies may also be part 
broader social plans and may become an instrument of regional welfare building. In 
the section dedicated to Italy, I show that, as in the case of health care and social 
assistance policies, there is substantial cross-regional variation in the level of 
development of active labour market policies, which may thus be seen as another 
interesting case of increasing territorial fragmentation of welfare.  
                                                          
8
 See http://www.issirfa.cnr.it/1219,1018.html (date of access 27/07/2015).  
9
 See http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/budget/track-the-budget/stacked-group-bars-2015/stackedbar.html 
(date of access 27/07/2015). 
10
 See http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00481380.pdf (date of access 27/07/2015) 
11
 See http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/publicacionpresupuestos/aspx/inicio.aspx (date of access 27/07/2015). 
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The decision to focus on social assistance and health care policies is mainly 
driven by the need to limit the scope of the empirical analysis, which would require a 
very broad set of indicators (not always available at the sub-state level) for each 
additional policy sub-field, but also by theoretical concerns. Indeed the effects of 
contextual factors (particularly demographic and socio-economic factors) may 
substantially vary across different sub-fields of welfare. Including labour market 
policies would therefore increase the complexity of the two-dimensional (cross-
regional and cross-country) comparative approach employed by this study by 
adding a third dimension, that is, a comparison across different welfare sub-fields. 
Moreover, it would not allow controlling for similar welfare legacies across the three 
countries analysed here. Indeed, whereas we can note similar underlying 
characteristics in the structure of health systems12 across Spain, Italy and Great 
Britain, notably the fact that they are all ‘taxation-based’, we cannot say the same in 
the case of labour market policies. Similarities may exist between Italy and Spain 
(Ferrera, 2005b) but not between these two cases and Great Britain (Hemerjick, 2013). 
This does not mean, however, that future studies should neglect the plural character 
of welfare and, for instance, test whether the same political dynamics that seem to 
affect sub-national health care and social assistance are also relevant for labour 
market policies13. Other interesting policy areas that could be studied in depth are 
education (particularly in Spain and Great Britain), supplementary pension schemes 
                                                          
12
  This legacy also had an effect on social assistance policies, particularly elderly care and child care, 
traditionally linked to health care.  This is why in this study analyses both health care and social assistance as 
part of increasingly integrated social plans. In Italian regions the integration of social and health care is often 
promoted through the Piano Sociosanitario. In Spain the Plan Sociosanitario defines a similar ambitious project. 
Also in the devolved governments of Great Britain linking social assistance to health care (and vice versa) has 
become one of the main goals of public institutions (see for instance the Scottish government website 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Health/Policy/Adult-Health-SocialCare-Integration).  
13
 Evidence presented in the quantitative analysis of the section on Italy seems to suggest that territorial 
mobilisation also plays an important role in the development of sub-state labour market policies. 
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and immigration policies. Some aspects of such policies are analysed in the 
qualitative parts of each country-specific section14, although not in a systematic way.   
 
The European Union and regional welfare systems 
 
A focus on labour market policies would in turn require paying more attention to the 
impact of the European Union on the process of welfare building at the regional 
level. Indeed, the EU has played a direct role in policy fields such as employment 
and labour mobility through the Structural Funds, which have often been seen as the 
best example of a new social Europe based on the alliance between supra-national 
and sub-national actors. Yet the importance of such transfers has often been 
exaggerated. Indeed, Kleinmann (2002: 117) has argued that although Structural 
Funds represent a large share of the EU budget, ‘member states still dominate the 
budgetary process as a whole’. Generally, ‘the Funds remain small scale; national 
governments retain a high degree of influence; regional input is fragmented and 
variable; and spillovers to other policy fields are limited’ (Ibid.).  
The weakness of EU ‘spillovers’ to other welfare sub-fields seems to be 
confirmed by the fact that the EU is rarely mentioned as an important player in the 
promotion of sub-national health care and social assistance policies in European 
countries (there are many examples of this. See, for instance, Pavolini [2008], 
Madama [2010], Béland and Lecours [2008], Gallego et al. [2003], Greer [2004]). For 
this reason, the EU is not systematically included in the analysis as a variable directly 
affecting the development of the policy areas that are at the core of this study.  
 This, however, does not mean that the EU is totally irrelevant. As underlined 
in the literature review, one of the premises of this research is that the EU has had a 
general, mainly indirect, effect on the ‘destructuring’ of national welfare systems by 
                                                          
14
 Supplementary pensions are mentioned in the case of South Tyrol and other ‘alpine’ Italian regions. 
Immigration policies are analysed when comparing ‘red’ Italian regions to regions where the ‘right-wing’ 
Northern League has been stronger. Education policies are an important factor of regional welfare building in 
the Scottish case.  
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imposing constraints on the redistributive authority of central governments, 
promoting cross-national mobility and legitimising the political role played by sub-
national authorities. It is not a coincidence that the idea of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 
started to be at the centre of the political debate during the acceleration of the process 
of European integration in the 1990s (Loughlin, 1996). Ferrera (2005a: 183) has also 
suggested that the strengthening of supra-national institutions has encouraged 
‘cross-border experimentation’ through the development of interregional 
associations. Indeed, regions belonging to different countries have engaged in 
processes of policy integration, which often include ‘a social policy component, 
typically in the field of health care, employment, or care services’ (Ferrera, 2005a: 
186). This means that territorially mobilised regions may rely on new opportunities 
of cooperation that often transcend central governments’ control and, instead, 
include authorities and power centres that are outside the national borders. Two 
examples of interregional association, the Euroregion Tyirol-Südtirol-Trentino and the 
Four Motors of Europe, and their impact on social policy are presented in the 
qualitative analysis of the section on Italy. Additionally, I briefly discuss less 
institutionalised forms of cross-border experimentation, which are also important in 
territorially mobilised contexts, as the strengthening connections between the 
Scottish and Scandinavian countries clearly show.  
 
Not only ‘structuring’ but also ‘closure’: the process of region building 
 
In the 19th and 20th centuries, social policy was an important factor in the process of 
‘state formation and nation building’. Today, at least in some countries, it is 
increasingly becoming an important instrument for ‘region building’. As in the case 
of state formation and nation building, also region building can be seen as a 
phenomenon that combines ‘structuring’ of region-specific policies (with their 




 This study mainly focuses on the process of ‘structuring’ of regional welfare 
systems and investigates the sub-state political dynamics that shape such process. 
Yet, the broader aim of regionalist parties and territorial movements may be to use 
social policy as the main ‘pillar’ of a strategy that would radically redefine the 
boundaries of social citizenship. In extreme cases, welfare policies may be crucial in 
the process of ‘closure’ of regional boundaries, thus resulting in a totally separate 
and ‘territorially bounded’ welfare regime, which is only loosely linked to the social 
system in place in the other regions of the same country. Although the ‘closure’ of 
regional social programmes is not systematically analysed here, it should be 
underlined that, as shown in Figure 1.5, region building results from the combination 
of both welfare structuring and closure. 
Looking at regulatory elements, such as language or residency requirements, 
that define the conditions for access to regional social programmes might provide 
information on the ‘boundedness’ of regional welfare systems. This fourth dimension 
can be combined to the spending, planning and implementation dimensions 
presented above, which, in turn, can be considered as indicators of regional welfare 
‘structuring’. However, the analysis of ‘regional social closure’ falls beyond the scope 
of this study and would require more theorizing and a range of empirical data that 
are not available at the present stage. In the qualitative analysis, the Catalan and 
Scottish cases are presented as examples of increasing boundedness of highly 
developed regional welfare systems. In the first case, the debate on language and 
culture as requirements to access social services is becoming increasingly salient. In 
the Scottish case, instead, we have a more ‘civic’ version of regional closure, which is 
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Chapter 2.  
Italy: Territorial mobilisation and left-wing partisanship: the two paths to welfare 
building in the Italian regions 
Introduction 
Despite having a long history of territorial divisions and cultural heterogeneity, since 
its unification Italy has been a highly centralised country. Indeed, despite being 
divided into provinces, it lacked an intermediate institutional level (a ‘meso-level’) 
that was large and powerful enough to challenge the primacy of the national 
government and introduce innovative and distinctive policies (Musella, 2011: 18). 
Even though the democratic constitution approved after the Second World War 
established regions as a new administrative level between central and local 
governments, it took more than twenty years to devolve real powers and democratic 
representation to the new regional entities. The only exception was a group of 
‘special statute regions’, which were created much earlier due to their geo-political 
and geo-cultural characteristics (Bortolussi, 2010: 43). These regions – Sicily, Sardinia, 
Autonomous Province of Bolzano (or South Tyrol), Autonomous Province of Trento, 
the Aosta Valley and Friuli Venetia Giulia15 (Table 2.1) – were entrusted with 








                                                          
15
 Friuli Venetia Giulia became an Autonomous Region in 1963.  
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Table 2.1. Special and ordinary statute regions 
Special Statute Regions Ordinary Statute Regions 
Aosta Valley 
Friuli Venetia Giulia 
Autonomous Province of Bolzano (South Tyrol) 





















In the 1970s fifteen ‘ordinary’ status regions with common regulations were 
established and, as already underlined in the previous chapter, they have 
substantially increased their powers in the last 20 years, thus becoming important 
arenas of policy making (Vassallo, 2013). This also implied a process of ‘re-
symmetrisation’ and decreasing differences between ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ statute 
regions (Amoretti, 2011). More generally, since 1970 the process of decentralisation in 
Italy has not been targeted at individual regions but has involved the whole national 
territory. As highlighted by Francese and Romanelli (2011: 7), today the persisting 
differences between ordinary and special status regions mainly concern the 
composition of financing (share of own resources versus funds drawn from national 
general taxation) and are not so significant in terms of policy making (particularly in 
the fields of health and social care). 
The aim of the next section is too see how this process of decentralisation has 
been accompanied by transformations in welfare governance in Italy. Through this 
historical account of the evolution of Italian social policies, it is possible to 
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contextualise the emergence of region-specific models of welfare governance in 
recent years.  
 
Transformations and territorialisation of the Italian welfare state 
Although initially classified as a ‘conservative’ welfare system (Esping-Andersen, 
1990), Italy has often been included in the group of ‘southern European’ or 
‘Mediterranean’ welfare states characterised by high functional fragmentation (Picot, 
2012), clientelism, familism and underdeveloped social services (Saraceno 1994; 
Ferrera 1996, 2005b; Antonnen and Spilä 1996; Eardley et al., 1996; Rhodes 1997). The 
policy making process was dominated by the Christian Democratic Party which was, 
however, quite different from its European counterparts, like the CDU or the ÖVP, 
and did not fully promote the emergence of a ‘social market economy’ (Van 
Kersbergen, 1995). However, in the 1970s elements of universalism were added to the 
Italian model. In 1978 the insurance-based and highly fragmented health care system 
was replaced by a national health care system (Sistema Sanitario Nazionale, SSN), 
which was universal and taxation-based (like the British and Scandinavian systems). 
The construction of the Italian welfare system was also linked to processes of 
centralisation and ‘nationalisation’ of politics and social rights (which, however, 
remained functionally fragmented [Picot, 2012]). As pointed out by Ferrera (2005a: 
193):  
 
Italy's welfare state followed rather closely the historical parabola of 
‘nationalisation’ [...] The first compulsory social insurance schemes were 
introduced between 1898 and 1919, breaking with the tradition of localized and 
discretional assistance offered by religious charities and (later) friendly societies. 
The system of national social insurance was completed and consolidated during 




Municipal and provincial administrations played a ‘residual’ role in the social 
assistance sector as they were ‘the main loci of (public) response to social needs not 
covered by national insurance schemes’ (Ibid.: 198). Such administrative entities were 
too small and lacked the economic and administrative resources that would allow 
them to build welfare models with markedly distinctive characteristics.  
It may seem a paradox but the process of decentralisation started in the 1970s, 
that is, when the National Health System was created and the construction of a 
statewide welfare system was completed. Regional assemblies and governments 
were created in 1970 (although four special regions and two autonomous provinces 
had been created much earlier) but only in 1977 were they were granted some (very 
limited) powers in the area of social assistance (Fargion, 1997: 97 – 107). In the health 
sector, regions only had planning and coordination powers whereas municipalities 
were more actively involved in the administration of the newly created SSN. Indeed, 
the establishment of local agencies (Unioni Sanitarie Locali or USL) facilitated the 
participation of mayors and local politicians in the governance of health services 
(Pavolini and Vicarelli, 2013: 200).   
In 1992-1993 the crisis of the Italian welfare system became evident (Ferrera 
and Gualmini, 2004) and the process of regionalisation accelerated. Regions became 
important actors in the administration of health care, taking power away from both 
central government and municipalities (Ferrera, 2006: 206–211). As underlined by 
Saraceno (1994: 65): 
 
Reforms introduced in late 1992, aimed at decreasing the heavy public debt, have 
reduced the scope of the universalism of the health system and increased 
geographical differentiation in the provision and cost of social services. 
 
Also Giannoni and Hitiris (2002: 1829) confirm that healthcare reforms approved in 
the 1990s increased interregional inequality ‘aggravating [...] existing regional 
divergence’. With the constitutional reform ratified in 2001, regional levels 
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of government were entrusted with primary responsibility in three social policy 
fields: health care, social assistance and active labour market policies (Fargion, 2005). 
Particularly in the field of health care, the role of the state has been limited to the 
provision of a general framework in which each regional administration has been 
encouraged to develop region-specific institutional arrangements (Benassi and 
Mussoni, 2013: 173). Social insurance, including pension schemes and unemployment 
benefits, is still controlled by central authorities (although, as shown in the following 
sections, some regions like South Tyrol have promoted complementary pension 
schemes).  
It is therefore evident that in recent years regions have been offered increasing 
opportunities to develop comprehensive welfare reforms, particularly in the sectors 
of health care and social assistance. The reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s not only 
devolved these two policy sectors to sub-national administrations but also pushed 
for more integration between them, stressing the importance of regional social plans 
that addressed illness, inequality, deprivation and social exclusion as inter-linked 
problems (Turati, 2013:54). In this context, it is important to understand whether and 
why some regions have been more able or willing than others to exploit such 
opportunities and establish what I define as a ‘strong’ model of welfare. In the next 
section I therefore try to quantify cross-regional variation in welfare development by 
focusing on the three dimensions presented in the previous chapter: spending, 
legislation and effective implementation.   
 
When regions become arenas of ‘new welfare building’: measuring territorial 
differences in Italy 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, between the early 1990s and mid 2000s, all 
Italian regions had increasing opportunities to establish their own programmes 
particularly in the sectors of social assistance and health care. Since 1992 a large 
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number of reforms was approved and culminated in the constitutional reform of 
2000-2001 that transformed Italy into a quasi-federal political system. Therefore it 
would be interesting to see whether the regional welfare systems that emerged 




As mentioned in the theoretical framework of this study, the first important indicator 
that can be used to assess the level of regional welfare development is spending. 
Here I consider aggregate per-capita spending in two policy areas: social assistance 
and health care. The data are provided by the Ministry of Economic Development 
and cover the 1996—2011 period. Table 2.2 shows that total social spending is highest 
in the Aosta Valley and lowest in Campania. We assign the score 1 to the leading 
region, thus rescaling all the other regions to a 0-1 range. This is a useful statistical 
device aimed at making spending more comparable to the measures of 
planning/innovation and efficiency that will be presented in the next paragraphs and 

















0 – 1 
score 
Aosta Valley 2013 464 2477 1 
Bolzano- South Tyrol 1754 569 2323 0.94 
Trento 1586 673 2259 0.91 
Lombardy 1523 174 1697 0.69 
Emilia Romagna 1550 144 1694 0.68 
Umbria 1590 87 1677 0.68 
Sardinia 1408 190 1598 0.65 
Tuscany 1419 106 1525 0.62 
Veneto 1410 107 1517 0.61 
Friuli Venetia Giulia 1283 221 1504 0.61 
Latium 1372 114 1486 0.6 
Piedmont 1347 109 1456 0.59 
Marche 1339 111 1450 0.59 
Calabria 1357 47 1404 0.57 
Abruzzi 1298 76 1374 0.55 
Liguria 1261 110 1371 0.55 
Sicily 1233 117 1350 0.55 
Basilicata 1224 73 1297 0.52 
Apulia 1238 54 1292 0.52 
Molise 1214 61 1275 0.51 
Campania 1197 59 1256 0.51 




The second indicator is the role that regional governments play in planning social 
programmes. For this section I use the data provided by Pavolini (2008), who in turn 
relied on reports by Mapelli (2007) and Maretti (2008). He provides scores that, on 
the basis of regional legislation, assess the planning and innovation capacity of 
                                                          
16
 Social Assistance spending includes regional and municipal spending since a large part of financial resources 
is transferred from regions to local authorities and then spent by the latter.  
17
 Sum of local and regional spending in social assistance policies.  
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regional governments in the period that goes from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. 
Pavolini’s study considers social assistance and health care policies. The score of 
planning for social assistance ranges from 0 (inexistent) to 3 (very strong), whereas 
the one for health care ranges from 0 (inexistent) to 4 (very strong). I rescaled each of 
these scores to a 0 to 1 range (1 being the maximum and 0 the minimum) and then 
calculated the sum. Finally I assigned the score 1 to the region with the highest sum 
and adjusted the other scores proportionally. The results are summarised in Table 
2.3. It can be noted that Tuscany is the region with the highest capacity to plan and 
innovate, followed by Lombardy and the Aosta Valley. At the bottom of the ranking 


















Table 2.3. Social legislation of Italian regional governments  







0-1     0-1 Sum Final  




Tuscany 4 2.5 1 0.833 1.833 1 
Lombardy 3 3 0.75 1 1.75 0.95 
Aosta Valley 3 3 0.75 1 1.75 0.95 
Bolzano- South Tyrol 3 2.5 0.75 0.833 1.583 0.86 
Sardinia 4 1.5 1 0.5 1.5 0.82 
Friuli Venetia Giulia 3 2 0.75 0.667 1.417 0.77 
Emilia Romagna 3 2 0.75 0.667 1.417 0.77 
Marche 4 1 1 0.333 1.333 0.73 
Umbria 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Liguria 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Abruzzi 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Molise 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Basilicata 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Piedmont 2 2 0.5 0.667 1.167 0.64 
Trento 1 2.5 0.25 0.833 1.083 0.59 
Veneto 1 2 0.25 0.667 0.917 0.5 
Sicily 2 1 0.5 0.333 0.833 0.45 
Apulia 3 0 0.75 0 0.75 0.41 
Latium 1 1.5 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.41 
Calabria 3 0 0.75 0 0.75 0.41 
Campania 2 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.27 
Source: Pavolini (2008)  
 
Effective Implementation 
Finally, I turn to the third dimension, that is, effective implementation of social 
services. In this case I rely on data collected by Mapelli (2007) and ISTAT18. Most of 
these data have also been summarised by Pavolini (2008). Mapelli has provided a 
health care score that is measured through a bi-dimensional scale ranging from 0 to 
100 and considers both the implementation process and the final performance of 
                                                          
18
 ISTAT is the Italian Statistical Office (www.istat.it)  
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health care services. I have also used Eurostat data that indicate the average number 
of hospital beds and long-term care places per 100,000 inhabitants over the last two 
decades. Finally I have also taken into account the percentage of children and old 
people that have access to specific social services (ISTAT data that are also reported 
in Pavolini [2008]). 
Also in this case, all measures have been rescaled to a 0–1 range, where 1 is the 
best score and the other scores are proportionally adjusted, and their sum has been 
calculated. The region with the highest sum is in turn assigned a score of 1 and, 
again, the other results are adjusted. Results are presented in Table 2.4. Trento, the 
Aosta Valley and Emilia Romagna are the regions where welfare services are 
generally most extensive and efficient. Calabria, Apulia, Campania and Basilicata are 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Measuring the strength of regional welfare models 
We now have an estimation of how each Italian region scores on the three important 
dimensions used to measure overall welfare development at the sub-state level. As 
argued in the theoretical chapter, rather than adding these three dimensions, it 
would be better to multiply them. Indeed, a region might spend a lot on social 
programmes without playing any role in coordinating and regulating such 
programmes or effectively implementing them. A multiplicative index better detects 
significant cross-dimensional discrepancies and ‘rewards’ those regions that score 
consistently well across all three dimensions whereas it punishes those that have 
inconsistent or consistently negative results.   
In the correlation matrix below (Table 2.5), it can be noted that these 
dimensions are positively correlated with each other but such correlations are far 
from perfect or very high. For instance, the correlation between spending and 
legislation is only 0.49 and between legislation and implementation it is slightly 
above 0.6. The existence of inconsistent scores across the three dimensions makes the 
use of a multiplicative index preferable to an additive one (this will be even more 
evident in the Spanish and British cases).  
 
Table 2.5. Correlation matrix including the three dimensions of welfare development 
(Number of cases: 21 regions) 
 Spending Legislation Implementation 
Spending 1.0000    
Legislation 0.49 1.0000   
Implementation 0.72 0.61 1.0000 
 
Table 2.6 shows the results of the multiplicative index, which may range from a 
maximum of 1 to a minimum of 0. In reality, no region scores 1 in all the three 
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dimensions, thus obtaining the maximum possible final score, but regions such as the 
Aosta Valley, South Tyrol and Lombardy score consistently well and therefore have 
the highest multiplicative scores. On the contrary, Sicily, Apulia, Calabria and 
Campania have consistently low scores and, consequently, they are at the bottom of 
the ranking. The scores of other regions, such as Latium, Basilicata, Sardinia and the 
Veneto, are penalised by the existence of cross-dimensional inconsistencies (the 
puzzling case of the Veneto will be discussed in Chapter 3 together with the 
qualitative analysis of the Lombard case). Generally, it can be noted that there is 
significant variation in the development of health and social assistance policies across 
Italian regions. The following sections refer to the main hypotheses of this study and 
provide an explanation of territorial variation in welfare development by focusing on 
different levels of mobilisation of regionalist or left-wing political parties in Italian 
regions. The general question that will be answered is whether centre-periphery and 
left-right cleavages have affected the process of welfare building that has occurred in 












Table 2.6. Applying the multiplicative index to Italian regions: measuring the level of 
development of regional welfare systems (focus on health care and social assistance). 
Region Spending Legislation Implementation Multiplicative 
score  
Aosta Valley 1 0.96 0.99 0.95 
South Tyrol/Bolzano 0.94 0.86 0.94 0.76 
Lombardy 0.69 0.96 0.92 0.61 
Trento 0.91 0.59 1 0.54 
Emilia Rom. 0.68 0.78 0.99 0.53 
Tuscany 0.62 1 0.81 0.5 
FVG 0.61 0.78 0.9 0.43 
Sardinia 0.65 0.82 0.66 0.35 
Umbria 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.29 
Veneto 0.61 0.5 0.94 0.29 
Piedmont 0.59 0.64 0.78 0.29 
Marche 0.59 0.73 0.66 0.28 
Liguria 0.55 0.68 0.7 0.26 
Abruzzi 0.55 0.68 0.61 0.23 
Molise 0.51 0.68 0.63 0.22 
Latium 0.6 0.41 0.65 0.16 
Basilicata 0.52 0.68 0.44 0.16 
Sicily 0.55 0.45 0.56 0.14 
Apulia 0.52 0.41 0.45 0.1 
Calabria 0.57 0.41 0.42 0.1 
Campania 0.51 0.27 0.44 0.06 
 
 
Territorial mobilisation in Italy since 1980 
Since 1980, the average strength of regionalist parties in Italian regions has increased 
substantially, as shown in Figure 2.1. In the period from 1980 to 2010, the strength of 
regionalist parties has more than doubled, meaning that in recent years the centre-
periphery cleavage has become an increasingly important factor in party competition 
(Alonso, 2012). In particular, it can be noted that late 1980s and early 1990s were 
characterised by a sharp increase in territorial mobilisation, with the emergence of the 
regional leagues, which was followed by a period of stabilisation and consolidation of 
that mobilisation. Finally, the 2000s were characterised by a new wave of territoriality 
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that resulted in a further strengthening of the electoral support for regionalist parties. 
In 2010 regionalist parties had, on average, three times as many regional 
representatives as in 1980. 
In the 1980s territorial mobilisation was relatively strong only in South Tyrol-
Bolzano, the Aosta Valley, Trento and Sardinia, whereas it has emerged more 
recently in other regions, such as Friuli Venetia Giulia, Lombardy and the Veneto 
(Table 2.7). In particular, Lombardy was the epicentre of the new electoral earthquake 
that occurred in the early 1990s, when the Northern League became an important 
actor in Italian politics. 
What becomes evident from this preliminary analysis is that, since the 1990s, 
regionalist mobilisation has not just been confined to regions with strong ethno-
linguistic minorities such as South Tyrol and the Aosta Valley, but it has become a 
more diffuse phenomenon particularly in some regions of Northern Italy (Giordano, 
2000). The Northern League can be considered as the most important regionalist 
party to have emerged in recent decades. Its rise was linked to internal and supra-
national political and socio-economic phenomena. In particular, scholars have 
pointed to the collapse of the old party system in the early 1990s and to processes of 
Europeanisation and globalisation as the main structural factors that have 
contributed to the electoral success of the League (Golden, 2004; Gomez Reino-
Cachafeiro, 2000). At the same time, as underlined by Gomez Reino-Cachafeiro 
(2000), the increasing saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage has not just been a 
politicisation of the historical divide between North and South but it has also given 
‘political visibility to social and economic differences within the northern Italian 
regions’ (Gomez Reino-Cachafeiro, 2000: 103, italics added). This is certainly reflected 
in the different levels of electoral strength of the Northern League in northern Italian 
regions. Lombardy, Friuli Venetia Giulia and, more recently, the Veneto are the three 





Figure 2.1. Average share (%) of regional council seats controlled by regionalist 
parties in the 21 Italian regions 1980-2010. 
 

















Table 2.7. The political strength of regionalist parties from 1980 to 2010 (% of council 




1980S 1990S 2000S Average  
1980—2010  
South Tyrol/ Bolzano 63.7 70.6 75 70 
Aosta Valley 46.4 53.4 72.2 57.6 
Trento 12.8 33.8 53.3 34 
FVG 3 21.5 13.5 12.7 
Lombardy 0 16.7 17.8 11.7 
Veneto 0 10.3 18.2 9.8 
Sardinia 10.2 7.9 7.7 8.6 
Piedmont 0 6.7 7.7 4.9 
Liguria 0 4.7 4.1 3 
Sicily 0 0 7.1 2.5 
Emilia Romagna 0 2 4.4 2.2 
Apulia 0 0 3.7 1.3 
Molise 0 0 1.5 0.5 
Tuscany 0 0 0.5 0.2 
Marche 0 0 0.4 0.2 
Umbria 0 0 0.3 0.1 
Abruzzi 0 0 0 0 
Basilicata 0 0 0 0 
Calabria 0 0 0 0 
Campania 0 0 0 0 
Latium 0 0 0 0 
Average across 21 
regions 
6.5 10.8 13.7 10.4 
Source: Ministero dell’Interno (www.interno.it)  
 
The question that this study tries to address is whether the different levels of 
territorial mobilisation across regions is linked to the different levels of development 
of sub-national social models. Indeed, old and new regionalist parties may have used 
social policies to strengthen territorial solidarities and mobilise them against the 
standardising pressures exerted by central governments. Figure 2.2 highlights the 
existence of a strong correlation between territorial mobilisation and the 
multiplicative score of regional welfare development (r= .81). However, a bivariate 
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correlation is not sufficient to prove the existence of a strong relationship, since other 
factors may explain cross-regional variation in welfare development. Before moving 
to a multivariate model accounting for the existence of other background variables, I 
consider another aspect of party competition that might explain part of the cross-
regional variation, that is, different levels of strength of centre-left political parties.   
 













































Left-wing mobilisation in Italy since 1980 
Although the importance of the centre-periphery cleavage has increased significantly 
in the last few decades, class mobilisation has been the main factor of party 
competition in Italian politics for most of the 20th century. As underlined by Bartolini 
and Mair (1990), the class cleavage has been the dominant cleavage in Western 
Europe and has persisted even in the face of widespread social change during the 
transition from industrial to post-industrial democracy. Italy has not been an 
exception in this respect although, at the same time, it displays some peculiarities that 
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make it a ‘special’ case among Western democracies. For instance, the Christian 
democratic (before 1994) and centre-right political forces (after 1994) have played a 
dominant role in national politics, controlling the government for 59 years since 1945. 
Until the mid-1990s, in Italy there was no real alternation between left- and right-
wing parties and this situation produced what has been called a ‘blocked’ or 
‘uncommon’ democracy (Pempel, 1990). The Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the 
Communist Party (PCI) were the two largest parties, together controlling almost 70 
per cent of the vote, but the latter was considered an anti-system party. It followed 
that strong polarisation and centrifugal, rather than centripetal, drives were 
encouraged (Sartori 2005: 117-120; Vampa, 2009: 351). Moreover, the political 
alternatives that the voters faced were, more than in other western European 
countries, ‘significantly constrained by the political realities of the Cold War’ (Sani 
and Segatti, 2001: 163). 
In addition, Figure 2.3 shows that since 1980 the average share of regional 
council seats won by left-wing political parties was greater than 50 per cent in only 
four regions: Tuscany, Umbria, Emilia Romagna and Marche. As argued by Diamanti 
(2003), the main party of the Italian Left, the Communist Party and its political 
successors, can be considered more a regional than a national party, given the fact 
that their support is mainly concentrated in a few Italian regions, the so called ‘red 
belt’, and that for many decades they have played a more marginal role in central 
government than other left-wing parties in Western Europe (Vampa, 2009). This 
means that regions are likely to have become a privileged arena of welfare 









Figure 2.3. The strength of centre-left parties in Italian regions (average percentage of 
regional parliamentary seats controlled by centre-left parties in the 1980-2010 period) 
 
Source: Interior Ministry, www.interno.it.  
 
In Figure 2.4 it can be noted that there is no clear correlation between left-wing 
strength and welfare development in Italian regions. At the same time, the scatter 
plot suggests that there might have been two alternative paths to regional welfare 
building. Indeed, Emilia Romagna and Tuscany, the regions in which the left has had 
the highest political support, have levels of welfare development that are similar to 
those of Trento and Lombardy, where centre-left forces have been much weaker but 
territorial mobilisation has strengthened in recent decades. Therefore, although it is 
not detected in the bivariate correlation, the positive effect of left-wing mobilisation 
on regional welfare building might become more evident in the multivariate model 





















































Background variables: socio-economic development, ageing (demographic 
vulnerability) and population size 
Before testing the two alternative hypotheses, some background variables are 
included in the analysis. First of all, socio-economic development should be taken 
into account, since it is well known that there is a significant gap between central-
northern and southern Italian regions. Economic development may be measured in 
terms of per capita GDP. However, Putman (1993) has suggested that one should go 
beyond purely economic development and also consider the importance of ‘social 
capital’ as a predictor of institutional performance in Italian regions. Using some 
indicators suggested by Putnam, social capital may be measured through an index 
that includes measures of referendum turnout, participation in voluntary 
Weak left, strong 
regionalist parties 




organisations and newspaper readership19. Figure 2.5 shows that economic 
development and social capital are strongly correlated (r=0.92) and this may cause 
problems of ‘multicollinearity’ in the regression model predicting the strength of 
regional models of welfare. Therefore, I have created an index that combines both 
dimensions of economic and social capital development (index of socio-economic 
development). The results of the index are shown in Figure 2.6. Alternatively, since 
the two dimensions are highly correlated, only one of them (e.g. per capita GDP) can 
be used as a proxy of the other.  
 






























































                                                          
19
 Relevant data can be found on the website of the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT) in the section ‘Sistema di 
Indicatori Territoriali’ (http://sitis.istat.it/sitis/html/, date of access: 28/10/2013). 
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Figure 2.6. Socio-economic development of Italian regions (combining economic 
development and social capital) 
 
 
Additionally, the level of economic development of Italian regions can also be used 
as a proxy for their fiscal capacity. Figure 2.7 focuses on ‘ordinary status’ regions and 
shows that, although they have been formally granted the same fiscal autonomy, 
they differ quite substantially in terms of fiscal capacity, which is measured in terms 
of revenues deriving directly from regional taxation (y axis in Figure 2.7). Therefore, 
keeping formal autonomy constant, rich regions seem to rely on a larger amount of 







Figure 2.7. Relationship between regional GDP and fiscal capacity in Italian regions 
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Relationship between per-capita revenues from regional taxation and per-capita GDP
 
Sources: ISSIRFA and ISTAT. Author’s own calculation. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, another factor that might explain cross-
regional variation in the strength of welfare models is the level of ‘demographic 
vulnerability’, which is most effectively measured by considering the percentage of 
regional population aged 65 and above. Regional governments faced with an ageing 
population may be more inclined to pay attention to health care and social assistance 
policies and establish integrated social programmes. As shown in Table 2.8, Liguria 





Table 2.8. Ageing (indicator of demographic vulnerability) in Italian regions (average 
1981–2010) 





















S. Tyrol 15.9 
Campania 14.5 
Source: ISTAT (1981-2011). Author’s own calculation.  
 
Following a ‘functionalist’ approach, women’s participation in the job market is 
expected to have an effect on the development of regional social services 
(particularly child care). Table 2.10 provides data taken from Eurostat and referring 
to average levels of female employment in the period from 1999 to 2014. These data 
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suggest the existence of significant discrepancies across Italian regions. Whereas in 
Emilia Romagna more than 60 per cent of women aged between 15 and 64 are 
employed, in Campania this figure is just 26.3 per cent. 
 




Emilia Rom. 60.9 
South Tyrol 60.5 



















Source: Eurostat. Author’s own calculation.  
 
Finally I take into account differences in the size of the regions that, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter, may affect the ability of regions to allocate public money, 
distribute resources and quickly respond to the needs of the local population. The 
size of the regions may be measured in terms of population size and Table 2.9 
79 
 
summarises the average values in the 1981 and 2011. It can be noted that the range of 
population size is very large with a maximum of 9 million inhabitants in Lombardy 
and a minimum of around 100,000 inhabitants in the Aosta Valley.  
 
Table 2.10. Population size in Italian regions (millions of inhabitants) 1981-2011 





















Aosta Valley 0.1 
Source: ISTAT (1981-2011). Author’s own calculation. 
 
Building the multivariate model 
Having presented the main variables of this study, I now proceed to assess the way 
they relate to each other. First of all, I build a multivariate regression model with the 
score of welfare development as dependent variable, territorial and left-wing 
mobilisations as explanatory variables and (socio-)economic development, 
population ageing and population size as control variables. I have also included the 
variable ‘institutional asymmetries’ in the model. That variable, which distinguishes 
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between the ‘ordinal’ and ‘special’ status regions, is useful to understand whether 
territorial mobilisation has a direct effect on welfare development, regardless of 
institutional asymmetries (H1 in the previous chapter), or it has an indirect impact 
through the promotion of such asymmetries (H2). Institutional asymmetries are 
measured through the RAI index built by Hooghe et al. (see previous chapter).  
The results of the multivariate regression models are indicated in Table 2.10. 
Since the independent variables are measured differently, I used standardised 
coefficients so that the magnitude of their effects can be more easily compared. 
Moreover, in model 1 I included the index of socio-economic development, which 
aggregates both measures of economic development and social capital, whereas in 
model 2 I included the variable per capita GDP, which, being strongly correlated 
with human capital, can be used as a proxy of both economic development and social 
capital. In any case, the coefficients of the two models do not change radically and 
they both account for 88 per cent of cross-regional variation in welfare development 
(r-squared= 0.88). 
 It can be noted that left-wing and territorial mobilisations (measured in terms 
of seats controlled by left-wing and regionalist parties within the regional councils in 
the 1980-2010 period) are the two factors that are more strongly correlated with 
welfare development, controlling for all the other background variables. Territorial 
mobilisation has very high coefficients in both models (0.90 and 0.84) and this seems 
to confirm the hypothesis that the centre-periphery cleavage significantly shapes the 
politics of welfare in Italy. We can therefore say that those regions in which territorial 
mobilisation has been a relevant political phenomenon, have invested more 
resources in the elaboration and implementation of sub-national social policies than 
other regions. 
Left-wing mobilisation also seems to have played a relatively important role 
in the construction of region-specific welfare systems. The coefficient of this variable 
is 0.25 in model 1 and 0.28 in model 2.Despite being much smaller than the territorial 
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mobilisation one, it is still higher than all other coefficients, including socio-economic 
development (model 2). In model 1, instead, it is the third largest standardised 
coefficient after territorial mobilisation and women’s employment. Thus the other 
main hypothesis presented in this study is partly confirmed by this preliminary 
analysis and we can say that those regions governed by left and centre-left parties 
have also been arenas of ‘new’ welfare development in the last thirty years. This, 
however, may be due to the fact that the Italian Left has played a rather marginal role 
in national government and, therefore, its primary political action has been confined 
to a small number of regions. 
 
Table 2.11. The determinants of welfare development (health care and social 
assistance) in the Italian regions (1980-2010).  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
 
Standardised coefficient (β) Standardised coefficient (β) 
Territorial mobilisation .85 .84 
Left-wing mobilisation .25 .28 
Institutional asymmetries .18 .16 
Index of socio economic 
development 
-0.05 --- 
Per Capita GDP --- .09 
Population ageing .15 .16 
Female employment .29 .15 
Population Size  .19 .16 
N 21 21 
R-squared .88 .88 
 
On the other hand, institutional asymmetries do not seem to have had a very strong 
positive effect on welfare development (coefficient: 0.18 and 0.16 in models 1 and 2). 
This can be explained by the fact that in Italy the dual distinction between ‘special’ 
and ‘ordinary’ statute regions has been in place since the post-war period and has 
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not been significantly affected by different (and changing) levels of territorial 
mobilisation. Indeed, the Italian constitutional system is rather rigid and individual 
regions rarely have the opportunity to participate in bilateral bargaining with central 
authorities to determine their level of autonomy. As underlined by Keating (2009a), 
in Italy, ‘the reform process has played out at the centre, with relatively little 
involvement from the regions themselves’. Even when decentralisation has resulted 
from pressures coming from territorial movements (e.g. the Northern League in the 
1990s), it has led to the devolution of the same standardised powers to all regions and 
not only to those ones demanding more autonomy (e.g. Lombardy and the Veneto). 
Moreover, increasing decentralisation has actually reduced the asymmetries between 
special and ordinary statute regions, thus resulting in a ‘catching-up’ process 
(Amoretti, 2011), which did not acknowledge the different demands for regional 
autonomy of individual regions. Therefore, we can say that the intervening effect of 
the institutional variable has been almost completely absent in Italy.  
Of course, performing a multivariate analysis with a relatively small number 
of cases (21) is just an exploratory exercise. In order to minimise the number of 
independent variables and maximise the explanatory power of the model, one could 
also employ a ‘stepwise’, backward strategy, which gradually excludes the least 
significant independent variables, leaving the most important ones (Madama, 2010: 
208). Thus, in Table 2.12 we can see that in the ‘parsimonious’ model territorial 
mobilisation remains the most important variable together with left-wing 
mobilisation and women’s participation in the job market. However, interpreting the 
importance of the latter variable in causal terms is quite problematic. As underlined 
by Madama (2010: 201–202) higher female employment may indeed produce a 
stronger demand for social services but, at the same time, may be the consequence of 




Table 2.12. Parsimonious model including the three most important independent 
variables 
 
 Standardised coefficient (β) 
Territorial mobilisation .78 
Left-wing mobilisation .22 





We can therefore say that in Italy the new politics of regional welfare building has 
followed two paths. The more important (and also relatively recent) one is 
represented by the mobilisation of territorial identities. The more traditional one, 
where ‘class mobilisation’ is the dominant political force, is still relevant, although to 
a much lesser extent than territorial mobilisation. These two paths seem to have 
remained relatively separate and parallel. Indeed the correlation coefficient between 
strength of regionalist parties and strength of left-wing parties is negative and rather 
strong (-0.68), meaning that the two types of mobilisation have rarely coexisted in 
Italian regions. 
 
Beyond health care and social assistance: labour market policies, a preliminary 
analysis 
Although, as stated in the first chapter, this study mainly focuses on health care and 
social assistance, this section presents a brief, exploratory analysis on the regional 
structuring of labour market policies, which have also been significantly 
decentralised, particularly in their ‘activation’ component (Fargion, 2005). The tables 
below show some preliminary results, which are based on some sketchy data and, 
therefore, should be interpreted with extreme caution.  
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First of all, a similar index of welfare development is calculated by using 
spending, legislation and implementation data in the field of active labour market 
policies. As in the case of health care and social assistance, spending figures are taken 
from the archive of the Ministry of Economic Development 
(http://www.dps.gov.it/it/cpt/). The level of development of regional legislation is 
assessed on the basis of the data provided by Mapelli (2007) and Pavolini (2008). This 
score considers whether regions transposed three pieces of national legislation that 
delegated to them the (re-)organisation of job centres and, more generally, creation of 
regional employment systems20. Finally, I also rely on the Isfol (2008) index to 
measure the quality and efficiency of the employment services in the different 
regions.  
All the original and rescaled scores can be found in Table 2.13. The last 
column contains the multiplicative scores, indicating the overall level of 
development of labour market policies. At the top of the ranking we find Trento, 
South Tyrol, Emilia Romagna and Tuscany. Molise, Abruzzi, Calabria and Campania 










                                                          
20
 Pavolini assigns the score of 0 to Aosta Valley and Calabria, even though these two regions transposed one of 
the three pieces of legislation (although slightly later than the other regions). Instead, I decided to assign the 
score 1 to these two regions.  
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Table. 2.13. Measuring the level of development of labour market policies across the 
21 Italian regions (multiplicative score) 















Trento 232 1 2 0.67 14.2 0.97 0.65 
South Tyrol 191.6 0.83 2 0.67 13.77 0.94 0.52 
Em. Romagna 50.8 0.22 3 1 14.32 0.97 0.21 
Tuscany 49.2 0.21 3 1 13.94 0.95 0.2 
Marche 37.12 0.16 3 1 14.09 0.96 0.15 
Umbria 45.8 0.2 2 0.67 14.7 1 0.13 
Aosta Valley 231.7 1 1 0.33 4.7 0.32 0.11 
Piedmont 39.6 0.17 2 0.67 13.97 0.95 0.11 
Liguria 37.08 0.16 2 0.67 14.68 1 0.11 
FVG 80 0.34 2 0.67 7.3 0.5 0.11 
Veneto 36.02 0.16 2 0.67 13.12 0.89 0.1 
Lombardy 45.4 0.2 2 0.67 10.1 0.69 0.09 
Latium 95 0.41 1 0.33 10.14 0.69 0.09 
Sicily 93.01 0.4 2 0.67 4.88 0.33 0.09 
Sardinia 100.9 0.43 2 0.67 4 0.27 0.08 
Basilicata 98 0.42 1 0.33 7.48 0.51 0.07 
Apulia 27.3 0.12 2 0.67 11.49 0.78 0.06 
Molise 48.9 0.21 1 0.33 11.27 0.77 0.05 
Abruzzi 30.9 0.13 1 0.33 14.41 0.98 0.04 
Calabria 26.31 0.11 1 0.33 10.96 0.75 0.03 
Campania 11.4 0.05 2 0.67 6.23 0.42 0.01 
Sources: Ministry of economic development http://www.dps.tesoro.it/cpt/cpt.asp, Pavolini (2008), Mapelli (2007), Isfol 
(2008). 
 
Table 2.14 shows the results of a ‘parsimonious’ multivariate model which includes 
the variable unemployment instead of GDP and female employment, since the latter 
variables were both highly correlated to the former (-.93 and .94), thus causing 
problems of multicollinearity). The ageing variable has not been included because, 
while it may play an important role in the case of health care and, of course, elderly 
care, it does not seem relevant for the development of active labour market policies 
(indeed the correlation coefficient was just -.05). Also ‘population size’ was excluded, 
since it had a small coefficient (-.06).  
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Among the remaining variables, the one with the highest standardised 
coefficient is, once, again territorial mobilisation (.45), although its magnitude is 
smaller than in the case of health care and social assistance. This is followed by the 
variable unemployment (-.28), which suggests that labour market policies are more 
developed in regions with lower levels of unemployment. In this case, however, the 
causal chain between unemployment and labour market policies may be also 
reversed, since it would be reasonable to say that highly developed employment 
service3s may negatively affect the overall level of unemployment. Higher levels of 
institutional autonomy seem positively associated with the development of labour 
market policies at the regional level (.26).  
Surprisingly, left-wing mobilisation has the smallest coefficient (.16). This may 
be due to the fact that whereas health care and social assistance policies started to 
become important regional policies in the late 1970s, when large part of the left was 
excluded by national government and could play a primary role mainly at the sub-
national level, active labour market policies have been developed more recently, 
particularly in the 1990s, in a more ‘fluid’ context of national politics. At the same 
time, it should also be underlined that both Emilia Romagna and Toscana, two 
regions in which the Left has been traditionally very strong, are at the top of the 
ranking assessing the level of development of regional labour market policies. This 
suggests that, going beyond this preliminary quantitative analysis, centre-left parties 
may have favoured the strengthening of regional employment services. 
Finally, it should be noted that the ‘explanatory power’ of the model indicated 
by the R-squared is much lower than in Tables 2.11 and 2.12, suggesting that there 
might be other variables not considered in this study, which explain part of the cross-






Table 2.14. The determinants of development of labour market policies in the Italian 
regions 
 
 Standardised coefficient (β) 
Territorial mobilisation .45 
Left-wing mobilisation .17 
Unemployment  .38 




As already mentioned at the beginning of this section, these are just some 
preliminary results and are not integrated in the main analysis of this study, which 
focuses on health care and social assistance. They show that territorial-based politics 
may play an important role in the development of other welfare sub-fields. In the 
case of labour market policies, future research should also investigate the link 
between territorial mobilisation and the opportunities offered by the European 
Union. Indeed, through the European Social Fund (ESF), the latter actively finances 
activation programmes (Verschraegen et al., 2011), which, in the Italian case, are 
directly implemented by regional governments.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to quantitatively explain cross-regional divergence in 
regional welfare development, which has been measured by focusing on health care 
and social assistance policies in all the 21 Italian regions. This preliminary 
quantitative analysis seems to suggest that even when accounting for the well-known 
regional disparities in socio-economic development, both territorial and left-wing 
mobilisations have had a positive effect on the emergence of strong models of 
welfare at the ‘meso-level’. However, the effect of the first variable seems generally 
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stronger than the latter (even if we move from health care and social assistance to 
labour market policies). Additionally, territorial mobilisation seems to have directly 
affected the establishment of region-specific social programmes, whereas it has not 
had any substantial indirect effect through the promotion of asymmetries in formal 
regional autonomy, which have remained quite ‘rigid’ over time.  
In the next two chapters I complement the quantitative analysis presented in 
this chapter with a more qualitative analysis. Since there seem to be two clearly 
different paths to welfare building in Italian regions, I first consider some cases of 
regionalist parties promoting sub-national social policies and then I focus on the 
welfare effect of left-wing parties in some of the regions in which they have been 






The (re)emergence and strengthening of the centre-periphery cleavage in Italy: 
(old and new) regionalist parties and sub-state welfare building (1980-2010) 
 
Old and new regionalist parties and the increasing saliency of the 
‘decentralisation’ issue in Italian politics 
In the previous chapter I showed that in the 1990s and 2000s there was an increase in 
the strength of regionalist parties across the 21 Italian regions. I also suggested that 
such strengthening marks a rise in the importance of the centre-periphery cleavage. 
This seems to be confirmed by data that indicate the increasing saliency of issues 
related to the territorial configuration of political power in the manifestoes of the 
main Italian parties. Figure 3.1 shows the average saliency of the decentralisation 
issue of Italian parties obtaining more than 4 per cent in national elections. Saliency is 
measured as the percentage of semi-sentences referring to two specific categories 
included in the coding of the Party Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001; Volkens et 
al., 2013) that focus on the issues of decentralisation or centralisation of 
political/economic power in a country21. The figure clearly shows that between the 
late 1980s and the 2000s, the saliency of the centralisation/decentralisation issue 
increased considerably in the Italian party system. This increase is much stronger 
than that which occurred in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, when ‘ordinary status’ 





                                                          
21
 In the codebook of the Party Manifesto Project, the two categories are 301 (federalism and decentralisation) 
and 302 (centralisation).  
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Figure 3.1. Average saliency of the centralisation-decentralisation issue in the 




Source: Volkens et al. (2013). Author’s own calculation.  
 
In the light of data showing that the saliency of regionalism has increased only in 
recent decades, it should also be underlined that, until the late 1980s, Italy, unlike 
Spain, did not have a legacy of strong ethno-territorial movements that were able to 
influence statewide politics (Llamazares and Marks, 2006: 239).  
Generally, the story of regionalist parties in Italy can be divided into two 
periods. The first period, going from 1945 to the mid-1980s, is characterised by the 
existence of some ethno-regionalist parties in small, peripheral regions such as South 
Tyrol, the Aosta Valley and Sardinia. The second period, starting in the late 1980s, 
has seen the emergence and electoral consolidation of new regionalist movements, 
the so-called leghe (leagues), which emerged as the late consequence of socio-
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economic changes that had already started in the late 1960s. According to Woods 
(1992: 56): 
 
The emergence of regional leagues are a reflection of the differentiation of Italian 
civil society from a centralised political authority - mediated through parties - and 
the development of regional and local units as centres of economic and political 
legitimacy and representation. (Italics added). 
 
Today old and more recently formed regionalist parties coexist in Italy and, as I show 
in this chapter, both types of parties have played an important role in regional 
welfare building in a context of increasing decentralisation of political power and 
economic resources.  
 
Old and new regionalist parties in Italy 
Among the ‘historical’ regionalist parties, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrolean 
People’s Party, SVP), the Union Valdôtaine (Valdostan Union, UV) and the Partito 
Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian Action Party, PSdAz) are the oldest and most important22. 
However, the latter party has played a much more marginal role in its own region 
than the other two parties. Indeed, the SVP and UV have been the dominant ruling 
parties in South Tyrol and the Aosta Valley for many decades, whereas the PSdAz 
managed to lead the regional government only in the 1980s (in a coalition with the 
much stronger Communist and Socialist Parties). In addition, the SVP and UV are 
clearly ethno-regionalist parties, representing the German-speaking and French-
speaking minorities (which are actually majorities in South Tyrol and the Aosta 
                                                          
22
 In the post-war period a regionalist movement also developed in the Autonomous Province of Trento. The 
name of the party was Trentino Tyrolean People’s Party (PPTT) and ideologically it was very similar to its alpine 
sister party the SVP. However the party was not very successful and in the late 1980s was replaced by a new, 
and electorally more relevant, party called Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party (PATT).  
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Valley), whereas the PSdAz abandoned any references to Sardinia constituting an 
‘ethnie’ at an early stage of its political life (Hepburn, 2010: 153).  
Ideologically the three parties are positioned at the centre of the political 
spectrum and have all established alliances with both centre-left and conservative 
political parties (which, in the case of the SVP and UV, have just played the role of 
junior coalition partners). The UV and the SVP represent very well what has been 
defined as the ‘alpine’ political culture, characterised by localism, ethnicity, tradition, 
religion and work ethics (Caramani and Meny, 2005; Massetti and Sandri, 2012). The 
political identity of the PSdAz is much more difficult to define and, in the period of 
its maximum political strength (the 1980s), it was influenced by the so-called Neo-
sardismo, a movement based on the demand for the recognition of Sardinian socio-
cultural traditions (Hepburn, 2011: 119). However, as underlined by Hepburn (2011), 
the story of the Sardinian party, unlike that of the two ‘Alpine’ parties, has not been 
characterised by substantial successes (see also Figure 3.2). Since the late 1980s the 
support for the PSdAz has significantly declined and in the last two decades the 
party has played a marginal role in regional politics, also suffering from the 
competition of even smaller autonomist groups (Ibid.: 123–124). The SVP and UV 
have also been challenged by some regionalist competitors (see next section) but they 












Figure 3.2. Average percentage of seats won by SVP, UV and PSdAz since the 1950s 
 
Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu. Author’s own calculation.  
 
Despite playing a very important role in their own regions, the SVP and UV were not 
able to influence the dynamics of the national party system. Only in the late 1980s 
would territorial issues start to become central in the national political debate. This 
was mainly due to the strengthening of the regional Leagues that were created in 
some Northern Italian regions, where voters were increasingly disappointed with the 
old political elites that had controlled the central government for decades. Among 
the regional leagues, the Lega Lombarda (Lombard League), led by Umberto Bossi, 
soon emerged as the strongest; and, at the 1989 European elections, it established an 
alliance with other autonomist groups in the Veneto, Piedmont, Emilia, Liguria and 
Tuscany. This alliance was the prelude to the founding of the Lega Nord (Northern 
League, LN), formally enacted on 4 December 1989 (Tarchi, 1998: 144). This new 
party can be defined as ‘macro-regionalist’ because it has sought to represent all the 
regions of Northern Italy. However, as I show in this chapter, its political strength is 
mainly concentrated in Lombardy and the Veneto and, between these two regions, 
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the former has often been the ‘dominant’ one in expressing the party leadership and 
influencing its strategy.  
The first real success of the Lega Nord occurred in the 1990 regional elections, 
when the party became the second strongest party in Lombardy and also managed to 
obtain some representation in the Veneto, Piedmont, Liguria and Emilia Romagna. 
The League soon became a politically relevant party at the national level, obtaining 
more than 8 per cent of the vote in the 1992 and 1994 general elections and even more 
than 10 per cent in the 1996 general election. This ‘new wave’ of territorialism was 
therefore much more important and had a much stronger effect on the whole Italian 
party system than the previous one. Indeed, Italian party competition was no longer 
shaped exclusively by the left-right cleavage but was also increasingly influenced by 
the tensions between centre and periphery.  
As already underlined, the Northern League has been a ‘macro-regionalist’ 
party, whose organisation has developed in more than one region. However, its 
strength has varied substantially across Northern Italian regions. Lombardy has 
clearly been at the heart of the new territorial mobilisation. This is the region in 
which the Northern League had its first electoral exploit and which has defined the 
party leadership for more than two decades. Moreover, Lombardy is by far the 
largest Italian region, and it is where the Northern League has constantly obtained 
around half of its total votes (Figure 3.3). The strategic and electoral importance of 
the Veneto has increased particularly in the last decade and this has also led to 
internal tensions with the Lombard hegemonic group. As shown in Figure 3.4, the 
support for the League has been much less stable and generally weaker in other 
central-northern Italian regions. The centrality of Lombardy in the organisation of 
the party has been challenged only in recent years by the Venetian party branch and 
this should be taken into account when studying the development of regional social 




Figure 3.3 Geographical distribution of the Northern League vote in General and 
Regional elections 1990-2013 (% by region) 
 
Source: Ministero dell’Interno (www.interno.it). Author’s own calculation. 
 
Figure 3.4 Representation of the Northern league in Central-Northern Italian regions 
(% of regional council seats) between 1990 and 2013 
 





Unlike the SVP and UV, the Northern League could not appeal to ethnic or cultural 
regionalism but, rather, stressed the fact that Lombardy and the other Northern 
regions were the wealthiest in Italy and that their dynamic economies were being 
‘exploited’ by the central government. As underlined by Golden (2004), the Northern 
League attracted the support of those entrepreneurs and productive groups that saw 
central political elites as an obstacle to their economic competitiveness in the global 
markets.  
Of course, it was not long before the Northern League started promoting an 
‘invented ethnicity’ and tried to establish some historical and cultural foundations 
for its claims of self-determination. However it always combined these cultural 
aspects with ‘individualism, hard work and free market values’ (Ginsborg, 1996: 30). 
Giordano (2000: 445) has argued that ‘the LN has attempted to invent an ethnicity for 
the North of Italy (or “Padania”) in order to justify its political claims for the 
protection of the economic interests of the region.’ It is thus no surprise that the party 
soon positioned itself on the right of the political spectrum and established an 
alliance with Berlusconi’s party (Forza Italia), which was created in 1994 and 
‘occupied the same ideological space—neoliberalism, anti-statism, fiscal protest—but 
was not territorially bounded to the north alone’ (Ignazi, 2005: 345). This contributed 
to the creation of a hegemonic political block in Northern Italy, and particularly in 
Lombardy, based on a mix of market values, populism and localism. 
The Northern League has been the main but not the only regionalist party to 
emerge in the last twenty years. For instance, in the Autonomous Province of Trento, 
autonomist parties and movements strengthened significantly in the early 1990s. 
Among these parties, the Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese (Trentino Tyrolean 
Autonomist Party, PATT) has been the most successful (Stacul, 2003) and is today 
leading the government of Trento. Like the SVP in South Tyrol, the PATT is a centrist 
party, clearly linked to the alpine political tradition, which, however, does not aim to 
represent a specific ethno-linguistic minority.  
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The new wave of territorial mobilisation has been much weaker in Southern 
Italy, with the partial exception of Sicily. Until the mid-2000s, territorial mobilisation 
was almost completely absent in this region and statewide parties remained 
dominant and unchallenged political actors (Sberna, 2013: 265). Only in the second 
half of the 2000s was a new regionalist movement called the Movimento per le 
Autonomie (Movement for Autonomies, MPA) created on the basis of a pro-south 
political platform calling for more economic and political self-determination for 
Sicily and other Southern Italian regions. The leader of the party, Raffaele Lombardo 
(a former Christian Democrat), was elected president of the region in 2008 with the 
support of a centre-right coalition formed of statewide and regionalist movements. 
Since then, the political mobilisation of the centre-periphery cleavage has become a 
more relevant phenomenon in Sicilian politics and also statewide parties have 
suffered internal divisions based on territorial struggles. However, Sicilian politics 
has been very unstable in recent years and, generally, it is still too soon to assess the 
effect that the emergence of new regionalist parties and the organisational 
fragmentation of statewide parties have had on Sicilian welfare governance.  
Table 3.1 summarises the main characteristics of the regionalist parties that 
have been presented in this section. The next two sections mainly focus on two 
specific cases of old and new regionalist parties in action: the SVP in South Tyrol and 
the Northern League in Lombardy. The first region shows that a strong regional 
identity and its political mobilisation have played a very important role in the 
construction of a highly developed and distinctive welfare system. The second one 
provides a more dynamic picture. Indeed, in Lombardy regionalist mobilisation only 
emerged in the 1990s and, unlike South Tyrolean regionalism, does not have any 
historical or cultural roots. However, the growing salience of the centre-periphery 
cleavage, mainly based on socio-economic factors, has had an important impact on 
the recent development of Lombard social policies, which have become increasingly 
peculiar and innovative.  
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Table 3.1. The main (old and new) regionalist parties in Italy 
Old (but still existing) regionalist parties 
Party Region Foundation and ideology 
Südtiroler Volkspartei  
(South Tyrolean People’s Party, 
SVP) 
South Tyrol   
(Autonomous Province of 
Bolzano) 
Founded in 1945. Centrist 
(moderately conservative), 
catch-all party. Strong links 
with the ‘alpine’ tradition. 
Representative of German-
speaking ethnic minority. 
Union Valdôtaine (Valdostan 
Union, UV) 
Aosta Valley Founded in 1945. Centrist, 
catch-all party. Strong links 
with the ‘alpine’ tradition. 
Representative of French-
speaking ethnic minority. 
Partito Sardo d’Azione 
(Sardinian Action Party, PSdAz) 
Sardinia Founded in 1921. Centrist party 
(leaning to the left in the 1980s 
and to the right in more recent 
years). Influenced Neo-
sardismo in the 1980s.  
New regionalist parties 
Lega Nord  
(Northern League, LN) 
Lombardy and Veneto are 
strongholds. Party also in 
Liguria, Piedmont, Friuli Venetia 
Giulia, Trento, Aosta Valley, 
Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, 
Umbria and Marche.  
Founded in 1990/1991 as an 
alliance of regionalist leagues 
that emerged in the 1980s. 
Main values: individualism, 
hard work and free market. 
Right-wing, populist party 
supporting federalism and/or 
independence of Northern 
Italian regions. 
Partito Autonomista Trentino 
Tirolese  
(Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist 
Party, PATT) 
Autonomous Province of Trento Founded in 1988. Centrist, 
catch-all party. Strong links 
with the ‘alpine’ tradition. 
Movimento per le Autonomie 
(Movement for Autonomies, 
MPA) 
Sicily (but also some 
representation in other 
Southern Italian regions) 
Founded in 2005. Centre-right 
party, calling for more political 
and economic self-
determination of Southern Italy 





An example of an ‘alpine’ regionalist party: the SVP and the construction of a 
South Tyrolean welfare system 
 
Using a rokkanian expression, South Tyrol can be defined as an ‘inter-face’ region. 
Despite being part of the Italian state, the overwhelming majority of its population is 
linguistically and culturally closer to Austria. More generally, South Tyrol belongs to 
the category that Caramani and Mény (2004) have defined as an ‘alpine’ macro-
region, also including the Aosta Valley, Switzerland, Austria and Bavaria. This 
macro-region has experienced a relatively recent and very rapid process of economic 
expansion and is characterised by high levels of political consensualism, moderatism 
(although mixed with elements of populism) and attachment to the alpine traditions.  
Together with the Province of Trento, South Tyrol forms the Trentino Alto 
Adige region. Yet, since the beginning of the 1970s, also as a consequence of 
international agreements with the Austrian government, both provinces have 
substantially increased their powers and autonomy and the administrative role of the 
Trentino Alto Adige region is today negligible (Steininger, 2004: 136–144; Hooghe et 
al, 2010; Grote, 2012: 113 - 119). Therefore the two Autonomous Provinces of 
Bolzano/South Tyrol and Trento, have enjoyed similar powers to those of other 
‘special statute’ regions and can be seen as fully-fledged regions. For this reason, in 
the remainder of this section the terms ‘province’ and ‘region’ will be used 
interchangeably.  
The Autonomous Province of South Tyrol has been for many decades 
dominated by the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP), a moderate autonomist party that is 
very representative of the ‘alpine culture’ and traditions of the German-speaking 
community. The SVP is positioned in the centre of the political spectrum and defines 
itself as a cross-class party inspired by a Christian, ‘humanitarian’ conception of the 
world23. It is also a mass party, with more than 50,000 members – which is around ten 
                                                          
23
 From the SVP’s official website http://www.svp.eu 
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per cent of the South Tyrolese population (Massetti, 2009: 155). The ‘social’ 
orientation of the party is further strengthened by the existence of many regional 
associations directly or indirectly linked to the party. The SVP even encouraged the 
formation of an ‘ethnic’ South Tyrolean trade union, separate from the Italy-wide 
union confederations, called the Union of South Tyrolean Independent Trade Unions 
(ASGB) (Ibid.: 157). 
Despite not being the only regionalist party active in South Tyrol, the SVP has 
been by far the largest one, controlling the absolute majority of seats and the regional 
government since the post-war period (Figure 5). Only in recent years has the 
primacy of the SVP been challenged by a new regionalist party, Die Freiheitlichen, 
which, unlike the SVP, has a more populist political platform (similar to the Austrian 
Freedom Party, FPÖ) and aims to achieve full independence (not just ‘special’ 
autonomy) for South Tyrol (Massetti, 2009: 168). In the last regional election of 2013, 
the SVP failed to obtain the absolute majority of South Tyrolean seats for the first 
time since the creation of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano (Scantamburlo and 
Pallaver 2014). On the other hand, Die Freiheitlichen increased their electoral support 
to almost 20 per cent of the vote. Overall, as shown in Figure 3.5, the representation 










Figure 3.5. Share of council seats controlled by the SVP, other regionalist parties and 
statewide parties in the Autonomous Province of Bolzano-South from 1948 to 2013. 
 
 
By employing the framework presented by Stolz (2009) in his study on regional 
representation in Scotland and Catalonia, South Tyrolean political parties can be 
located on a two-dimensional map that considers both centre-periphery and left-right 
political cleavages (Figure 3.6). As already mentioned, the SVP is the ‘hegemonic 
party’ (Holzer and Schwegler 1998) and occupies a moderate, centre-right political 
position and, of course, it has a pro-regionalist political stance. The other main 
regionalist parties, Die Freiheitlichen (DF) and the Northern League (LN) are more 
clearly on the right but the latter is less pro-regionalist, since it does not focus on 
South Tyrolean autonomy but on the autonomy (or even independence) of the 
Padania macro-region (central-northern Italy) as a whole (Giordano 2000 and 2001). 
Therefore it does not fully acknowledge the specificity of South Tyrol. On the centre-
left we have the Democratic Party (PD), which is moderately pro-autonomy and, in 
recent years, has even established alliances with the SVP (dotted line in Figure 3.6). 
The Green Party has also been a rather important left-wing party and supportive of 
decentralisation. On the centre-right the People of Freedom (PDL-FI) has been less 
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supportive of autonomy and has actually been the main representative of Italian 
nationalism. 
 
Figure 3.6. Locating South Tyrolean parties in the two-dimensional political map 







































As underlined by Holzer and Schwegler (1998: 164), in South Tyrol  
[T]he regional feeling of belonging is the point of reference for social and 
political issues. The main political task of the SVP is not only to defend the 
political and socio-economic rights of the German community but also to 
strengthen a sense of solidarity and thereby enhance chances for survival (italics 
added). 
 
This suggests that regional welfare may have been used to preserve and further 
strengthen the distinctiveness of the South Tyrolean ‘ethnic’ community. In the 
development of regional social policies the SVP seems to have followed the 
alpine/conservative idea that the social cohesion of the local community and 
traditional social structures should be preserved through social programmes that are 
much more generous than the national ones. Additionally, although social initiatives 
promoted by private actors are welcomed, the SVP has generally been suspicious of 
processes of privatisation and market-based competition24. This may be seen as a 
defensive response from the traditionalist alpine culture against processes of extreme 
liberalisation that might undermine social harmony (Caramani and Mény, 2005; 
Pallaver, 2005).   
Within the European Union, South Tyrol has been able to strengthen its cross-
border relationships and reinforce the distinctiveness of its social model. For 
instance, with the establishment of the Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino Euroregion25, the 
Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano and the Austrian Land of Tyrol have 
promoted many cooperation projects in the fields of health care, social assistance and 
employment policy. The high mobility within this Euroregion has required the 
                                                          
24
  In 2009 the health care minister of the province of Bolzano, Richard Theiner, stated that ‘a privatization of 
the health care system, which implies increasing competition between private and public sectors, is not a 
sensible measure’. 
http://www.provinz.bz.it/sanita/attualita/news.asp?&aktuelles_action=4&aktuelles_article_id=314380 (date of 
access 3/03/2013). 
25




establishment of special arrangements and the coordination of health systems that 
are shaped by different national legacies and legislative frameworks26. Special 
emphasis has also been placed on the construction of integrated systems of social 
protection, which also include ‘activation policies’ and cooperation in vocational 
training27, a sector in which South Tyrol seems closer to its Austrian counterpart than 
to the rest of Italy. Generally, the South Tyrolean political elite has seen the European 
integration as an opportunity to actively participate in a process of social integration 
within a cross-national macro-region. Yet while promoting cross-border 
convergence, South Tyrol is gradually shifting away from other Italian regions. 
As argued by Sagner (2011), the traditional family is conceived as the centre of 
the South Tyrolean welfare system, which mixes very generous monetary transfers 
with well-developed in-kind services of social assistance. As shown in Figure 3.7, 
cash benefits (particularly maternity benefits) directly transferred by regional 
institutions to families are much higher than in other regions analysed in this study, 
such as Lombardy and Tuscany, and in the rest of Italy. It is also significant that, 
unlike in many other Italian regions, in South Tyrol (but also in the Aosta Valley) the 
regional ‘ministry’ of social assistance is explicitly called the department of ‘family 
and social policies’. In 2012, the South Tyrolean government approved a ‘Family 
Charter’ (Carta Famiglia), and in 2013 it passed a special law aimed at ‘developing 
and supporting the family in South Tyrol’ through an extensive and highly 
integrated system of benefits coordinated by a Family Agency (Agenzia per la famiglia) 
(Sagner, 2013: 20). The new law states that: 
 
                                                          
26
 http://www.europaregion.info/it/convegno-diritto-alla-salute.asp (date of access 03/07/2015) 
27
 http://www.europaregion.info/it/euregio-tagung-zum-thema-arbeit-lehrlingswesen-im-vergleich.asp (date 
of access 14/07/2015) 
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The family is the foundation of our society and it is the primary locus of 
education, formation and socialisation for children. It plays an important social 




This strong support for the family should not be confused with ‘familialism’ or 
‘familism’ that can be generally found in southern European welfare systems and in 
the Italy-wide welfare system in particular. Indeed, whereas the ‘family-oriented’ 
welfare system of South Tyrol actively supports the family through extensive public 
policies, generous money transfers and efficient services, the ‘familistic’ welfare 
system does not provide such active and extensive support but, due to its inertia, 
actually burdens families with additional responsibilities in the provision of social 
care. As pointed out by Flaquer (2000), ‘in Southern Europe it is taken for granted 
that it is up to households to provide for the welfare of their members and therefore 
no emphasis is placed on family policy’ (italics added). Generally, the South Tyrolean 
model of welfare can be defined as a ‘family supporting’ system, in which: 
[F]amily roles are assisted to continue, or are taken over in whole or in part, by 
various supplementary services or by services which substitute for the family 








                                                          
28 Legge provinciale 17 maggio 2013, n. 8, Sviluppo e sostegno della famiglia in Alto Adige 
http://lexbrowser.provinz.bz.it/doc/it/197036/legge_provinciale_17_maggio_2013_n_8.aspx?view=1&a=2013




Figure 3.7. Per-capita monetary transfers to families in South Tyrol, Tuscany, and Lombardy 
(Italian average also indicated) from 1981 to 2010. Spending in euros at 2010 constant prices. 
 
 
Source ISSiRFA. Author’s own calculation. 
 
To be sure, higher pro-family spending may be partly due to the greater fiscal 
autonomy that South Tyrol enjoys in comparison with Tuscany, Lombardy, and 
other regions that have been given ‘ordinary’ powers. However, this spending gap 
between South Tyrol and other Italian regions has remained rather stable in more 
recent years, even though constitutional reforms have significantly reduced 
institutional asymmetries, also in term of fiscal autonomy, between ‘special’ and 
‘ordinary’ regions by granting increasing powers to the latter (Amoretti, 2011). 
Moreover, even compared to its ‘sister’ autonomous province of Trento, which 
enjoys the same degree of fiscal autonomy, South Tyrol has been much more 





Figure 3.8. Per-capita transfers to families in the Autonomous Province of 
Bolzano/South Tyrol and Trento from 1981 to 2010 (Spending in euros at 2010 
constant prices) 
 
Source ISSiRFA. Author’s own calculation. 
 
Therefore, political, rather than institutional, factors might have played an important 
role in determining the clear pro-family orientation of South Tyrolean social policies. 
Indeed, the dominant ruling force of South Tyrol, the SVP, is culturally quite close to 
other political movements of the ‘alpine’ region such as the German CSU or the 
Austrian ÖVP, which, also inspired by a Christian democratic vision of welfare, 
support a family-centred (but not familistic) model of welfare. On the other hand, in 
Trento the political influence of ‘alpine’ territorial mobilisation has been mitigated by 
the greater strength of (centre-left and centre-right) Italy-wide parties, which still 
control around 50 per cent of the provincial representation. 
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South Tyrol is a rather small region and, partly for this reason, one may expect 
to find a regional model of governance in which municipalities are granted 
significant discretionary powers in welfare administration. The Christian democratic 
political tradition inspiring the SVP may also have contributed to strengthening the 
so-called ‘subsidiarity principle’, according to which local/municipal authorities 
should be central actors in policy making and implementation (Huber, Ragin and 
Stephens, 1993: 717). In this context, the ‘central’ government of the region is 
expected to support or replace municipal authorities only when they are unable to 
perform their administrative functions. In reality, the approach of the South Tyrolean 
regional government has generally been much more centralistic and paternalistic 
than one would expect, with municipal and social actors more or less systematically 
excluded from core planning activities (Lippi, 2006: 219).  
Of course, the establishment in 1991 of district agencies, called Comunità 
Comprensoriali, which involve municipalities in the administration of social services, 
has encouraged local communities to cooperate among themselves and with the 
regional government. For instance, municipalities, through the Comunità 
Comprensoriali, may participate in the drafting of the regional social plan. However, 
the regional government by exerting almost full control over the budgeting process 
clearly maintains a dominant role in the development of social programmes (Sagner, 
2011).  
This ‘regional centralism’ may be explained by the fact that the largest 
municipalities of South Tyrol (Bolzano and Merano) are the ones in which the Italian 
community is strong and the SVP has the weakest political support. On the other 
hand, the SVP is clearly dominant in most of the small municipalities and villages of 
the Autonomous Province29. The electoral geography of the region may therefore 
explain why the SVP has actually placed more emphasis on the regional (i.e. 
                                                          
29
 The Autonomous Province of South Tyrol has 116 municipalities 96 of these have a population of less than 
5,000 inhabitants (source: http://www.comuni-italiani.it/021/lista.html, date of access, 1/12/2013).  
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provincial) level than on the municipal/local level. Indeed, in a context of higher 
autonomy of the local level, the largest municipalities, where the SVP is politically 
weaker, would have more opportunities (and resources) to challenge the policies 
promoted by the regionally dominant party. At the same time, a weak role of the 
regional government in social planning and coordination would risk jeopardising the 
effectiveness of social policies in small towns and villages in the rest of the Province, 
thus undermining the existence of a distinctive and integrated South Tyrolean 
welfare model.  
Another interesting point is that, although the Italian central government still 
fully controls the administration of pension schemes and social insurance, South 
Tyrol also developed a system of complementary pension schemes between the early 
1990s and early 2000s (Sagner, 2011: 174; Ferrera, 2005: 201). At the same time, a 
rather advanced and extended system of income support for vulnerable social 
groups has been established. In particular, South Tyrol is one of the few Italian 
regions to have introduced a ‘basic guaranteed income’ and a ‘housing benefit’ 
mainly targeted at the unemployed but also at students, pensioners and other 
economically vulnerable groups (even immigrants). In 2010, between 2.1 and 2.8 per 
cent of the population benefited from the two programmes (Sagner, 2011: 160), a 
rather high figure in a region where unemployment is below 3 per cent (ISTAT). 
Of course, as already mentioned in this section, the financial generosity of the 
South Tyrolean welfare system is also explained by the fact that this region enjoys 
some fiscal autonomy (it is a ‘Special Statute Region’). However, as shown in the 
quantitative analysis, formal institutional asymmetries are weakly correlated to 
welfare development in Italian regions and, in any case, they do not help explain 
how economic resources are allocated and administered. Indeed, welfare governance 
in South Tyrol is mainly the outcome of a political process in which the regionalist 
party SVP has been the undisputed protagonist.  
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In sum, the existence of a strong regional identity and political mobilisation 
seems to have favoured the emergence of a well-defined social model in South Tyrol. 
That model is in many respects different to the Italian model, defined as ‘southern 
European’ by welfare literature focusing on ‘nation-states’. Indeed, whereas the 
former is characterised by integrated social governance, high spending generosity, 
pro-family public policies, complementary pension schemes and extensive support 
for the poor, the latter has often been described as a highly fragmented, 
underdeveloped, residual, familistic and ‘exclusive’ system of social protection.  
 
South Tyrol is similar to other Italian regions characterised by what has been called 
welfare munifico – generous welfare (Caltabiano, 2004). This type of welfare can also 
be defined as the alpine model, given the fact that the regions adopting it are all 
located in the alpine macro-region and are characterised by the existence of similar 
territorial movements (alpine regionalist movements). The Autonomous Province of 
Trento has already been mentioned. Although its welfare system is less generous and 
distinctive than the South Tyrolean one, the increasing ‘regionalisation’ of its party 
system since the early 1990s (with the strengthening of the PATT and other 
autonomist movements) seems to have had an effect on the development of policies 
that are also characterised by high spending generosity, integrated services and pro-
family policies. In 2012, during a general conference on the welfare system of Trento, 
Ugo Rossi, leader of the Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party and former provincial 
‘minister’ of health care and social policy (today he is president of the Autonomous 
Province), argued that in a context of retrenchment of the Italian welfare system, the 
province of Trento increased its social spending (which is twice as large as the Italian 
average), extended the network of assistance for the most vulnerable sectors of 
society (the elderly, poor, children and youth) and implemented pro-family policies 
111 
 
aimed at boosting birth rates30. In 2011 the Provincial government even created a 
Provincial Agency for Family, Birth Rate and Youth Policies, with the aim of 
‘supporting the family through innovative policies’31. 
Another important example of the alpine welfare model is the Aosta Valley. In 
the quantitative section presented in the previous chapter, this small region of 
Northern Italy had the highest score of welfare development measured on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 1 (0.95). Also in this case, an ethno-regionalist party representing 
the French-speaking minority, the Union Valdôtaine, has been the dominant political 
force for many years. Similarly to South Tyrol, the creation of an integrated system of 
generous social programmes seems to lie at the heart of the welfare model of the 
Aosta Valley32. Figures provided by the Institute for the Study of Regionalism, 
                                                          
30
 Parts of Ugo Rossi’s speech can be found at  http://www.trentinofamiglia.it/Attualita/Archivio-
2012/Marzo/Un-welfare-inclusivo (date of access 2/12/2013).  
‘Il contesto in cui troviamo ad operare è molto cambiato in questi anni. Basti un dato: nel 2007 il Fondo 
nazionale per le politiche sociali era di 745 milioni di euro, l'anno scorso è stato di 274 milioni, questi sono i 
tagli apportati dai governi nazionali. Poi c'è stata la riforma pensionistica, fatta nel giro di poche settimane, ma 
la sfida è l'invecchiamento della popolazione: in Trentino nel 1981 c'erano 11 mila persone con più di 80 anni di 
età, oggi sono 30 mila e le stime ci dicono che diventeranno oltre 50 mila nel 2030. Viviamo di più, ma è chiaro 
che le cronicità ci accompagnano per un periodo assai più lungo della nostra vita. Si lavora in modo 
discontinuo, non ci sono coperture pensionistiche, abbiamo anche un modello familiare in crisi, le difficoltà 
nelle genitorialita sono gravi e lo stesso disagio ha cambiato i suoi connotati: basti pensare al gioco d'azzardo. 
La crisi ha cambiato il contesto in cui viviamo e sono nate nuove povertà. In questo quadro altre indicazioni, ad 
esempio sull'immigrazione: oggi i nuovi trentini sono il 10 per cento della popolazione, erano meno dell'1 per 
cento nel 1992’. ‘Il Trentino oggi mette in campo 268 euro, contro i 107 della media italiana, nella spesa pro 
capite in politiche sociali. La Provincia dovrà sempre più garantire reti di protezione, mentre toccherà alle 
Comunità, al territorio, al privato sociale e al volontariato essere chiamati a realizzare le risposte personalizzate 
al bisogno. Diverse sono le sfide: assegno di cura, ammortizzatori del lavoro - ricordo che con l'accordo di 
Milano possiamo sperimentare e sostenere ingresso e uscita dal lavoro -, sostegno alla natalità (e lo abbiamo 
fatto con legge apposita), frontiera della politiche della casa con una attenzione particolare nel far sì che 
all'abitazione possano accedere in particolare i giovani. Infine le politiche assistenziali, dove accanto al reddito 
di garanzia abbiamo voluto affidare responsabilità al territorio assegnando alle Comunità la competenza 
diretta. Già in questo 2012 avremo per la prima volta i piani sociali della Comunità, elaborati sul territorio con 
tutti i soggetti’. 
31
 See http://www.trentinofamiglia.it/Menu/Chi-e-dove-siamo (date of access 02/12/2013). 
32
 From the official website of the Union Valdôtaine http://www.unionvaldotaine.org/datapage.asp?id=87&l=1 
(date of access 02/12/2013): 
‘Les politiques sociales continueront à assurer le Welfare régional, dans l’objectif d’une distribution toujours 
plus équitable des ressources, par le biais d’actions visant à identifier et à toucher les couches les plus faibles. 
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Federalism and Self-Government suggest that the amount of cash benefits directly 
transferred to families is very similar to that of South Tyrol, which, as shown above, 
is far above the average of all the other Italian regions33. Finally, in the 2000s, the 
government of the Aosta Valley has also promoted the establishment of 
complementary pension schemes aiming at compensating for the retrenchment of 
statewide social insurance34.  
 
Lombardy: the epicentre of the ‘regionalist earthquake’ in the late 1980s.  
Until the early 1990s Lombardy was the stronghold of electoral support for the 
Christian Democratic Party (DC), the dominant party in central government, and the 
Socialist Party (PSI), its junior coalition partner. This perhaps explains the scarce 
attention that pre-1990 regional governments have paid to the development of 
region-specific social policies (Ciarini, 2012). However, in the early 1990s Lombardy 
became the centre of an electoral earthquake that would completely change the 
Italian party system and make the centre-periphery cleavage very salient in the 
political debate (Fargion, 2005). Indeed the Lombard League, a regionalist party that 
then merged with other regionalist parties and became the Northern League (LN), 
mobilised a very large share of the Lombard electorate on the basis of a platform that 
called for increasing regional autonomy and fiscal federalism. In 1994, in a context of 
deep crisis of statewide political parties, a member of the Northern League, Paolo 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Pour ce faire, le concept même de politiques sociales devra englober non seulement les actions d’assistance, 
mais aussi l’ensemble des politiques publiques destinées à défendre l’individu et sa famille’ 
33
 For instance, in 2010 the amount of per capita cash transfers to families was 400 euros in the Aosta Valley, 
514 euros in South Tyrol and 202 euros in Trento. In all other regions, regional cash benefits to families were 
below 100 euros (average 16 euros). Data from ISSiRFA http://www.issirfa.cnr.it/1219,1018.html 
34
 From the official website of the Union Valdôtaine http://www.unionvaldotaine.org/datapage.asp?id=87&l=1 
(date of access 02/12/2013): 
‘Les réformes des retraites qui ont été introduites en Italie entraîneront une réduction progressive des 
couvertures garanties par la retraite de base; par conséquent, la prévoyance complémentaire représente un 
moyen toujours plus important pour le futur maintien d’un niveau de revenu adéquat. Il s’avère fondamental 
de mettre en œuvre les stratégies et mesures au profit de la population valdôtaine déjà énoncées dans la loi 
régionale n° 27/2006, en vertu surtout des compétences du ressort de notre Région.’ 
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Arrigoni, even managed to become President of the Region35 (although his 
presidency only lasted for one year). 
As mentioned in the first part of this chapter, the LN soon established an 
alliance with the centre-right party created by Silvio Berlusconi in the mid-1990s. 
This contributed to the formation of a new dominant coalition that has been very 
active in the promotion of a Lombard model of welfare. Unlike the SVP, the 
Northern League has not monopolised the process of welfare building since it acted 
as a junior, although very influential, coalition partner of a statewide political party. 
Moreover, the Lombard health care reform was approved at the end of the 1990s, 
before the formal involvement of the League in the centre-right regional government. 
As underlined by Maino (2001) and Gori (2005), the Lombard branch of Berlusconi’s 
party – Forza Italia (FI), later called Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom, PDL) – 
and its leaders (especially the regional president, Roberto Formigoni) played a very 
important role in the transformation of the Lombard welfare system with the support 
of important interest and business groups, the most important ones being the 
catholic organisations Comunione e Liberazione (CL) and Compagnia delle Opere.  
However, even if indirectly, regionalist mobilisation set the conditions 
favouring the process of sub-national welfare building. First of all, it put an end to 
the supremacy of political forces such as the Christian Democrats and its allies that 
considered Lombardy as an electoral fiefdom upon which they could rely to 
consolidate their control of the central government. With the rise of the Northern 
League, Lombardy ceased to be a safe power basis on which central elites could rely 
and in fact became a challenger of the national government. As already mentioned, 
the Northern League strengthened and stabilised the front of supporters of a market-
based model of welfare (Alfieri, 2008), which, if efficiently implemented, would 
become an additional element of distinctiveness of the region.  
                                                          
35
 The other case of regional presidency obtained by the Northern League in the early 1990s was in the Friuli 
Venetia Giulia region (1993-1994 and 1994-1995).  
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Secondly, the increasing saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage in Lombard 
politics could not be ignored by the local leaders of the new statewide party founded 
by Berlusconi, which saw the League as an important ally but also as a competitor on 
the centre-right. As highlighted by Cento Bull and Gilbert (2001: 103), the Northern 
League’s project of promoting Lombard autonomy could be perpetrated and 
expanded ‘thanks to the renewed alliance between this party and Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia, which was subject to the latter accepting the need to promote regional 
autonomy’.  
It should also be added that, as pointed out by Hopkin (2009a: 98), within the 
internal organisation of Forza Italia the Lombard branch led by Roberto Formigoni 
has de facto acted as an autonomous territorial party, following an independent 
political line and forming social and political alliances with a broad range of regional 
interest groups. This suggests that territorial mobilisation and region-specific issues 
may become important also within statewide political parties that are characterised 
by a ‘stratarchical’ political organisation (Carty, 2004; Katz and Mair, 2009) and are 
challenged by purely regionalist parties. These intra-party dynamics were not 
detected by the quantitative analysis presented in the previous chapter and this 
points to the importance of combining quantitative and qualitative analyses (the 
‘nested’ analysis proposed by Lieberman [2005]) in order to maximize the validity of 
social and political research. 
Additionally, it is important to note that, once the Northern League became a 
stable coalition partner in the centre-right Lombard government, it almost constantly 
controlled the regional department of health care36. Therefore the LN has gradually 
strengthened its role in the governance of Lombard welfare and has also become 
increasingly closer to key interest groups, like the already mentioned Comunione e 
Liberazione (Pinotti, 2010), with which it had initially had a difficult relationship.  
                                                          
36
 Two Northern League members, Alessandro Cè and Luciano Bresciani, were health care ‘ministers’ in 
Lombardy between 2005 and 2012.  
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Thus, in the two-dimensional map of party competition (Figure 3.9) the LN is 
located on the right of the political spectrum and on the pro-regionalist side. Unlike 
the SVP, however, it is just a junior partner of a larger statewide, centre-right force 
(PDL-FI), which, however, has also been moderately supportive of decentralisation. 
On the left, we find the centre left coalition, dominated by the Democratic Party, PD, 
which has played an opposition role in regional politics over the last twenty years. 
 
Figure 3.9. Locating Lombard parties on the two-dimensional political map combining left-

































As shown in the quantitative part of this study, today the Lombard welfare system is 
one of the most efficient in Italy and provides an extensive set of services to Lombard 
citizens. However, the provision of such services is not fully controlled by the public 
sector. As underlined by Gori (2005), the long-term plan of the Lombard regional 
government is to privatise the provision of social services, while assigning the role of 
financier and regulator to the public sector. This can also be defined as a ‘competition 
system under fixed prices’ or ‘quasi-market system’ with the assumption that the 
only way public and private providers can compete, given that the prices paid by 
patients are fixed (at zero), is via their quality and their ability to meet the demand 
generated by their choice of quality (Colombo, 2008: 191; Gravelle et al. 2012: 5; 
Benassi and Mussoni, 2013: 171–172). Competition among private service providers 
is thought to make the allocation of public funds more efficient. In the health care 
sector, the main principle that has driven health care reforms in Lombardy is that 
‘money follows the patients’ and this should reward those providers that are able to 
attract a larger number of ‘citizens-customers’ (Neri, 2008: 107; Bifulco 2011). Table 
3.2 shows that the percentage of in-patients treated in private hospitals increased 
considerably in Lombardy from 1995 to 2010, whereas it remained stable, at 
relatively low levels, in Tuscany and South Tyrol.  
 
Table 3.2. Percentage of in-patients treated in private hospitals (1995–2010). 
 1995 2010 
Lombardy 11% 26.9% 
Tuscany 5.9% 7.3% 
South Tyrol 8.5% 5.1% 




As underlined by Fox Harding (1996: 212), ‘in the field of family policy, it is 
important to distinguish rhetoric from reality’. Indeed, another aspect that 
characterises the new Lombard welfare is the marked discrepancy between formal 
political statements that are highly supportive of the role of the family (Marotta, 
2011; Gori, 2011a) and actual policies. For instance, the social plans of 2005-2009 and 
2010-2014 clearly state that the aim of the region is to build a system that has ‘the 
individual and the family at its centre’ (Piano Socio-Sanitario, 2007-2009: 34; Piano 
Socio-Sanitario, 2010-2014: 38, italics added). However, as underlined by Gori (2005, 
2011b) and as suggested by the spending figures presented in the previous section on 
South Tyrol, the actual support for the family – in terms of monetary transfers and 
in-kind services – seems rather limited. This is not so surprising since the largely pro-
market idea of social assistance supported by the Lombard ruling coalition seems to 
put more emphasis on individual choice rather than on the preservation of 
traditional family ties.  
Despite the promotion of ‘horizontal subsidiarity’ between public and private 
sectors, the Lombard government has established a rather vertical system of 
governance in which sub-regional, municipal authorities are seen as rather passive 
executors of decisions taken by regional central institutions (Pavolini, 2008: 175). 
Therefore national centralism has been replaced by regional centralism. District health 
care agencies (the ASL) have been created but they have not been arenas of local 
social planning but instruments of control and monitoring over the implementation 
of central programmes. This has not substantially changed since the establishment of 
district plans (Piani di Zona) in 2002, since the plans directly developed by the 
regional government have remained quite detailed, leaving municipalities with little 
margin for manoeuver (Avanzini and Ghetti, 2011: 108). Therefore there is a 
hierarchical rather than horizontal relationship between regional agencies and 
municipalities (Gori, 2005).  
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Additionally, the region does not seem to encourage the formation of an 
institutionalised system of bargaining with social partners. Agreements with trade 
unions and employers’ organisations are often the initiative of individual (often 
centre-left) municipalities (Colombo and Regalia, 2011) without the coordinating 
action of the regional government. In any case, concertazione37 is not recognised as a 
stable method of social governance. The type of welfare system adopted in 
Lombardy has been influenced by the marked aversion of the regional government 
towards the role played by municipal authorities and social partners in the planning 
of social programmes. It is also partly influenced by the more ‘region-centric’ vision 
of governance supported by the Northern League (Stacul, 2003: 30), which sees 
regional institutions as the most important level of political action against the 
centralising pressures of Rome and the demands coming from sub-regional 
municipalities that are often controlled by hostile, centre-left coalitions. Indeed, 
whereas the regional government has been constantly controlled by a centre-right 
coalition within which the Northern League has been one of the two main pillars 
(together with Berlusconi’s party), many municipalities in important areas of 
Lombardy have been controlled by centre-left coalitions. Thus the sub-regional map 
of power of Lombardy has been much more complex than the macro-level picture 
suggests (Calossi, 2013) and this has had a certain (negative) effect on the 
relationship between regional and sub-regional authorities.  
Also in the sector of social assistance, Lombardy emerges as the most market-
oriented region. Indeed, with the establishment of a system of vouchers (Gori, 2005; 
Giunco, 2011; Pesenti, 2005), Lombard citizens are free to choose their service 
providers, which therefore have to compete in order to attract the largest share of 
customers and obtain public funds. The highly distinctive welfare system of 
Lombardy is therefore based on the figure of the ‘individual-customer’, who is given 
                                                          
37
 Type of social governance in which social partners (especially trade unions and employers’ organisations) 
play an important role under the coordination of public institutions. 
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full freedom of choice in a competing system of service providers (Pavolini, 2004: 
192). In sum, regionalist mobilisation has created the conditions for the construction 
of a peculiar model of welfare that tries to promote Lombard citizens’ well-being by 
fostering private participation in social assistance.  
As in the case of South Tyrol, also Lombardy has exploited the opportunities 
offered by the process of European integration and has promoted social cooperation 
with regions in other EU member states. In 1988, ‘The Four Motors of Europe’ – an 
interregional association between Lombardy, Catalonia, Baden Württemberg and 
Rhônes-Alps – was created to strengthen economic cooperation among four of the 
richest regions in Europe. This, in turn, prompted the trade unions of the four 
regions to coordinate their actions and promote a common social agenda (Ferrera, 
2005: 185). To be sure, this regional association was more based on socio-economic 
affinities than on geopolitical, political and cultural factors (which play a much more 
important role in the Alpine Euroregion to which South Tyrol belongs). However, it 
is another example of Europe as an open arena in which alliances between regions 
belonging to different countries may take place and may give life to initiatives that 
often include a social policy component. Additionally, one can note some common 
characteristics, such as the market-based approach and the stress on freedom of 
choice, in the social models adopted by Lombardy and Catalonia (for a detailed 
analysis of the Catalan case see chapter 6). This aspect, of course, does not provide 
enough evidence to causally link interregional associations and the diffusion of 
specific social models, but may suggest that cross-border regional cooperation is 
positively driven by the existence of common conceptions of social governance. 
Overall, as highlighted by Colombo (2008: 192), the Lombard model is ‘very 
different from the traditional Italian welfare system’. Indeed, whereas the former is 
inspired by ‘freedom of choice and public recognition of private initiatives’, the latter 
views ‘social policy and education as matters which belong to the public-monopoly 
remit’. The result is that the ‘two different perspectives are confronting each other’. 
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In the Italian system, ‘individuals, families and social bodies are assisted as passive 
targets of welfare policies’. On the other hand, in Lombardy, individuals and, to a 
lesser extent, families and social bodies (mainly pro-business organisations) ‘are 
empowered and conceived as active subjects of welfare policies’. 
Despite this generally positive picture, in more recent years the Lombard 
system has undergone a period of crisis due to some corruption scandals that have 
exposed the collusion between the regional political elite and the private 
associations, particularly CL, that have promoted the marketization of the Lombard 
welfare system. Yet these scandals have not resulted in a change of orientation of the 
regional government and have actually increased the strength of the Northern 
League in the regional government. Indeed, Roberto Formigoni, president of the 
regions since 1995 and member of Berlusconi’s political movement, has been 
replaced by Roberto Maroni, new leader of the Northern League, who won the 
regional election in 2013 with the support of a ‘renewed’ centre-right coalition. Thus, 
despite its electoral decline in the national political debate, today the Northern 
League has become the leading party of the Lombard government. So far, this 
‘change of the guard’ within the dominant centre-right coalition has not produced 
any substantial change in the type of welfare model promoted in Lombardy, thus 
supporting once again the argument that the League has also been an important 
promoter of the ‘market-based’ model of welfare established in Lombardy. In his 
election programme, Maroni underlines the importance of further developing the 
‘open’ health care system of the region based on the ‘freedom of choice between 
public and private sectors’. The same programme also emphasises the fundamental 
role of the 1997 reform of the health care system that started the process of ‘new’ 
welfare building in Lombardy (Northern League-Maroni, Election Programme ‘La 




The case of the Veneto, another region in which the Northern League has had 
significant support, is more puzzling than the Lombard one. In the quantitative 
analysis presented in the previous chapter, the Veneto has an intermediate score of 
welfare development, well below that of other regions in which regionalist 
mobilisation has been rather strong. How then can this ‘Venetian exception’ be 
explained?  
One possible explanation can be found in the context in which Venetian 
territorial mobilisation emerged. Indeed, the Veneto is often considered as the best 
example of an Italian region in which a deep and socially diffuse political sub-culture 
influenced by Catholicism has developed and remained very strong for most of the 
20th century38 (Baccetti and Messina, 2009). It is therefore not surprising that this sub-
culture has also influenced the Venetian branch of the Northern League, which in the 
1990s replaced the Christian Democratic Party as the dominant political force in 
important parts of the regional territory (Bull and Gilbert, 2001: 102). Subsidiarity has 
been one of the main principles supported by social Catholicism and this has resulted 
in more emphasis being placed on the social role of municipalities, local 
organisations and the church rather than on the role of region-wide institutions and 
political actors. Given this historical legacy, the Venetian welfare system has 
developed as a ‘polycentric’ system in which regional institutions have played a less 
central role even in a context of increasing territorial mobilisation (Ciarini, 2012: 145). 
In fact, the strengthening of regional autonomy and identity has contributed to the 
consolidation and development of a polycentric and local-based, rather than region-
centric, social system (Ibid: 148). Since the data used for the quantitative part of this 
study mainly refer to the level of development of policies directly promoted and 
planned by the regional government, they may not have captured the high development 
and distinctiveness of social policies promoted at the local level.  
                                                          
38
 Catholicism has been very strong in many Italian regions, particularly in the South. However, the Veneto 
region has been the only case of ‘organised’ Catholicism, which has supported the emergence of a highly 
developed and integrated civil society. 
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Additionally, other qualitative data, which could not be included in the 
quantitative part, seem to suggest that, at least partly, the Veneto has also been an 
arena for the development of innovative social policies. For instance, a regional 
solidarity fund was established in the 1990s to promote individual retirement savings 
(Ferrera, 2005: 201). The stress on complementary pension schemes for some specific 
sectors of the labour force makes the Veneto partly similar to conservative/alpine 
regions, although in the Venetian case social partners (the catholic trade union, CISL 
and employers’ organisations) seem to have played a more active role. 
Finally, the fact that the region-wide welfare model of the Veneto is not as 
well defined as the Lombard one may be due to political dynamics within the 
Northern League and to differences in the level of autonomy of regional leaderships 
within the mainstream centre-right party, Forza Italia-PdL. Firstly, the Northern 
League can be defined as a macro-regionalist party, since it is a federation of 
different regionalist movements that merged in the early 1990s. The Lombard 
League, originally led by Umberto Bossi, who then became the leader of the whole 
confederation, has always been at the centre of the running of the confederated 
organisation. As pointed out by Tambini (2001: 92), the regional branches of the 
Northern League have had little influence in the highly centralised policy 
formulation process of the League dominated by the Lombard leadership of Umberto 
Bossi and his closest allies. Lombardy has therefore been more relevant in the 
political strategies of the macro-regionalist party and in the formation of its social 
and political alliances. At the same time, as already mentioned, the Lombard branch 
of Forza Italia-PdL has enjoyed greater autonomy from the central leadership than all 
the other regional branches of the party, including the Veneto, and it has been able to 
build very solid alliances with Lombard interest groups. Thus, the Lombard-centric 
organisation of the League and the high autonomy and strong social ties of the 
Lombard branch of Forza Italia-PdL may have had a positive combined effect on the 
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elaboration and implementation of a Lombard model of welfare that is easier to 
identify than the Venetian one. 
In conclusion, it should be underlined that things changed significantly in the 
late 2000s, when the electoral support for the Venetian League significantly increased 
and the regional leaders of the party managed to increase their autonomy and their 
influence on the central party. This has been combined with the crisis of the Lombard 
leaderships of the League (the downfall of Umberto Bossi in 2012) and of Forza Italia-
PdL (the end of the almost twenty-year-long leadership of Roberto Formigoni in 
2013). The quantitative data used in this study only marginally refer to the late 2000s 




This chapter has shown that territorial mobilisation has played a very important role 
in the process of regional welfare building in Italy. Of course, regionalist parties may 
end up building qualitatively different models of welfare depending on their origins, 
on the role that they play in the regional party system and on their ideas of social 
justice. Moreover, as the Lombard case shows, regional branches of statewide parties 
that are influenced by regionalist mobilisation and enjoy high autonomy from the 
central party leadership may also be very active in promoting distinctive social 
policies at the regional level. This underlines the importance of considering both 
cross-party and within-party political competition.  
The analysis of the case studies presented in this chapter also highlights the 
shortcomings of welfare classifications that take the nation-state as the only level of 
analysis. Indeed, both the alpine regions and Lombardy show characteristics that 
cannot be found in the general description of Italy as a Southern European welfare 
model. Indeed, the latter is characterised by low generosity and coverage of benefits, 
high fragmentation, low development of social services and familism. The alpine 
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model, on the other hand, is very generous, highly integrated, and supportive of 
families though a well-developed system of benefits and services. The Lombard 
model is also very peculiar, since it has promoted important forms of horizontal 
subsidiarity between public and private actors, which cannot be found in other 




Chapter 4.  
 
Class mobilisation and regional welfare building: the ‘peculiar’ case of the Italian 
Left 
 
The Italian Left: past and present 
 
The history of the Italian Left in the last fifty years has been quite different from that 
of the Left in other European countries. Indeed, until the early 1990s Italy was the 
only country in which an openly communist party controlled the majority of left-
wing votes (winning between 20 and 34 per cent of the total vote) and was constantly 
excluded from government (Vampa, 2009). Between 1950 and 1992, the other main 
party of the Left, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), never managed to obtain more than 
15 per cent of the total vote and was squeezed out by the competition between the 
two main competing parties, the PCI and the Christian Democrats (DC). Of course, 
the importance of the PSI in Italian politics increased in the 1980s. The new leader of 
the party and Italy’s first socialist prime minister, Bettino Craxi, ‘wanted to cultivate 
the impression among the middle-class electorate that he could make modern Italy 
governable through strong executive control’ (Maguire, 1993: 87). Yet when Craxi 
became Prime Minister in 1983 he was in a very different position from that of his 
socialist colleagues Felipe González and Andreas Papandreou, since his coalition was 
composed of five parties among which the Christian Democrats (Democrazia 
Cristiana, DC), and not the PSI, was the largest (Vampa, 2009: 350).  
In the 1980s the Italian Communist Party (PCI) underwent a process of ‘social-
democratisation’ and began the march towards its transformation into a more 
moderate, centre-left party (Vampa, 2009: 351). In fact, ‘the PCI’s conscious shift 
towards an ideological affinity with social democracy came after Berlinguer’s death’ 
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(Abse, 2001: 61), that is, in the early 1980s. In 1989 an important member of the 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD), Peter Glotz, stated that ‘the PCI can be 
considered as a truly social-democratic party. It only needs to openly and officially 
define itself as social-democratic’ (interview in Barbieri, 1989: 4, quoted in Vampa, 
2009: 353). In the early 1900s the PCI was officially transformed into the Democratic 
Party of the Left and in the late 1990s its name was again changed, becoming the Left 
Democrats (DS). The PDS became a member of the Socialist International and even 
managed to become a governmental force for the first time in 1996, although, again, 
it was part of a larger coalition including moderate, centre parties. Figure 4.1 
summarises all the transformations that the main party of the Italian Left has 






















      



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The process of transformation of the Italian left was completed in the late 2000s with 
the creation of a broad centre-left party: the Democratic Party (PD). Figure 4.2 shows 
that the PCI-PDS-DS-PD has constantly controlled a clear majority of left-wing 
votes39 (with the only exception being 1992) and it is therefore important to focus on 
this party and its political strategies when assessing the impact of left-wing 
mobilisation on regional welfare development.  
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 Other left-wing and centre-left parties are the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian 
Unity (PSIUP), Proletarian Democracy (DP), Communist Refoundation Party (PRC), Federation of the 




The PCI/PDS/DS/PD and Territorial Politics 
 
Attitudes towards decentralisation and regionalism 
As already mentioned, long-term exclusion from central government seems to have 
had an important effect on the attitudes of the main party of the left towards the 
regional dimension. Mazzoleni (2009: 207) points out that: 
[T]hrough the 1950s there was a radical shift of party positions: the Communists 
and Socialists, excluded from national government, began to adopt a strong 
decentralist stance, conscious of their massive electoral support in some regions, 
and for similar reasons the ruling DC blocked the implementation of 
decentralization, discovering the benefits of a centralized unitary state. 
 Using the data of the Party Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001; Volkens et al., 
2013), it is possible to measure the support of main Italian parties for decentralisation 
based on the analysis of their political programmes. Figure 4.3 compares support for 
the decentralisation of the PCI (then PDS, DS and PD) with average support for the 
decentralisation of the other Italian parties obtaining more than 4 per cent of the 
vote40. It can be seen that for most of the time since the post-war period the main 
party of the Left has been more in favour of decentralisation than the rest of the party 
system. The difference in support for decentralisation is very noticeable in the 1960s, 
1970s and 2000s. It is interesting to see that the only decade in which the PDS/DS was 
substantially less supportive of decentralisation than the other main parties is the 
1990s. This can be explained by the fact that during this decade the Northern League 
emerged as an important actor in national politics and, at the same time, the Left 
managed to become the main governing force in Rome for the first time in almost 
                                                          
40
 By using the Comparative Manifesto Project codebook, support for decentralisation is measured by 
subtracting the category 302 (General opposition to political decision-making at lower political levels. Support 
for unitary government and for more centralisation in political and administrative procedures) from the 
category 301 (Support for federalism or decentralisation of political and/or economic power).  
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four decades. Yet it lost control of central government again in the 2000s (with the 
exception of the 2006-2008 biennium).  
 
Figure 4.3. The support for decentralisation of the main party of the Left compared to 
average support for decentralisation of all other Italian parties with more than 4 per 
cent of the vote  
 
 
Source: Volkens et al. (2013). Author’s own calculation 
 
The territorial organisation of the Party 
 
In the last three decades the main party of the Left has completed the transition from 
the monolithic and centralised power structure of the old Communist Party to a 
pluralistic and decentralised organisation (Giannetti and Mulé, 2006: 476). Even in 
the context of high centralisation of the 1960s and 1970s, the regional branches of 
Emilia Romagna and Tuscany, where the PCI had very strong political support (see 
next section), enjoyed enough authority to become important laboratories for the 
promotion of region-specific policies.   
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During the 1980s and, even more so, immediately after the creation of the 
PDS, local elites started campaigning for a less centralised party organisation and 
regional leaders were given more power and autonomy. Although oligarchic 
tendencies were still very strong, a new-federalist culture soon developed within the 
party accompanied by the emergence of local clientelism and patronage (Baccetti 
1997: 104–111). The process of decentralisation was continued by the DS in the early 
2000s when the statutes approved during the congress in Turin (2000) and Pesaro 
(2005) sought to create a ‘federal party’, with regional units (Unioni Regionali) as the 
basic organisational level (DS constitution, 2005: art. 7). The provincial organisations 
(Federazioni Provinciali) also played the fundamental role of mediators between party 
members and central office (Ibid.: art. 8.4).  
Within the Democratic Party, founded in 2007 by the Left Democrats and Left-
wing Christian Democrats (see Figure 4.1), the autonomy of the regional and 
provincial organisations has further increased. Indeed, the Democratic Party is 
explicitly defined as a federal party (PD Constitution, 2010: art. 1) in which regional 
and local organisations enjoy a high degree of autonomy. According to the new 
constitution, Regional Units are granted full political, financial, programmatic, and 
organisational autonomy (PD constitution, 2010: art. 12.1). The national party 
organisation may intervene only if local units do not respect the very general 
principles stated in the Ethical Code or Party Manifesto (Ibid.: art. 12.2). Local leaders 
(segretari regionali and segretari provinciali) may also oppose the decisions taken by 
national leaders by appealing to a special committee (Ibid.: art. 12.3). Like in the DS, 
in the Democratic Party the regional leaders form a federal committee representing 
them at the national level. However, this committee does not have any effective 
power and it can only approve non-binding resolutions (Ibid.).  
Overall, the ‘vertical integration’ between national, regional, and local 
organisations within the PD is rather weak. Vertical integration refers to the extent of 
organisational linkages, interdependence and cooperation between central and 
132 
 
regional party organisations in both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
arenas (Thorlakson, 2009: 161). Patterns of vertical interaction may take a ‘top-down’ 
or ‘bottom-up’ form (Swenden and Madsen, 2009: 7). In a centralised party (like the 
Italian Communist Party) top-down relations are dominant and local organisations 
are subject to the strict control of the central office. By contrast in federal parties the 
regional units enjoy significant autonomy but, being strongly integrated in central 
party organs, all cooperate at the national level in order to define the strategy of the 
party (Bolleyer, 2011: 17). Therefore, the interaction is bottom-up since the national 
leadership relies on the support of local units. The organisation of the PD has gone 
beyond these two types of vertical integration (Fava, 2010: 620) and today it is more 
akin to a stratarchy (Katz and Mair 2009), in which each organisational layer is almost 
totally independent of every other layer and focuses on a different territorial and 
political dimension. This increasing disconnection between statewide and regional 
party organisations may have also resulted in further territorial differentiation of 
social policies promoted and implemented in the so-called ‘Red Belt’.  
 
A regionally concentrated electoral support: the Red Belt 
It should be underlined that electoral support for the PCI and its successors has been 
regionally concentrated (Diamanti, 2003). The main party of the Left has been 
electorally successful in an area that has often been defined as the ‘Red Belt’ 
(Ramella, 1998; Vampa, 2009). The borders of this macro-area have been rather stable 
over time and mainly include three regions: Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and Umbria. 
Such regions have been characterised by what has been defined as ‘red political sub-
culture’ (Floridia, 2010). According to Trigilia (1986), a territorial political subculture 
can be found when the support for a specific political force, emerged and 
strengthened in a long historical process, is almost ‘consensual’ within a local 
community and such political force is an important mediator and aggregator of 
different interest groups at the local level. At the same time, the existence of political 
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sub-cultures seems to be strongly linked to high levels of civic culture as underlined 
by Putnam (1993). One may argue that political sub-culture and civicness are 
mutually reinforcing since the former contributes to reducing social fragmentation 
and atomisation (or familialism), whereas the latter has a positive effect on active 
political participation, which strengthens political identities.  
The existence of a limited geographical area characterised by ‘left-wing 
consensus’, combined with long-term exclusion of important forces of the Left from 
national government and increasing stratarchisation of the party organisation, may 
have contributed to the emergence of an alternative welfare model at the regional 
level. In the next section I therefore outline the main characteristics of social policies 
developed in the red-belt and I show that they diverge quite substantially from the 
so-called ‘Southern European’ welfare model.  
 
The ‘Red Belt’: social-democracy at the local level? 
As underlined in the previous section, in the red regions, Tuscany, Emilia Romagna 
and Umbria, the weakness of territorial mobilisation has been compensated by the 
existence of a deep-rooted political sub-culture based on socially progressive values. 
Only in Emilia Romagna has the Northern League been able to obtain some good 
results in recent years (Stefanini, 2010), although it has failed to achieve the level of 
political influence that it has had in Lombardy, the Veneto and other Northern Italian 
regions. The political strength of the Left in the red regions is even more impressive 
if compared with its relative weakness in the rest of the country. Additionally, the 
strength of the ‘red’ political subculture has resulted in a very stable political system 
in which the ruling parties have never been seriously challenged by the opposition 
(Passarelli, 2013; Chelotti, 2013). As underlined by Tronconi (2013: 82–83), Emilia 
Romagna and Tuscany are the two Italian regions with the most cohesive and least 
vulnerable governments. In this highly stable and politically distinctive political 
context, it is possible to talk about the emergence of forms of sub-state social-
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democracy. This section focuses on the two largest regions of the Red Belt, Emilia 
Romagna and Tuscany, and highlights the main characteristics of the welfare models 
that they have developed in the last decades. 
According to Ciarini (2012), the development of more extensive social policies 
in Tuscany and Emilia Romagna date back to the emergence of the first socialist 
movements at the beginning of the 20th century. The marginal role that these 
movements played at the national level made the local dimension the only one 
available for the promotion of universalistic welfare values. This legacy re-emerged 
and consolidated after the collapse of Fascism. Fargion (1997) has underlined that, 
since an important part of the Italian Left was excluded from the central government 
for many years after the end of World War Two, sub-national policy making soon 
became the only instrument it had to implement its political agenda. The author even 
talks of a refoundation of the welfare state promoted by the red regions at the sub-state 
level (Ibid. 164). Baccetti (2005) argues that, for instance, the Tuscan branch of the 
Communist Party ‘invested’ a lot of resources in the construction of regional 
institutions. Particularly in the field of social policy, the aim of the Communists was 
to use sub-state institutions (both regional and municipal) to provide an example of 
good administration (buon governo) that could be contrasted with the residual and 
inefficient system of welfare promoted by the Christian Democrats at the national 
level (Baccetti, 2005: 223). Generally, this ‘regional focus’ was translated into strong 
policy interventionism of local and regional authorities, which actively promoted a 
universalistic, advanced and integrated system of public services in the red regions 
(Ramella, 2005: 144).  
The three distinctive elements of the welfare models of Tuscany and Emilia 
Romagna are the centrality of the public sector, the existence of an extended and 
highly coordinated network of social policy-making, which involves municipalities 
and social partners and the promotion of equality of status among all citizens. As 
already shown in the comparison with the Lombard case, in the health care sector the 
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process of ‘marketization’ has been almost completely absent in Tuscany where 
social protection is considered as a public good that could not be subject to the logics 
of market competition. Therefore, public hospitals and organisations still provide 
most of the health and social care services.   
In Tuscany, social partners are fully involved in the policy making process 
through the so called tavoli di concertazione, where trade unions and employers’ 
organisations ‘discuss and make recommendations to the regional government on 
legislation and policy initiatives’ (Keating, 2014: 144). Moreover, as underlined by 
Fargion (1997), Cepiku and Meneguzzo (2006), Pavolini (2008) and Ciarini (2012), 
municipalities have played an active role in the elaboration and implementation of 
regional social plans in the Red Regions. However, this cannot simply be defined as 
‘vertical subsidiarity’ since each municipality is not just granted extensive autonomy 
in social policymaking, but, rather, it is encouraged to coordinate and cooperate with 
other municipalities and with regional institutions (Neri, 2008: 109). This can also be 
defined as a network governance model (Cervia 2011). In Tuscany representatives of 
local communities are actively involved in social planning through the district 
organisations, the Società della Salute, set by the regional government in 2004 (Regione 
Toscana, 2009), in which health and social care services are fully integrated. Also in 
Emilia Romagna municipalities are recognised as the main strategic actors in the 
development of regional social policies. Unlike Lombardy, where money transfers 
are controlled by regional agencies (Asl), in Emilia Romagna municipalities can 
directly manage the redistribution of economic resources transferred by the regional 
government (Arlotti, 2012: 315).  
In addition, constant bargaining between planners and providers of social and 
health care services does not result in the emergence of a system based on full 
competition between providers like the Lombard one (Neri, 2008: 109). Public 
agencies at the district level (Società della Salute or Aziende Sanitarie Locali, Asl) 
directly provide services or rely on the services of a limited set of preferred providers 
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(Benassi and Mussoni, 2013: 175–176). The outcome of this decentralised but highly 
coordinated system is that, as in the case of social-democratic systems in Northern 
Europe (Lähteenmäki-Smith, 2005: 172), all citizens are expected to receive similar 
standards of public services independently of whether these are provided directly by 
the region or by other actors, such as municipalities or cooperatives. 
The active involvement of municipalities in an integrated network of social 
planning has also been facilitated by the fact that the red regions are characterised by 
a high degree of political homogeneity across different levels of administration. 
Figure 4.4 highlights the fact that in Tuscany and Emilia Romagna the parties 
controlling the regional government are also dominant in most of the medium-sized 
and large municipalities. The peculiarity of these two regions is even more evident if 
they are compared to other large regions such as Piedmont, the Veneto, Lombardy, 
Latium, Campania and Puglia. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, social 
governance in Lombardy has developed in a clearly hierarchical and region-centric 
way and this may be due to the fact that the regional government has been 
dominated by a coalition of parties that have failed to control the overwhelming 
majority of municipalities. In fact, whereas in Lombardy regional governing parties 
control just one third of medium-sized and large municipalities, in Tuscany and 









Figure 4.4. Percentage of municipalities (with a population above 15,000 inhabitants) 
controlled by regional governing parties (January 2014) 
 
Source: http://www.comuni-italiani.it/. Author’s own calculation (date of access 26/01/2014). 
 
Consistent with the dominance of a left-wing political coalition, there is no clear 
emphasis on the role of the family in Tuscan social policies. For instance, in the social 
report of the Tuscan region (2009), the regional government explicitly expresses 
scepticism about the role of the family as the focal point of social protection in a 
context of increasing involvement of women in the labour market and a decreasing 
number of married couples. Indeed, ‘the redistributive role of the family can no 
longer be taken for granted’ and, therefore, ‘without the support of the public sector, 
vulnerable social groups risk ending up below the poverty threshold’ (Regione 
Toscana, 2009: 34). For this reason, the regional government, together with other 
social and institutional actors, has been active in the implementation of an integrated 
system of social services (Ibid.: 5) upon which citizens can still rely in the context of the 
declining centrality of more traditional family networks. Using Fox Harding’s (1996) 
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categories, it can be argued that, whereas, for instance, the South Tyrolean system is 
‘supporting families’, the Tuscan model instead tends to respond to needs and 
demands coming from individuals regardless of their family conditions and is much 
less interventionist in family matters. Also Pesenti (2005) has noted that the Tuscan 
region pays attention to the role of the family only in relation to a very limited range 
of childcare policies. This ‘progressive’ approach to family policy has also influenced 
other policy areas. For instance, Tuscany is the only Italian region that has approved 
and regulated artificial insemination by donor (AID), even though this practice has 
been explicitly forbidden by the central government, which takes a more 
‘traditionalist’ position on this issue (Piccolillo 2014).   
The universalism that characterises the welfare systems of the Red Belt also 
results in policies that pay particular attention to the rights of immigrant residents, a 
sector of society that is often neglected, or even explicitly excluded, in the social 
programmes of other regions with similar levels of immigration. Between 2004 and 
2010, Emilia Romagna and Tuscany were two of the few regions that legislated in 
favour of the social integration of immigrants (Stuppini, 2011: 174). Caponio and 
Campomori (2013) have quantified the level of development of social policies 
targeted at immigrant groups by creating an index ranging from 0 (no development) 
to 5 (very strong development)41. Figure 4.5 highlights the fact that Emilia Romagna 
and Tuscany (but also other left-wing regions such as Umbria and Marche) have 
built systems of social inclusion for immigrants that are much better developed than 
those in place in other Italian regions with similar levels of immigrant population. 
For instance, Lombardy and the Veneto have paid very scarce attention to this issue 
and, so far, they have not approved any piece of specific legislation in favour of 
integration (Caponio and Campomori, 2013). South Tyrol, which has not been 
                                                          
41
 The index considers three aspects of immigration policies: institutional consolidation (financing and 
legislation), planning (level of detail of administrative procedures), and transparency (clear procedures for 
access to services and documents).  
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included in Caponio and Commodori’s study, approved a law for the integration of 
immigrants only in late 2011. However, it should be noted that almost half of the 
beneficiaries of the basic income and housing benefit schemes introduced in the 




Figure 4.5. Level of development of social legislation for immigrants plotted against 
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As shown in this section, Emilia Romagna has developed a welfare system 
that, in many respects, is similar to the Tuscan one. In its 2008-2010 Social Plan (Piano 
Sociale e Sanitario), the government of Emilia Romagna stated that the system of social 









sector’42. Yet, at the same time, the Plan strongly underlined the importance of the 
role played by the so-called Third Sector, which includes voluntary organisations, 
cooperatives and civil society organisations. This suggests that, due to region-specific 
factors, it is also possible to detect some differences in the administration of social 
programmes between Tuscany and Emilia Romagna. As underlined by Ciarini (2012: 
113), although the regional government of Emilia Romagna has pursued goals of 
universalism, equality and integration of social services, which are similar to those of 
Tuscany, it has tried to develop a network of social relations that goes beyond the 
centrality of the public sector. Ciarini defines it as ‘institutionalized polycentrism’ in 
which non-profit and private organisations are also involved in social planning and 
delivery. Already in 1985, Emilia Romagna was one of the first regions that 
recognised the importance of cooperatives and voluntary organisations in the social 
assistance sector and established collaborative, rather than hierarchical, relations 
between the public sector and voluntary organisations. On the other hand, the 
legislation that Tuscany developed in the same years was much narrower and less 
open to cooperation with voluntary organisations that were privately funded 
(Ciarini, 2012: 113). 
The participation of voluntary organisations and different levels of 
administration in social governance has been further encouraged by the governments 
of Emilia Romagna in recent years. For instance, in his programmatic statement, the 
former president of Emilia Romagna, Vasco Errani (2011: 75), declared that the 
Region would continue to develop integrated social programmes (which include 
both health and social care) following an inter-institutional model of governance 
(modello interdisciplinare e interistituzionale) and involving different social actors. Also 
in the recent electoral campaign, the Democratic Party, while restating the necessity 
                                                          
42
Emilia Romagna, Piano Sociale e Sanitario 2008-2010, 
http://www.saluter.it/documentazione/leggi/regionali/delibere/delibera-dell2019assemblea-legislativa-n.-175-
2008 (date of access 27/10/2014).  
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to strengthen services, which would be public, universal, and highly efficient, 
underlined the important social role played by the network of associations and 
voluntary organisations43. 
 The success and persistence of ‘institutionalized polycentrism’ is probably 
due to the fact that, as shown in Table 4.1, the network of voluntary organisations 
and associations, which are privately funded, has traditionally been much more 
extended in Emilia Romagna than in Tuscany and in all other Italian regions (with 
the exception of South Tyrol). Yet, it should be underlined that in Emilia Romagna 
socially-oriented private organisations are not seen as a potential replacement for 
public intervention within a long-term project of welfare marketization (like in the 
Lombard case). In fact, they have been regarded as important actors contributing to 
the integration and expansion of a social protection network, which aims to become 







                                                          
43
 Centre-left Coalition, Emilia Romagna, Lavoro Per L’Emilia, Programma per le Elezioni Regionali  
http://www.stefanobonaccini.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Bonaccini_Documento_programmatico1.pdf 
(date of access 8/11/2014). 
‘È necessario ripensare ed innovare il nostro welfare per conservarne il valore in una stagione di risorse 
economiche limitate, rafforzando gli strumenti del sistema pubblico, garanzia di universalità di accesso e di 
qualità dei servizi per e valorizzando in pieno le risorse della comunità. Una comunità forte, irrobustita dalla 
rete associazionistica e del volontariato, preziosi e insostituibili compagni di viaggio, con i quali consolidare un 




Table 4.1. Socially-oriented voluntary associations which are privately funded (per 
100,000 inhabitants) 
 Privately funded 
voluntary organisations 
per 100,000 inhabitants  
South Tyrol/Bolzano 45.8 




















Source: ISTAT http://sitis.istat.it/sitis/html/. Author’s own calculation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the Italian Left has played an important 
role in the construction of sub-state welfare governance. Being excluded from central 
government for many decades and having a regionally concentrated electoral base, 
the mainstream Left has acted as a regionally focused political force. Emilia Romagna 
and Tuscany can therefore be regarded as examples of regions with highly 
developed and distinctive welfare systems. They can be defined as models of sub-
state social democracy characterised by elements of universalism, strong coordination 
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between regional and local authorities and centrality of the public sector. At the same 
time, the two regions show some differences in the relationship between private and 
public sectors, with Emilia Romagna being more open to forms of cooperation with 
non profit and private organisations.  
Overall, it can be argued that in Italy there have been two alternative paths to 
regional welfare building. The first one has been dominated by territorial movements 
that have sought to strengthen regional solidarities through the development of 
distinctive models of social protection. The other path has been characterised by the 
mobilisation of left-wing parties that have viewed regions as the main arenas in 


























Regional welfare building and the tensions between territorial and class 
mobilisations 
Spain can be considered, together with Italy, as having a ‘regionally framed’ welfare 
system (Kazepov, 2010: 60). This means that regions play a central role in the 
elaboration and implementation of social policies. However, as in Italy, this has not 
always been the case. Until the late 1970s, when the Francoist dictatorship collapsed, 
regional authorities in Spain generally did not exist – or had only very limited 
powers. Only in the last three decades have the Autonomous Communities managed 
to obtain an increasing amount of responsibilities from the central government. This 
has not occurred homogeneously and institutional asymmetries have become an 
important feature of the decentralised Spanish system. Yet, unlike the Italian regions, 
the Spanish Autonomous Communities cannot be grouped into two well-defined 
categories since the process of devolution has been the outcome of bilateral 
interactions between regional governments and the central government. Generally, 
as underlined by Magone (2009: 194), the Spanish constitutional formula was very 
‘open-ended’ and this allowed Spanish regions to play a much more active role in the 
devolution process than Italian regions. Moreover, unlike ‘classic’ federal systems, 
the Spanish institutional framework has ‘weak mechanisms for multilateral 
negotiation and cooperation’ (Colomer, 2007: 86). Therefore, powers have been 
devolved depending on the demands that individual regional governments have 
voiced in bilateral bargaining processes with Madrid (Musella, 2011: 26). These 
demands are likely to be stronger in those regions where the political mobilisation of 
territorial identity is higher. Table 5.1 shows the average level of regional autonomy 
enjoyed by each Autonomous Community in the 1980-2010 period as measured by 
the already mentioned Regional Authority Index elaborated by Hooghe et al. (2010). 
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Table 5.1. Level of Autonomy of Spanish Regions (1980–2010) 
Region RAI index 








Valencian Community 13.1 
Castile Mancha 13.1 
Aragon 13.1 
Murcia 13.1 
La Rioja 13.1 
Extremadura 12.6 
Madrid 12.6 
Balearic Islands 12.6 
Castile and Leon 12.6 
Source: Hooghe et al. (2010). Author’s own calculation.  
 
As already pointed out in the case of the Italian regions, one of the consequences of 
‘meso-level’ decentralisation is the emergence of cross-regional differentiation in the 
level of development of region-specific welfare systems. This is particularly true in a 
context in which central authorities are not fully able to coordinate and ‘standardise’ 
social protection. In the next section I show that in Spain, a tension between 
statewide welfare building and increasing territorialisation of social protection has 
existed since the collapse of the Francoist regime. This tension has also had an 
important influence on the role that political mobilisations of territorial identities and 
class solidarity have played in the construction of distinctive welfare systems at the 






Transformations and territorialisation of the Spanish welfare state 
 
In Spain, a centralised but very residual system of social protection was established 
during the ‘Francoist’ regime, particularly since the 1960s (Arriba and Moreno, 2005: 
144–147), although a system of compulsory health insurance was already established 
in the 1940s. In particular, the Basic Law of Social Security approved in 1963 
‘consolidated previously fragmented corporatist schemes which, from 1967 [...] for 
the first time counted as public expenditure in National Accounts’ (Castles, 2006: 54). 
In general, the system of social protection that developed during the Francoist era 
was mainly organised along corporatist lines, without any involvement of territorial 
institutions and actors (Guillén 1996).  
This first phase of fundamentación was followed by periods of crisis, expansion 
and restructuring that started after the downfall of the dictatorship and have 
continued until recent years (Gallego, Gomà and Subirats, 2003b: 47). The 
establishment of a more advanced and extensive welfare system occurred between 
the late 1970s and the 1980s. This new phase of welfare building was still partly 
influenced by the corporatist legacy of the authoritarian period and followed a 
general path of development that was similar to that of other Southern European 
countries (Ferrera, 1996; Castles, 2006). García and Karakatsanis (2006) have 
underlined that the main characteristics of the Spanish welfare regime are the high 
levels of ‘familism’, that is, ‘informal family-based strategies of welfare provision’ (p. 
102) and relatively high levels of functional fragmentation in social provision, with 
important dissimilarities among professional categories. This means that the Spanish 
welfare state developed as ‘a system of occupation-related funds that finances social 
insurance and is supported primarily by employer and employee contributions’ (p. 
97). Yet functional fragmentation has also been accompanied by increasing territorial 
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fragmentation of social policies, especially social services such as health care and 
social care.  
Indeed, it should be underlined that the Spanish welfare expansion in the 
1970s and 1980s coincided with a process of radical decentralisation and 
strengthening of the Spanish Autonomous Communities. As underlined by Arriba 
and Moreno (2005: 147):  
[A] historical review of the reforms implemented in Spain since the inception of 
the democratic Constitution of 1978 has to acknowledge the fragmented and 
inductive nature of the reforms implemented during the transition to democracy. 
According to the Spanish Charta Magna, social assistance is a regional power of 
the ‘exclusive competence’ of the seventeen Autonomous Communities (Art. 148: 
1.20). Powers concerning the basic legislation and the economic regime of the 
Social Security system remained in the hands of the central government. 
However, the […] Autonomous Communities […] could exercise executive 
powers in the running and managing of contributory programmes which could be 
decentralized to them (Art. 149: 117) 
This is confirmed by Gallego and Subirats (2011: 100) who have argued that ‘the 
evolution of welfare state in Spain has been, and still is, fully associated with the 
territorial distribution of power’. Moreover, the devolved nature of the Spanish 
health care system has also been linked to regional differences in health-related civil 
society and management practices and to the territorial dispersion of leading 
hospitals and health professionals (Costa-Font, 2013: 68).  
It is therefore evident that, since the beginning of the new democratic regime, 
Spanish regions have played a central role in narrowing the gap between Spain and 
the rest of Western Europe in the expansion and consolidation of welfare 
programmes. Talking about the establishment of the Spanish National Health 
System, Del Castillo (2000: 255) has underlined that Spain and Canada are the only 
two countries in the world in which the process of the construction of a universal 
health care organisation began after the creation of a quasi-federal state organisation. 
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The centrality of the regions as drivers of welfare development is even more evident 
than in the Italian case where, until the early 1990s, the central government and 
municipalities, rather than the regions, were the two keystones of social protection 
(Sacchi and Bastagli, 2005: 86). In Spain the increase in regional power has been much 
more sudden than in Italy, which, instead, has undergone a more gradual process of 
regionalisation (although today both Italian and Spanish regions enjoy similar levels 
of institutional autonomy).  
Gallego and Subirats (2012) provide a very clear picture of what social 
governance looks like in contemporary Spain. Over thirty years of regionalisation 
have meant that:  
 
[A]s a result of power transfers, the newly created ACs have enjoyed major 
capacities in the formulation and implementation of welfare policies. Although in 
most policy matters the legislation passed by ACs is required to fit within the 
framework of state regulations, state regulations have not always predated the 
policy initiatives of some ACs, such as in the case of health care. In some cases, 
such as social services, state regulations have hardly emerged at all, and AC 
policy initiatives have developed without a general compelling framework. 
(Gallego and Subirats, 2012: 271). 
 
In sum, as in the case of Italy, health care and social assistance have been the two 
policy domains in which Spanish regional governments have been given the 
opportunity to play the most important role as financiers, legislators/regulators and 
administrators/providers (Bergmark and Minas, 2010: 243). However, as I show in 
the next section, the level of activism in the three key dimensions of welfare 






When regions become arenas of ‘new welfare building’: measuring territorial 
differences in Spain 
 
The aim of this chapter is to quantitatively assess and explain cross-regional 
differences in the level of development of region-specific policies in the field of 
health care and social assistance. Also in the case of Spain the three dimensions that 
are considered to measure the strength of regional welfare models are spending, 
legislation, and implementation. The data used for the Spanish regions are similar but 
not identical to those used for the Italian regions. This is due to the fact that regions 
are embedded in a ‘national context’ and the policies on which they diverge may 
change from country to country. For instance, among the indicators of effective 
implementation of social policies in Spanish regions I have included differences in 
basic income coverage. Basic income (renta mínima) is an important social assistance 
policy developed by the Autonomous Communities but is almost totally absent in 
Italy (with some exceptions presented in the previous chapters). In addition, 
indicators of legislation and effective implementation are often provided by scholars 
focusing on regions of a single country and therefore are rarely homogeneous across 
different countries. Yet this is not a serious problem and does not undermine the 
validity of my findings since this study tries to assess and explain ‘within country’ 
cross-regional variation. So, provided that the social policies of regions belonging to 
the same country are assessed with consistent indicators, it is still possible to 
compare them to each other in an objective way. Finally, the strength of this study is 
that it does not only rely on quantitative analysis but also includes more in-depth 
analyses of how regionalist or centre-left parties promote social policies in specific 






In order to measure the level of sub-national spending in health care and social 
assistance I rely on data provided by the Health care Ministry and by García Herrero 
and Navarro (2012). In Table 5.2 it can be seen that the three most ‘generous’ 
Autonomous Communities are the Basque Country, Navarre and La Rioja. On the 
contrary, per capita spending levels are lowest in Madrid, the Valencian Community, 
and the Balearic Islands. These data seem to suggest that the differences are quite 
substantial since, in total, the last region in the ranking spends almost half as much 
as the per capita amount spent by the top Autonomous Community (see 0–1 score in 














Table 5.2. Per capita social spending in the Spanish Autonomous Communities44 (with a 





Total 0–1 score 
Basque Country 1311 773 2084 1 
Navarre 1336 488 1824 0.88 
La Rioja 1353 360 1713 0.82 
Extremadura 1279 354 1633 0.78 
Castile La Mancha 1141 468 1609 0.77 
Asturias 1270 298 1568 0.75 
Aragon 1265 268 1533 0.74 
Cantabria 1220 370 1590 0.76 
Castile and Leon 1203 300 1503 0.72 
Galicia 1161 256 1417 0.68 
Catalonia 1116 300 1416 0.68 
Murcia 1139 230 1369 0.66 
Canary Islands 1128 156 1284 0.62 
Andalusia 1002 279 1281 0.61 
Madrid 984 207 1191 0.57 
Valencian Community 1046 130 1176 0.56 
Balearic Islands 1022 120 1142 0.55 
Sources: Ministerio De Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad http://www.msssi.gob.es/ (average spending from 2002 to 
2011); García Herrero and Navarro (2012). 
 
Legislation/Regulation/Planning 
Gallego and Subirats (2011; 2012) provide a three-dimensional analysis of social 
policies, which is very similar to the one suggested in this paper. One of these 
dimensions is called the ‘symbolic dimension’ and refers to the degree of 
differentiation/innovation in the normative dimension of regional social policies. In 
the case of health care and social policy Gallego and Subirats took ‘into account the 
pace and scope of legal acknowledgement of new health rights’ and the timing of 
social service legislation and reform. The symbolic dimension is ranked on a three-
                                                          
44
 The data mainly refer to average spending in the 2000s. Comparable spending figures from previous years 
are not available. However, it can be assumed that, due to path dependency, spending patterns in the first 
decade of the 2000s were strongly influenced by spending patterns in the previous decades.  
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fold scale of regional (positive) differentiation that ranks from ‘low differentiation’ to 
‘high differentiation’. I have translated this scale into a score ranging from 1 (‘low 
differentiation’) to 3 (‘high differentiation). Regional scores are provided in Table 3. 
We can see that the four regions at the forefront of social legislation are the Basque 
Country, Catalonia, Navarre and Galicia. On the other hand, La Rioja has low scores 
in the legislation of both health care and social assistance. Also in this case, total 
scores have been rescaled to a 0–1 range.  
Table 5.3. Social legislation of Spanish Autonomous Communities 
 Health care Social 
Assistance 
Total 0-1 index 
Basque Country 3 3 6 1 
Catalonia 3 3 6 1 
Navarre 3 3 6 1 
Galicia 3 3 6 1 
Castile and Leon 2 2 4 0.67 
Madrid 1 3 4 0.67 
Cantabria 2 2 4 0.67 
Andalusia 2 2 4 0.67 
Canary 1 2 3 0.5 
Castile Mancha 1 2 3 0.5 
Valencian Community 2 1 3 0.5 
Murcia 1 2 3 0.5 
Extremad. 1 2 3 0.5 
Balearic Islands 2 1 3 0.5 
Aragon 2 1 3 0.5 
Asturias 1 2 3 0.5 
La Rioja 1 1 2 0.33 




The final step of this preliminary analysis includes an assessment of the level of 
effective implementation and administration of social services in the Autonomous 
Communities. To do this, I considered a broad range of indicators. As in the case of 
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Italy, I use Eurostat data that indicate the average number of hospital beds and long-
term care places per 100,000 inhabitants over the period from 2003 to 2009. 
Additionally, I include data collected by García Herrero and Navarro (2012) 
regarding the efficiency and coverage of services for old people, family, and the poor 
and basic income provisions. Finally, I also include the ‘operative dimension’ of 
health care and social care described by Gallego and Subirats. This dimension 
considers ‘all aspects associated with implementation, including management 
instruments, and the level of involvement of different agents in the provision of 
services’ (Gallego and Subirats, 2012: 276). Given the large number of indicators, 
Table 5.4 only shows their values rescaled to the 0–1 range and not their original 
values (see appendix for original values and their meaning). Again the final sum of 
all these indicators is in turn rescaled to a 0–1 range to make it comparable to the 
other two dimensions.  
Overall, Catalonia, Castile and Leon, the Basque Country and Navarre are the 
four best performing regions on this dimension, while Galicia, Castile Mancha, the 
Canary Islands and Murcia are the regions with the lowest overall scores. In 
particular, the implementation of social and health care services in Murcia is almost 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Measuring the strength of regional welfare models 
We now have all the information we need to measure the level of development of 
regional welfare regimes in the Spanish Autonomous Communities. The correlation 
matrix below (Table 5) shows that the associations between the three dimensions of 
welfare development are positive but even less strong than in the Italian case, thus 
suggesting that adding them might not be the best strategy since they measure three 
different aspects of welfare development that are not necessarily linked.  
Table 5.5. Correlation matrix including the three dimensions of welfare development: 
Spending, Legislation, Implementation (Number of cases= 17 Autonomous 
Communities) 
 Spending  Legislation Implementation 
Spending 1.0000    
Legislation 0.3303 1.0000   
Implementation 0.4334 0.4686 1.0000 
 
By multiplying the three key dimensions, we obtain an overall score of ‘welfare 
strength’, which tells us to what extent a certain region has been an arena of welfare 
building in the last decades. The results included in Table 5.6 show considerable 
variation across the Spanish regions. The Basque Country, Navarre, Catalonia and 
Galicia seem to have been the four Communities that have been more active in the 
establishment of regional social programmes. Particularly the first three regions score 
consistently high across the three dimensions. On the contrary, the Valencian 
Community, Canary Islands, Balearic Islands, and Murcia score quite low on all three 







Table 5.6. Applying the multiplicative index to Spanish Autonomous Communities: 
measuring the level of development of regional welfare systems (with a focus on 
health care and social assistance). 
Region Spending Legislation Implementation Multiplicative 
score 
Basque Country 1 1 0.97 0.97 
Navarre 0.88 1 0.89 0.78 
Catalonia 0.68 1 1 0.68 
Galicia 0.68 1 0.72 0.49 
Castile and Leon 0.72 0.67 1 0.48 
Cantabria 0.76 0.67 0.78 0.4 
Madrid 0.57 0.67 0.87 0.33 
Aragon 0.74 0.5 0.84 0.31 
Asturias 0.75 0.5 0.81 0.3 
Andalusia 0.61 0.67 0.74 0.3 
Extremadura 0.78 0.5 0.76 0.3 
Castile Mancha 0.77 0.5 0.72 0.28 
La Rioja 0.82 0.33 0.87 0.24 
Valencian 
Community 
0.56 0.5 0.77 0.22 
Canary Islands 0.62 0.5 0.68 0.21 
Balearic Islands 0.55 0.5 0.74 0.2 
Murcia 0.66 0.5 0.59 0.19 
 
 
In the next sections I try to explain such variation by referring to the saliency of the 
centre-periphery cleavage and to the level of strength of centre-left parties within 
each region. 
 
Territorial mobilisation in Spain 
Since the transition to democracy in the late 1970s, territorial mobilisation has been a 
very important political phenomenon in Spain (Padró-Solanet 1996; Magone, 2009: 
194–259). Whereas in Italy regionalist parties became important political actors in the 
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1990s and further strengthened in the 2000s, in Spain the rise of territorial politics 
occurred much earlier and had already reached its peak in the early 1990s. Figure 5.1 
shows the average share of seats controlled by regionalist parties in the 17 
Autonomous Communities from 1980 to 2010. What can be noted is that during the 
1980s the representation of regionalist parties in regional councils more than doubled 
and reached the maximum of 21% in 1994. In the following years that percentage has 
remained rather stable around 18-20%.  
 
Figure 5.1. Average share (%) of regional council seats controlled by regionalist 
parties in the 17 Autonomous Communities (1980 – 2010)45 
 
 
Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu. Author’s own calculation.  
 
                                                          
45
 In the 1980-1982 period, regional councils existed only in Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia and Navarre. 
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Table 5.7 shows that the political spectrums of the Basque Country, Catalonia and 
Navarre have been dominated by regionalist parties that, on average, have obtained 
more than 60 per cent of the regional representation. In the Canary Islands territorial 
mobilisation increased substantially in the 1990s and 2000s. The same can be said in 
the case of Cantabria, whereas in Aragon the strength of the regionalist movement 
has been constantly above 20 per cent. Territorial mobilisation has also been quite 
important in Galicia and has strengthened in more recent years. On the other hand, 
regionalist parties have been quite weak in La Rioja, Extremadura, Andalusia, 
Valencia and Asturias and totally failed to emerge in Madrid (unsurprisingly), Castile 





















Table 5.7. The political strength of regionalist parties from 1980 to 2010 (% of council 
seats controlled by regionalist parties). Averages by region. 
 
 1980s 1990s 2000s Average 
1980-2010 
Basque Country 68.7 66.7 54.9 63.1 
Catalonia 61.9 63.4 57.1 60.7 
Navarre 46.9 61.2 71 60.1 
Canary Islands 20.5 37.3 39 33 
Aragon 23.3 24.8 22.4 23.5 
Cantabria 6.3 33.6 22.9 23.2 
Galicia 13.2 17.7 19.6 17.1 
Balearic Islands 18.5 15.6 13.6 15.5 
La Rioja 5.8 6 6 5.9 
Extremadura 9.2 1.5 3.5 4.2 
Andalusia 1.9 5.5 4 4.1 
Valencia 2.9 6.1 0 2.9 
Asturias 0 0.7 1.8 1 
Castile and Leon 0.7 0 0 0.2 
Madrid 0 0 0 0 
Castile Mancha 0 0 0 0 
Murcia 0 0 0 0 
Average 16.4 20 18.7 18.5 
Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu. Author’s own calculation.  
 
Given this rather fragmented and heterogeneous picture, it would be interesting to 
see to what extent territorial mobilisation has favoured the promotion of region-
specific models of welfare governance that are less dependent on inputs from central 
government. A preliminary analysis suggests that the Basque Country, Catalonia and 
Navarre are the three Autonomous Communities having, at the same time, the 
highest levels of welfare development and the strongest regionalist parties (Figure 















































Left-wing mobilisation in Spain 
Since the transition to democracy, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) has been by far the strongest party of the Spanish left 
(Magone, 2009: 157–164), controlling between 80 and 90 per cent of left-wing 
electorate. The only statewide left-wing alternative to the PSOE has been United Left 
(Izquierda Unida, IU), which, however, gained electoral relevance only in the 1990s 
and only once it got more than 10 per cent of the vote in statewide elections (Ibid.: 
164–167). There are also some regionalist parties, such as Republican Left (ER), 
Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), Andalusian Party (PA) and Basque Solidarity (EA), 
which have combined a focus on territorial mobilisation with some left-wing, 
socialist political ideals (Elias, 2009; Massetti, 2011;). However, as I will also show in 
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the next chapter, these regionalist parties have seldom been electorally relevant even 
in their own regions and territorial mobilisation has mainly been dominated by 
centre or centre-right parties, the strongest ones being the Catalan Convergence and 
Union (CiU) and Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). 
Another important point that should be made is that the largest party of the 
left has also been the dominant party in Spanish Politics for many years, controlling 
central government from 1982 to 1996 (Méndez Lago, 2007). These were crucial years 
for Spain, which was fully involved in processes of economic expansion and 
internationalisation, European integration and welfare building and restructuring. 
The PSOE therefore was in a very privileged position in this new and dynamic 
context and could link economic and social policies to the construction of a new 
Spanish identity in the post-Franco era. Additionally, the almost unchallenged leader 
of the party during these years was the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González, who 
was able to exert strong control on the formally federal organisation of the party. As 
underlined by Méndez Lago, particularly in the late 1970s and during the 1980s, the 
organisational strategy of the party:  
[W]as based on three pillars: the leadership of Felipe González, the intense 
concentration of power in the hands of the party leaders, González himself and 
Alfonso Guerra, and the maintenance of a high degree of internal cohesion. 
(Méndez Lago, 2007: 90) 
Only in the late 1990s, when the party lost control of the national government, did 
the centralised structure of the PSOE start to be challenged by regional leaders (Ibid.: 
94). In 2004, the party returned to power and, although it was very difficult to 
recentralise the organisational structure of the party, the statewide leadership could 
again rely on statewide political and economic resources as an incentive to 
coordinate contrasting territorial interests within the party.  
Lastly, unlike the Italian left, the Spanish Left has been an important political 
force in almost all Spanish regions. Indeed, in the early years of decentralisation 
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(1980s and early 1990s), the PSOE was the largest and unchallenged party in the 
majority of autonomous communities. However, Figure 5.3 suggests that in the 
longer period from 1980 to 2010, the Left has clearly played a dominant role in a 
much more limited number of regions such as Andalusia, Extremadura, Asturias and 
Castile La Mancha.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. The strength of centre-left parties in the Spanish Autonomous 
Communities (average percentage of regional parliamentary seats controlled by 




In sum, given its dominance in national politics, the mainstream Spanish Left may 
have been very active in establishing statewide social policies or promoting regional 
developmental policies coordinated and controlled by the central government. This, 
however, also means that the Spanish Left may have tried to limit the emergence of 
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‘strong’ models of regional welfare that could compete with statewide welfare 
programmes and threaten uniformity in the provision of social services. Figure 5.4 
shows that the correlation between left-wing mobilisation and regional welfare 
development is indeed slightly negative. Yet one may argue that the regions in which 
the Spanish Left has been traditionally strong – Andalusia, Castile La Mancha, 
Asturias and Extremadura – are among the poorest. A multivariate regression 
analysis that takes into account cross-regional differences in socio-economic 
development is therefore performed in the next section, in order to confirm the weak 
effect of left-wing mobilisation on the establishment of region-specific welfare 
models.   
Figure 5.4. Correlation between left-wing mobilisation and welfare development in 











































Background variables: socio-economic development, ageing (demographic 
vulnerability), female employment and population size 
Other factors should be taken into account when trying to explain cross-regional 
differences in the establishment of region-specific welfare models. As in the case of 
the Italian regions, different levels of socio-economic development may have 
contributed to widening the gap between rich and poor regions, the latter being less 
able to invest resources in social programmes than the former. GDP per capita can 
provide important information on cross-regional inequalities that may affect social 
governance. At the same time, data on social capital of Spanish regions are not as 
easy to find as in the case of Italian regions, given the lack of any research project on 
Spain that is as extensive as Putnam’s research on Italy. However, as shown in the 
Italian case, there are no substantial differences in final results between a model 
using a composite measure of development that also includes social capital 
indicators and another model that just uses economic development (per capita GDP) 
as a proxy of socio-economic development. Therefore, assuming that also in this case 
there is a strong correlation between economic development and social capital (here 
we are not interested in what causes what), I use per capita GDP as a proxy of socio-
economic development. Figure 5.5 shows differences across the Autonomous 
Communities. Madrid, Navarre, Basque Country and Catalonia are the four 
wealthiest Autonomous Communities whereas Extremadura, Andalusia, Castile La 
Mancha and Galicia are the least economically developed. This territorial inequality 
in per capita income and the significant divide between North-Eastern (plus Madrid) 
and Southern regions are confirmed by several academic studies (for instance, 






Figure 5.5. Economic development (per capita GDP in euros) in Spanish 
Autonomous Communities (average from 1995 to 2010) 
 
Source: Eurostat. Author’s own calculation.  
 
The next variable that I take into account is the level of population ageing of the 
Autonomous Communities. Health care and social assistance for vulnerable people 
form the core of regional welfare systems, one may expect that Autonomous 
Communities with an ageing population have paid more attention to social policy 
than other Communities and this may explain some of the variation we have found 
in this chapter. Table 5.8 shows the average share of people aged 65 and above in 
each autonomous community in the last two decades. We can see that Castile and 
Leon is the Autonomous Community with the oldest population and its measure of 
demographic vulnerability is much higher (almost ten percentage points) than that of 





Table 5.8. Ageing (indicator of demographic vulnerability) in Spanish Autonomous 
Communities (1990s and 2000s average) 
Autonomous 
Communities 
% of people aged 
65 and above 




Basque Country 19.1 
Extremadura 18.88 
La Rioja 18.83 
Cantabria 18.76 






Balearic Islands 14.04 
Murcia 13.68 
Canary 13.34 
Source: Eurostat. Author’s own calculation. 
As in the case of Italian regions, one should also take into account different levels of 
female employment across Autonomous Communities. Indeed, together with ageing, 
this variable may highlight territorial differences in the demand for social services. 
We can see that women’s participation in the job market (Eurostat data referring to 
various years) is highest in Catalonia, Balearic Islands and Madrid and lowest in 














Balearic Islands 56.9 
Madrid 56.7 
Navarra 55.7 
Basque Country 53.8 
Aragon 53 








Castile Leon 42.7 
Andalusia 39.2 
Extremadura 38.6 
Source: Eurostat. Author’s own calculation. 
Lastly, I consider cross-regional differences in population size, which, as shown in 
Table 5.10, are quite considerable. Andalusia, the most populous region, has more 























Castile Leon 2.5 
Basque Country 2.2 
Canary Islands 2.1 





Balearic Islands 0.8 
Navarra 0.6 
Cantabria 0.6 
La Rioja 0.3 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Building the multivariate model 
In this section I look at all the variables mentioned in the previous sections and I 
consider them in relation to the development of regional welfare regimes, measured 
by the three dimensional index including spending, legislation/planning and 
effective implementation. As in the case of Italy, I also include in the model the 
‘institutional asymmetries’ variable (measured by the RAI index presented at the 
beginning of this chapter). This may help us to understand whether the impact of 
territorial mobilisation on welfare building is mainly direct, or also indirect through 
the establishment of ‘special statutes’ for some regions (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3).  
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The results of the multivariate regression model are indicated in Table 5.1. 
Also in this case I use standardised coefficients in order to gain a better idea of how 
strongly each variable is associated with sub-national welfare development 
regardless of its unit of measurement.  
 
Table 5.11. The determinants of welfare development (health care and social 
assistance) in the Spanish Autonomous Communities. 
 Standardised coefficient (β) 
Territorial mobilisation .44 
Left-wing mobilisation -.007 
Institutional asymmetries .38 
Socio-economic development 
(per capita GDP) 
.35 
Population ageing .36 
Female employment -.22 




As in the case of Italy, territorial mobilisation has the highest coefficient (.44) and this 
seems to confirm the hypothesis that in Spain too the centre-periphery cleavage 
significantly shapes the politics of welfare. Thus the strength of regionalist parties 
has had a direct effect on the development of regional welfare models in Spain. 
However, in Spain it seems that asymmetries in institutional autonomy also play an 
important role in explaining cross-regional variation (standardised coefficient=.38). 
This is partly due to the fact that such asymmetries result from the demands for 
173 
 
higher autonomy expressed by territorial movements. Indeed, the correlation 
between territorial mobilisation and institutional asymmetries is around .80 (in the 
case of Italy this correlation was much lower, at around .60), meaning that there 
might be a spurious relationship between these variables and the dependent variable 
(Figure 5.6).  
 
 














































Figure 5.7 illustrates that the territorial mobilisation variable may be directly linked 
to both institutional asymmetries and welfare development. In a context of moderate 
constitutional flexibility like the Spanish one, regional elites representing (or 
influenced by) territorial movements can more easily obtain additional powers for 
individual regions (Musella, 2011: 26), which are thus given more institutional 
opportunities than other regions to develop their own social policies.  
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Yet asymmetries do not fully reflect differences in territorial mobilisation, 
since in the 1980s regional governments were also created and empowered in regions 
where regionalist movements and parties were completely absent. As I show in the 
following chapters, the creation and strengthening of the Autonomous Communities 
across the whole Spanish territory was a strategy adopted by the Socialist-led central 
government to balance the centrifugal tendencies of Autonomous Communities such 
as Catalonia and the Basque Country, where territorial mobilisation was very strong. 
Over the years, processes of ‘re-symmetrization’ of power across all the 17 
Autonomous Communities have also been promoted by the central government, 
which, by empowering ‘ordinary’ regions, has sought to diminish the peculiarity and 
distinctiveness of the ‘special’ regions (Màiz and Losada, 2011). As a result of this, 
the powers of the regional government of Catalonia are only slightly greater than 
those of regions like Castile and Leon or Murcia, where the saliency of the centre-
periphery cleavage is extremely weak. This explains why the positive effect of 
territorial mobilisation on welfare development does not fully occur through 
institutional asymmetries (indirect effect) but is also significant if we keep such 













Figure 5.7. The direct and indirect effects of territorial mobilisation on welfare 











The second political variable considered in the model is the strength of left-wing and 
centre-left parties. It is striking to see that this variable has the smallest coefficient in 
the multivariate model (-.007), suggesting that, holding all other relevant variables 
constant, the effect of left-wing mobilisation on the development of regional welfare 
models is very weak. This does not necessarily mean that centre-left parties have not 
paid attention to social policies. As previously mentioned, the largest party of the 
left, the PSOE, controlled the central government for most of the post-Franco period 
and, therefore, it may have tended to focus more on the creation of statewide social 
protection and to oppose excessive welfare activism of regional governments that 
could undermine cross-regional uniformity and coordination. Although some, rather 
small, regionalist parties, such as the BNG and ERC, position themselves more 
closely to the left of the political spectrum, it should be added that the correlation 
between territorial mobilisation and the strength of left-wing parties is negative, with 
a coefficient of -.25. This negative coefficient is lower than in the Italian case (-.69) but 
still indicates a certain ‘tension’ between left-wing and territorial mobilisations in 
Spain. However, whereas in Italy regions have been the main policy-making arena 
Territorial Mobilisation 
Development of region-








for centre-left political forces for many years, in Spain the main social-democratic 
party has occupied a very privileged position in statewide decision-making 
processes. Given its weak role in central government, the Italian Left has acted as a 
‘regionally’ focused political force despite not deriving its political strength from the 
mobilisation of the centre-periphery cleavage and not representing any regional 
minority. On the other hand, the PSOE has been able to control and distribute 
resources from central government, thus attaching less importance to regions, which 
have been seen as a ‘second-order’ level of policymaking.  
The results are confirmed in the more parsimonious model including the three 
most important determinants of welfare development (Table 5.12). Unlike in Italy, 
where left-wing mobilisation was also included in this group, in the case of Spain 
only territorial mobilisation, together with institutional asymmetries and ageing, 
seem to play an important role in the politics of sub-state welfare.  
Table 5.12. Parsimonious model including the three most important independent 
variables 
 
 Standardised coefficients (β) 
Territorial mobilisation .47 






This chapter has provided some preliminary evidence of the role played by 
regionalist and left-wing parties in the development of region-specific models of 
welfare. The ‘strength’ of regional welfare models has been measured on the basis of 
a three-dimensional index including spending, legislation, and implementation 
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indicators. This measure of welfare strength has then been used in an exploratory 
quantitative analysis, which suggests that territorial mobilisation has had an 
important positive effect on regional welfare building. Such effect has been both 
direct and indirect. Indeed it has been underlined that, given the moderate flexibility 
of constitutional arrangements in Spain, regions characterised by high levels of 
territorial mobilisation have had the chance to obtain special autonomy by 
participating in bilateral bargaining with central authorities. However, the latter have 
also tried to promote processes of ‘re-symmetrization’ by empowering also 
‘ordinary’ regions. In this context the ‘direct’ positive effect of territorial mobilisation, 
holding institutional asymmetries constant, has also been important in regional 
welfare politics.    
On the other hand, the Left, and particularly its main party, the PSOE, does 
not seem to have encouraged the development of regional welfare policies that are 
‘disconnected’ from central control and coordination. This may be explained by the 
fact that the PSOE has been the dominant party in central government for most of the 
post-Franco period. Thus, whilst promoting the development of statewide social 
protection and programmes of regional redistribution, the largest centre-left party of 
Spain has generally been hostile to the emergence of strong models of welfare at the 
regional level that may produce excessive territorial fragmentation of social 
citizenship.  
In the next two chapters I provide more detailed, ‘qualitative’ evidence of the 
impact that both territorial and left-wing mobilisations have had on welfare politics 
is Spain in the last 30 years. Each chapter focuses on one type of mobilisation and 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





























































































































































Ethno-regionalist parties in Spain: linking regional welfare governance to ‘sub-
state’ nation building 
Spain is often defined as a ‘multinational’ state where ethno-linguistic minorities 
have traditionally been very strong. However, the recognition of this fragmented 
reality occurred only in the late 1970s with the collapse of the Francoist regime. Since 
then, the centre-periphery cleavage has been an important factor shaping party 
competition. 
Figure 6.1 shows that the saliency of the centre-periphery48 cleavage increased 
quite substantially in the 1980s and 1990s and then declined in the 2000s with the 
stabilisation of the democratic system. Thus in the period immediately after the 
transition to democracy, territorial issues became increasingly important and this 
was partly due to the (re-)emergence and strengthening of regionalist parties. In the 
last three decades, the two largest statewide parties, the Socialist Workers’ Party 
(PSOE) and the People’s party (PP), have competed with regionalist parties at the 










                                                          
48
 Measure of saliency based on data provided by the Party Manifesto Project (see Chapter 3). 
182 
 
Figure 6.1. Average saliency of the centralisation-decentralisation issue in the 
manifestoes of the main Spanish parties (parties obtaining more than 4 per cent of the 
vote at the statewide level) 
 
 
 Source: Volkens et al. (2013). Author’s own calculation.  
 
As shown in the previous chapter, Catalonia and the Basque Country are the 
two Autonomous Communities in which territorial mobilisation has been politically 
most relevant. For most of the time since their creation, these two regions have been 
governed by Convergence and Union (CiU) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), 
two sub-state nationalist parties that have tried to strengthen the autonomy and 
peculiarity of their communities. This chapter focuses on the social models promoted 
by these two parties and demonstrates that both Catalonia and the Basque Country 
have developed strong welfare systems at the regional level, which are substantially 
different from the Spanish/Southern European model. Yet it is also possible to note 
the existence of significant qualitative differences between the Catalan and Basque 
welfare systems. As already shown in the Italian case, qualitative differences in the 
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social models promoted by regionalist parties may derive from differences in their 
ideas of social justice and from the alliances they establish with other political parties 
and social actors. Additionally, the CiU and the PNV have not been the only 
regionalist parties in their regions, since they have had to compete with smaller 
political movements focusing on territoriality.  
Before moving to the in-depth analysis of the Catalan and Basque cases, it 
should be noted that, as underlined by Massetti (2011) in his overview of territorial 
mobilisation in Western Europe, regionalist parties have also emerged and 
strengthened in other Spanish regions. In Galicia, the Galician Nationalist Block has 
increased its political importance in recent years, although it has not been able to 
play a dominant role in Galician politics (Elias, 2009). In Navarre, the Union of the 
Navarrese People, which has promoted the uniqueness of Navarra vis-à-vis the 
Basque Country and its fiscal autonomy, has controlled the regional government 
since the early 1990s. In their classification of Spanish Regions, Maddens and 
Libbrecht (2009: 209 – 210) include Navarre in the same group as Catalonia and the 
Basque country, since also in this region territorial movements have generally 
obtained more than half of the votes. Other regionalist parties have obtained 
representation in the Canary Islands, Aragon, Balearic Islands, Andalusia, Cantabria 
and La Rioja but their electoral successes have been less consistent or more recent 
than in the case of regionalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country.  
 
Territoriality and welfare building in Catalonia 
The Party System of Catalonia and the dominance of Convergence and Union (CiU) 
As suggested by Marcet and Argelaguet (1998: 70), although the majority of Catalan 
political parties have their roots in the past, the period of political transition of 1976-7 
has to be considered as the origin of the present party system. For most of the post-
Franco era, the party system has been characterised by the competition between the 
regionalist coalition, Convergence and Union (CiU) and the Socialist Party of 
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Catalonia (PSC), whose organisation is federated with the PSOE. Although the PSC 
has traditionally obtained more electoral support in Spanish general elections, the 
CiU has been the strongest party in the regional parliament since the early 1980s and 
has ruled the Autonomous Community from 1980 to 2003 and from 2010 until today 
(Table 6.1). Such political dominance is mainly due to the charismatic leadership of 
Jordi Pujol who was president of Catalonia for 23 years and the main actor in the re-
construction of Catalan autonomy in the post-Franco period. Since the beginning, 
while freely referring to Catalonia as a country and a nation, Pujol and the CiU 
strongly supported continued membership in Spain. Pujol said: ‘We are a nation 
without state. We belong to the Spanish state but have no secessionist ambitions’ (As 
quoted in Garcia I Segura [1995]). 
 
Table 6.1. The governments of Catalonia from 1980 until today 
 
President  Period Parties 
Jordi Pujol 1980-2003 CiU (absolute majority 1980-
1995, minority government 
1995-2003) 
Pasqual Maragall 2003-2006 PSC-PSOE, ERC, ICV, EUiA, CPC 
(minimum winning coalition) 
José Montilla 2006-2010 PSC-PSOE, ERC, ICV, EUiA, CPC 
(minimum winning coalition) 
Artur Mas 2010- CiU (minority government) 
Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/  
 
The CiU is a confederation of two regionalist parties (Marcet and Casals 2011), 
Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, CDC) 
and Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, UDC). Both 
parties are located on the centre-right of the political spectrum. The CDC is the 
largest party of the confederation (it was founded by Pujol in 1974) and it is a liberal-
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democratic party, which aims to represent the Catalan petite bourgeoisie (Marcet and 
Argelaguet, 1998: 73). Although the CDC initially adopted a socially progressive 
political programme, it soon shifted towards the conservative side of the political 
spectrum. As highlighted by McRoberts (2001), the social democratic ideas that were 
evident in the CDC’s programme in its early years have effectively disappeared. 
Thus, the 1982 CDC programme flatly declared: ‘With the exception of some very 
concrete cases, public enterprise is not justified because it is less efficient than private 
enterprise’ (quoted in McRoberts, 2001: 68). Today the main constituency of the CDC 
revolves around the social sectors composed of managers, businessmen, executives, 
traders, self-employed and liberal professionals (Marcet and Argelaguet, 1998: 77). 
Since the early 1980s, the UDC has been the junior ally of the CDC. The UDC has 
been defined as a Christian Democratic party and, although its relationship with the 
CDC has not been immune from conflicts and tensions, over the decades their 
political alliance, the CiU, has stabilised as a permanent federation (Barberà 2010). 
If we consider both the centre-periphery and left-right dimensions in Catalan 
politics, it is possible to provide a map of the main parties competing with the CiU. 
As mentioned earlier, the PSC has been the main party of the Left and, although 
enjoying substantial autonomy from the PSOE, it has been strongly influenced by the 
Spanish leadership in its political strategies and, therefore, it has been defined by 
Marcet and Casals (2011) as an ‘integrated party’. The tension between territorial and 
class politics has always characterised the PSC. This aspect will be analysed in more 
detail in the next chapter focusing on the Spanish Left and its role in social policy 
making at the sub-state level. Here it is sufficient to say that the position of the PSC 
on the centre-periphery cleavage has been very moderate and has tended to mediate 
between the centralising pressures of the national leadership of the PSOE and the 
demands for more autonomy coming from Catalonia. The role played by the other 
two parties of the left, Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya, ERC) and Initiative for Catalonia-Greens (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, 
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ICV), has been quite marginal, although the ERC has increased its political influence 
in recent years (Rico and Liñeira 2014). Both the ICV and ERC are more supportive of 
Catalan self-determination than the PSC, but this is due to the fact that, since 2003, 
the ICV has been very loosely affiliated with the statewide party Izquerda Unida 
(IU), whereas the ERC has always been a ‘truncated’, pro-independence party (see 
Table 6.2 below). Finally on the right, there is the Catalan branch of the People’s 
Party (PP). This party is organisationally quite centralised and has generally been 
against Catalan autonomy. Yet due to the hegemony of the CiU in the centre-right 
political area, the PP, which is the main competitor of the PSOE in Spanish politics, 
has never managed to play an important role in the Catalan party system.  
Table 6.2 summarises the organisational characteristics of the main Catalan 
parties, as described by Marcet and Casals (2011). Only the CiU and ERC can be 
defined as truly regionalist parties since their organisation is fully ‘truncated’, that is, 
it is not federated or confederated within statewide political alliances. The PSC is 
instead fully integrated in the organisation of the PSOE. Only the PP is a ‘unitary 
party’ and, as underlined by Astudillo and García-Guereta (2007: 77), it is a ‘highly 
centralized party’.  
 
Table 6.2. The organisation of the main Catalan parties 
 
Unitary Parties  PP  
 
Non statewide parties 
Integrated parties PSC 
ICV (1987—1997) 














At the same time, using a slightly modified version of the two-dimensional map 
provided by Stolz (2009) – and already employed for South Tyrol and Lombardy – 
combining left-right and centre-periphery cleavages, it can be seen that the CiU 
clearly dominates both territorial mobilisation and the centre-right of the political 
spectrum, whereas the PSC appears to be more moderate on territorial issues (Figure 
6.2) and less dominant on the centre-left, due to the competition of the ERC and ICV.  
 
Figure 6.2. Locating Catalan parties on the two-dimensional political map combining left-





















Source: Stolz (2009: 34). The map has been slightly modified since Stolz’s version does not graphically show the sizes of the 
parties represented. Thus, in this map I also illustrate the size of electoral support enjoyed by each party in Catalan politics 















As already mentioned, the CiU has been a governmental force in Catalonia for most 
of the time since the transition to democracy. Between 1984 and 1995 the autonomist 
coalition managed to control the absolute majority of the seats in the Catalan party 
and this allowed Pujol and his allies to play a truly dominant role in regional policy 
making. In the 1995-2003 period, the CiU lost its majority but remained in power in a 
minority government. After the relatively short parenthesis of opposition during the 
centre-left government led by the PSC-PSOE (2003-2010), the CiU returned to power, 
leading a new minority government. Particularly in the period between 1984 and 
1995, the CiU had enough political strength and autonomy to forge a distinctive 
model of welfare governance that still characterises Catalonia. In the next section, I 
highlight the main characteristics of that model and link them to the political 
preferences and strategies of the dominant coalition of the region.  
Building a Distinctive Welfare Model 
 
As already highlighted in the quantitative analysis, in Spain territorial forces have 
been actively involved in the process of devolution of powers to regional 
governments. In the 1980s, the CiU adopted a moderate strategy in the bargaining 
process with Madrid. This allowed the Catalan government to assume full control 
over important policy making areas, such as health care and social assistance, well 
before most of the other Spanish regions (Gallego et al., 2003b: 76). Yet, unlike the 
Basque Country, Catalonia was not granted special fiscal autonomy (Garcia-Milà and 
McGuire, 2007). In sum, the Generalitat (the regional government) of Catalonia has 
been able to assume primary responsibility for the support and provision of health 
and social services, but generally within frameworks established by the central 
government, upon which it is highly dependent for funding (McRoberts, 2001: 128). 
Nevertheless, high political distinctiveness and strong decision-making autonomy 
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favoured a process of welfare building that has further increased the differences 
between Catalonia and the rest of Spain.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the Catalan party system has been 
characterised by the existence of two competing blocs of parties, one on the centre-
left and the other on the centre-right. The latter bloc has been dominated by the CiU, 
which has almost uninterruptedly controlled the government of Catalonia. On the 
other hand, the Catalan Socialist Party, federated with the PSOE, has been the largest 
party of the opposition for most of the time since the re-establishment of the 
Generalitat of Catalonia. In this context of polarisation, the CiU has promoted a 
welfare model, the distinctiveness of which derives from the centrality of private 
institutions in the provision of social services (McRoberts, 2001: 127). In his analysis 
of the party platforms, Sariego Mac-Ginty (2000: 86–87) defines the model supported 
by the CiU as géstion empresarial which favours horizontal subsidiarity between 
public and private sectors and a system of health care based on mixed organisation 
(sistema mixto de organización). The CiU also tried to interpret the historical tradition 
of Catalan welfare that, since the nineteenth century, was based on the existence of 
an extensive network of private and religious organisations.  
Data provided by Gallego (2003: 113) show that in 1995 Catalonia was the 
Autonomous Community in which the number of private hospital places was by far 
the highest. Indeed of a total of 4.8 hospital beds for 1,000 inhabitants, 3.1 were 
private and only 1.7 were public. The Spanish average was very different with 2.6 
public and 1.3 private hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Overall, in Figure 6.3, it is 
possible to see that through its promotion of private participation in welfare 
provision, Catalonia has been able to build a health care system that is much more 
extensive than that of most of the other Autonomous Communities, characterised by 
a lower total number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Also evident is a 
significant difference with the Basque Country, which has a health care system 
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almost as extensive as the Catalan one but much more based on the public, rather 
than private, provision of services.  
 
Figure 6.3. Number of private and public hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants in 1995. 




Source: Gallego (2003: 113) 
 
 
Gallego (2003) underlines that Catalonia has been a notable exception in the Spanish 
health care system and has been subject to a constant reform process. Analysing the 
developments in the Catalan health care system, Rico (1996) shows that the Catalan 
parliament, in which the CiU controlled the absolute majority of the seats, passed the 
Catalan Law of Health Care Reform (Ley de Ordenación Sanitaria de Catalunya) in May 
1990, only a month after a similar reform, the ‘quasi-market reform’, began to be 
applied in the British NHS. Therefore, Catalonia was one of the first European health 
care systems introducing ‘a division of financing and purchasing functions from the 
provision of services, shared by private (mostly non-profit-making) hospitals 
contracted out of the public system and by public hospitals and primary health care 
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centres’ (Rico, 1996: 124). Thus, Moreno (2000: 153), defines the Catalan health care 
system as a highly distinctive, ‘quasi-market’ model.  
The idea of ‘freedom of choice’ and the centrality of the individual in the 
welfare system has often been promoted by the CiU. For instance, in its manifesto for 
the 2010 local elections the CiU stated that: 
 
By helping the most disadvantaged and promoting upward social mobility, we 
strengthen our society. […] We believe in a welfare state that is neither 
interventionist nor inflexible but which takes into account the people and their 
sense of responsibility. We want to guarantee everyone's right to choose in all 
areas of social care. (CiU 2010 programme translated by Montagut et al. [2012: 
5]) 
 
In the recent campaign for the 2012 Catalan regional elections, the CiU, 
despite the worsening of the economic crisis, once again confirmed its commitment 
to the establishment of a more extensive, efficient and universal health system than 
those in place in other Spanish regions. At the same time, however, it declared that 
this goal could be fully achieved only through the participation of private actors in 
the process of evaluation and modernisation of health services (Una sanitat privada 
que contribueix als resultats de salut49). This cooperation between the two sectors could 
be further strengthened through the creation of an ‘ethical code of coexistence 
between public and private health’ (codi ètic de convivència entre la sanitat pública i la 
sanitat privada). 
During the 1980s the Catalan parliament had approved a series of laws aimed 
at reordering the system of social services on the basis of a dominant political vision 
that was inspired by pro-market principles (comercialismo) and regional centralism 
(antiprovincialismo) (Vilà, 2000: 371). The latter point underlines the fact that the CiU 
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was against transferring too many competences to local and provincial authorities, 
which often were under the control of opposition parties (for instance, Barcelona was 
a stronghold of the Socialist Party). Generally, in an increasingly multi-level and 
fragmented system of policy making, the regional government of Catalonia has 
tended to impose its hegemony over all other levels in the region (Loughlin, 2000: 31) 
and has come to play a more central role in welfare governance than the national, 
European, and local levels (Brugué et al, 2000: 112).  
While the Generalitat of Catalonia has consolidated its role of main regulator of 
social protection, as highlighted by Vilà (2000: 401), the private sector has controlled 
the provision of the majority of services for children, families, the handicapped, 
elderly, and the unemployed. For instance, evidence provided by Adelantado and 
Jiménez (2003: 170) shows that in Catalonia 84 per cent of residential care places are 
located in private institutions, whereas in Spain the average is 73.7 per cent. The Law 
on Social Services states that ‘in the past the absence of social protection was 
mitigated by the initiatives of charities and voluntary organisations, which are part 
of the Catalan tradition’50. The laws approved by the Catalan parliament recognised 
and promoted ‘social initiatives’ and were therefore aimed at supporting and 
consolidating a model of social assistance that makes Catalonia a rather singular case 
among the Spanish regions. Despite its emphasis on private initiatives, Catalan social 
legislation is considered as one of the best developed and most extensive in Spain. As 
highlighted by García et al (2013: 97), the Catalan Law on Social Services can be 
considered as coming very close to ‘excellence’ since it recognises an extensive set of 
subjective social rights and is very advanced in strategic social planning.  
Additionally, in the 1990s the CiU was one of the first political movements to 
promote a highly developed, modern and integrated system of family-oriented 
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policies, which would go beyond the traditional ‘familism’ of the Southern European 
welfare model. In 1993, the Catalan government approved an Integrated Plan in 
Support of the Family (Pla Integral de Apoyo a Las Famílies) through a list of twelve 
implementation programmes (Programas de Actuación), and established an integrated 
network of benefits and services aimed ‘at strengthening families and improving 
their quality of life’ (author’s translation from Alberdi 1997). A more recent plan51 
(covering the period from 2012 to 2016) further develops the idea of family support 
through an integrated system of social services that would complement more 
traditional forms of protection (polítiques familiars tradicionals), like cash benefits, as 
well as promoting cooperation between the public sector, private actors (món 
empresarial) and voluntary organisations.   
Overall, using McRoberts’s words, today Catalonia has ‘a welfare state regime 
similar to the more advanced southern European regions’ (McRoberts, 2001: 128). For 
instance, it is possible to find many similarities between the Catalan and Lombard 
welfare models since they are both based on the principle of ‘freedom of choice’ and 
on forms of horizontal subsidiarity between public and private sectors. The financial 
crisis that has hit Catalonia in recent years does not seem to have changed this 
political orientation but, rather, has accelerated the marketization of Catalan welfare in 
a framework of economic austerity and increasing demands for independence. 
Indeed, in its 2014 national convention, Comprometidos con las personas, the 
Democratic Convergence of Catalonia, the major partner of the CiU coalition, 
promoted a system of even stronger cooperation between private and public sectors 
in order to further extend social services and improve efficiency. The CDC affirmed 
that Catalan independence would favour the establishment of a truly liberal model of 
welfare governance, more efficient and sustainable than the Spanish one. Adopting a 
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http://benestar.gencat.cat/web/.content/01departament/05plansactuacio/enllasos/pla_suport_familia.pdf 
(date of access 04/11/2014).  
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more radical position on Catalan self-determination and citizenship, the CDC also 
aimed to link particular benefits coming from Catalan social services to a basic 
knowledge of the Catalan language and culture, which, in case of independence, 
would be important preconditions for obtaining full citizenship52.      
 
 
Territoriality and Welfare Building in the Basque Country 
 
The party system of the Basque Country and the dominance of the Basque Nationalist Party 
(PNV) 
 
Like Catalonia, the Basque Country has been almost uninterruptedly governed by a 
territorial movement: the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). This party has been 
described as ‘the first and most enduring organisational form of nationalism in the 
Basque County’ (Ugarte and Pérez-Nievas, 1998: 87). Although it was founded in the 
19th century, the PNV became the most influential party of the region only in the late 
1970s, during the transition to democracy and the establishment of the Autonomous 
Communities. In that period, the PNV supported a political arrangement that 
recognised the special status of the Basque Country while maintaining some federal 
connections with Spain (Irvin, 1999: 123).  
Despite its electoral strength, the PNV has never managed to control the 
absolute majority of the seats in the Basque parliament and has had to form minority 
or coalition governments. Yet even in this context the PNV could still play a 
dominant role in Basque Politics. Indeed, Ştefuriuc (2009: 197) underlines that:  
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 A summary on the main conclusions of the Comprometidos con las personas conference can be found in an 
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[A]s the Basque statute of autonomy grants substantially more powers to the 
Basque government than that of any other autonomous community, the necessity 
for everyday policy coordination between Madrid and Vitoria, the capital of the 
Basque Country is also more limited. The Basque government can enact a wide 
range of policies without having to cooperate with the central government. 
 
At the same time, it should be noted that, unlike Catalonia, the Basque Country has 
not developed as a party system based on two competing blocks of parties but, 
rather, as a system in which a party, the PNV, can be defined as the ‘authentic center’ 
(Llera Ramo, 1994: 65) – ideologically, in vote transfer, and also in its ability to 
balance and coordinate other political actors (Vazquez, 2010: 182). By building 
coalitions and establishing alliances with other political parties (Table 6.3), the 
Basque Nationalists have managed to control the regional government for most of 
the time since 1979 (with a short opposition parenthesis between 2009 and 2012) and 
can therefore be considered as the ‘dominant’ political force of the region (Vazquez, 
















Table 6.3. Governments of the Basque Country from 1980 until today 
President Period Parties 
Carlos Garaikoextea  1980-1985 PNV (minority government) 
José Antonio Ardanza 1987-1999 PNV, PSE-PSOE (minimum 
winning coalition, 1985-1991) 
 
PNV, EE, EA (minimum winning 
coalition, 1991-1995) 
 
PNV, EA, PSE-PSOE (minimum 
winning coalition, 1995-1999) 
Juan José Ibarretxe 1999-2009 PNV, EA (1999-2001, minority 
government) 
PNV, EA, EBB-IU (2001-2009, 
minimum winning coalition) 
Francisco Javier López 2009-2012 PSE-PSOE (minority 
government) 
Iñigo Urkullu 2012-  PNV (minority) 
 
Using a scheme similar to the one presented in the Catalan case, which combines 
centre-periphery and left-right political cleavages, it is possible to provide a map of 
the Basque party (Figure 6.4). The PNV dominates the party system and is also the 
most important territorial party. It is located on the moderate centre-right of the left-
right continuum (Massetti 2011) having on its left the statewide Socialist Party 
(PSOE-PSE) and other smaller regionalist or ‘sub-state nationalist’ parties (HB, EE 
and EA). On the right, the main competitor has been the statewide People’s Party 
(PP), which in the 1990s and 2000s managed to obtain more than 20 per cent of the 
vote (whereas in Catalonia it always remained a rather marginal political actor).  The 





Figure 6.4. Locating Basque parties on the two-dimensional political map combining 























Generally, the PNV has preferred to establish alliances with centre-left or left-wing 
parties (see Table 3) such as the Basque Socialist Party (the PSE, federated with the 
PSOE) in the 1990s and United Left (IU-EB) and Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna, 
EA) in more recent years (Ştefuriuc, 2009: 196). This may be partly due to the fact 
that, despite its centrist and Christian democratic ideology, the PNV has traditionally 
taken a more obviously ‘progressive’ stance on social issues than the CiU. Indeed, as 

















to the free market system as the basis for the economic organisation of Euskadi, they 
also realised that this system must be brought into accord with the needs of the 
community as a whole. This attention to the workers’ rights was also stimulated by 
the need to compete with smaller left-wing nationalist movements such as Basque 
Solidarity (EA) and Herri Batasuna (HB).  
Additionally, Keating (2004: 235) had underlined the fact the Catalan and 
Basque nationalisms are both ‘conservative’ but whereas the first one has sought to 
keep the ‘working class in their place’, Basque Nationalism, despite being initially 
reactionary, had sought ‘to co-opt the working class in a programme of nation-
building’. Thus, unlike the CiU, the PNV actively promoted the formation of a 
Basque trade union, the Basque Workers' Solidarity (in Basque: Eusko Langileen 
Alkartasuna, ELA). Since the beginning, the ELA was ardently pro-Catholic and, most 
importantly, it maintained very close links with the ‘bourgeois’ PNV, thus distancing 
itself from other unions that were closer to left-wing parties. As pointed out by Clark 
(1984: 250), the ELA and PNV formed an alliance of the Basque centre. The ELA-PNV 
collaboration brought together skilled workers, small farmers, peasants, artisans and 
small businessmen and middle- and upper-class professionals. Therefore, by 
focusing on the common identity of the Basque community, the ELA, which today is 
the largest Basque trade union, has tried to reduce class conflicts and, as a 
consequence, downplay the importance of the left-right cleavage. This makes the 
Basque case similar to the South Tyrolean one, where the centrist and Christian 
democratic South Tyrolean People’s party also supported the emergence of a 
moderate trade union promoting interclass cooperation. On the other hand, 
McRoberts (2001: 107) has highlighted the absence of strong nationalist trade unions 
in Catalonia, where Convergence and Union has had little affinity with unionism and 
its working class members are mainly in small and medium-sized enterprises.  
Given its central position in the party system, its strong Christian-democratic 
identity and its successful attempt to create a cross-class territorial identity and 
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establish alliances with centre-left parties, the PNV is expected to have promoted the 
emergence of a region-specific welfare model, which differs not only from the 
Spanish one but also from the more liberal and market-oriented one established by 
the CiU in Catalonia.  
 
Building a Distinctive Welfare Model 
 
Like Catalonia, the Basque Country also actively participated in the construction of 
the Estado de las Autonomías. In the devolution process, the PNV did not fight for the 
full separation of the Basque Country from the rest of Spain but bargained for the 
transfer of a wide range of powers from Madrid. A bilateral negotiation process 
commenced between the Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez (member of the Unión del 
Centro Democratico, UCD) and the PNV’s Carlos Garaikoetxea, who had become the 
leader of the temporary Basque General Council in 1979. The result of this process 
was a statute that would grant the Basques significant freedom in both economic and 
cultural matters. In the 1980s, the Basque Country was granted significant powers in 
the fields of health care and social assistance (Gallego et al, 2003: 76; Rico, 1996: 123– 
124). Public pension schemes are still administered by Madrid, although in recent 
years, the PNV has campaigned for the full devolution of pension-related policies53, 
which would mark an important step in the development of a fully-fledged welfare 
regime at the regional level.  
It should also be underlined that the Basque Country managed to achieve 
much more significant levels of fiscal autonomy than other historical communities 
such as Catalonia and Galicia. Indeed, the PNV and the Basque nationalist 
movements campaigned for the recognition of fiscal autonomy as one of the historic 
rights of the Basque provinces (foralismo). As underlined by Nordberg (2007), the 
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PNV declared the fueros – the fiscal prerogatives granted to the Basque provinces – ‘a 
symbol of the previous, imaginary independence of the region’ (97). Therefore, 
thanks to its ‘historical statutory rights’, the Basque Country (and also Navarre) 
could obtain special autonomy straightaway (Garcia, 1993: 193). On the other hand, 
the Catalan and Galician movements were initially weaker or more fragmented and 
could not appeal to a historical tradition of fiscal autonomy. For instance, Catalonia 
was denied any special status in fiscal administration and was instead immediately 
included in a ‘common’ fiscal regime (Régimen Común) promoting coordination, 
redistribution and cooperation across most of the Autonomous Communities (Ruiz 
Almendral, 2002; López-Laborda et al., 2006).  
Fiscal autonomy combined with strong decision-making autonomy in welfare 
issues allowed the establishment of a highly distinctive system of social protection in 
the Basque Country, and that system has been characterised by high levels of 
generosity. Indeed, as already shown in the previous chapter, the Basque Country is 
the Autonomous Community with the highest per capita spending on health care 
and social assistance. More generally, the Basque Country has ‘the most balanced 
provision offerings: extensive social services, highly developed economic benefits 
and a significant presence of non-professional, caregivers employed’ (Martínez-
Buján, 2014: 113). Thus it is not so surprising that Basque citizens today are among 
the most satisfied with their health care system (Sánchez Vitores 2013). 
As underlined above, the PNV has often established alliances with centre-left 
political forces and this seems to have influenced the type of social policies promoted 
by the Basque government. For instance, more emphasis has been placed on the 
importance of the public sector as the main provider of health care and social 
assistance. In his analysis of party programmes, Sariego Mac-Ginty (2000: 87) shows 
that the PNV has underlined the redistributive nature of health care policies, which 
are based on four main principles: ‘universality, solidarity, equality and quality’ 
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(universalidad, solidaridad, equidad, calidad). The aim of regional welfare is to 
strengthen ‘cohesion and social peace’ (cohesión, paz social).  
 Therefore, the Basque welfare system has evolved in a direction that is very 
different from the Catalan one. Gallego et al. (2003c) have underlined that both 
Autonomous Communities have built highly distinctive models of welfare (modelo 
diferencial), which are also very complex and ‘dense’ (modelo complejo comunitario), 
since their governance is based on the participation of a plurality of regional actors 
(Galego et al., 2003c: 215 and 221). However, whereas Catalonia has opted for a 
model that is clearly market-oriented and supportive of private initiatives (modelo 
mercantil), the Basque government has sought to strengthen the role of public actors 
in the network of social government, which, of course, also involves private actors 
but in a more subordinate position (modelo público). In sum, the Catalonian system 
has been defined as a modelo diferencial mercantil-comunitario, while the Basque Model 
can be considered as a modelo diferencial publico-comunitario. Figure 6.5 shows the 
results of the study conducted by Gallego et al. (2003c: 228), comparing the Basque 
and Catalonian models to those of other Autonomous Communities, which, despite 
enjoying some autonomy in welfare governance, have been characterised by lower 
levels of territorial mobilisation. The horizontal dimension refers to whether welfare 
governance has been based on the participation of different actors in highly 
developed social networks (redes sociales) or, in line with the Southern European 
model, has been characterised by high levels of familialism. On the other hand, the 
vertical axis considers the dominance of public or private sectors. Thus, for instance, 
Andalusia is characterised by a statist-familialistic model (see also next chapter), in 
which the public sector plays the role of ‘residual’ welfare provider outside the 
family. The Valencian Community is characterised by a privatised-familialistic model, 
in which the social role of family is only marginally complemented by market forces. 
In Catalonia and the Basque Country, on the other hand, welfare models are more 
complex, extensive and distinctive because public or market forces may rely on 
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communities rather than individual families, and this communitarianism has been 
fostered by the existence of strong territorial identities. 
 





















Source: Adaptation from Gallego et al. (2003c: 228). 
 
Gallego (2003) has also underlined the fact that the Basque Country has built a health 
care system that is peculiar in the context of the National Health care System of Spain 
because it has invested a lot in the construction and planning of a universal system of 
social care based on the needs of individual citizens. Moreover, in a context in which 
the public sector is central in welfare provision (see Figure 6.3 in the previous 

















PNV, has been actively involved in health care governance (Gallego 2003: 114). As 
mentioned in the previous section, this has not happened in Catalonia where a strong 
territorial trade union has failed to emerge.  
The universalistic aspirations of the Basque system can also be found in the 
level of extensiveness and generosity of the guaranteed minimum income (renta 
mínima de inserción) established by the regional administration. Aguilar et al. define 
the renta mínima de inserción as a social programme that, on the basis of some 
eligibility criteria, provides assistance to unemployed citizens through economic 
support and actions that facilitate their (re)integration in society and in the job 
market. On the basis of this definition, the authors show that in 1995 the Basque 
Country was the only Autonomous Community with a fully developed programme 
of minimum income. Catalonia also introduced a renta mínima, although this social 
programme was less generous and inclusive than the Basque one (this is confirmed 
by Noguera and Ubasart [2003: 198]). All the other Autonomous Communities (with 
the exception of Madrid) developed forms of protection that were less extensive and 
not as innovative as the renta mínima. 
 In recent years, all the Autonomous Communities have introduced some 
form of income support. Yet the Basque Country remains the region with the highest 
coverage of renta mínima, which has even increased during the current economic 
crisis. Indeed, as shown in Table 6.4, between 2010 and 2011 the percentage of Basque 
citizens that have benefited from the renta has increased from 2.4 per cent to 7.4 per 
cent, by far the highest percentage among Spanish regions. This is even more striking 
if we consider the fact that the Basque Country has the lowest level of 
unemployment and therefore the share of population needing income support is well 
below the Spanish average. At the same time, regions with high levels of poverty and 
unemployment such as Andalusia, the Canary Islands and Murcia are very far from 
the Basque and Navarrese figures. It should also be noted that in 2010 Catalonia was 
the region with the highest coverage after the Basque Country and Navarre but its 
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position worsened in 2011. This is probably due to the fact that, being part of the 
‘common’ fiscal regime, Catalonia has been fully involved in the financial crisis 
affecting Spain in recent years, whereas the two foral regions have used their special 
fiscal autonomy to protect and further expand their systems of social protection. 
 
Table 6.4. The coverage of renta mínima de inserción (% of the population that 
benefited from the scheme) in the Autonomous Communities and levels of 
unemployment in 2010 and 2011 
 
 Coverage 
2010 (% of 
population) 
Coverage 
2011 (% of 
population) 
Unemployment 2010 Unemployment 2011 
Basque Country 2.38 7.41 10.5 12 
Navarre 1.54 2.94 11.8 12.9 
Asturias 0.89 1.84 16 17.9 
Andalusia 0.99 1.57 28 30.4 
Aragon 0.59 1.11 14.8 17.1 
Cantabria 0.6 1.47 13.9 15.3 
Catalonia 1.03 0.82 17.8 19.2 
Madrid 0.44 0.82 16.1 16.7 
Canary Islands 0.47 0.69 28.7 29.7 
La Rioja 0.4 0.63 14.3 17 
Castile Leon 0.18 0.63 15.8 16.7 
Balearic Islands 0.41 0.62 20.4 21.9 
Galicia 0.28 0.58 15.4 17.4 
Castile Mancha 0.1 0.36 21 22.9 
Valencian C. 0.18 0.33 23.3 24.5 
Murcia 0.13 0.32 23.4 25.4 
Extremadura 0.35 0.3 23 25.2 
Sources: García Herrero G. A. and J. M. R. Navarro (2012: 140–141); García et al. (2013: 183).  
 
Thus it seems that during the period of economic crisis and austerity, the Basque 
Country has used its special autonomy to shield its social system and, as a result of 
this, today the gap between this region and the rest of Spain is widening This can be 
empirically shown through a preliminary analysis of the DEC index (Indíce de 
desarrollo de los servicios sociales) elaborated in 2012, 2013 and 2014 by a group of 
Spanish scholars and focusing on spending, regulation and implementation of social 
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services54 in the 17 Autonomous Communities. The score ranges from 0 (no 
development) to 10 (very high development). It can be seen that in the post-crisis 
periods, the dynamic of social service development seems to be much more positive 
in the Basque Country than in most of the other ACs. Whereas the Basque Country 
has further improved its already high score by 0.7 on the 0–10 scale, the average of 
the other communities has slightly decreased by 0.05.  
 
Table 6.5. Index of development of social services in Spanish Autonomous 
Communities. Post-crisis evolution: comparing 2012 and 2013 
 
  2012 2013 2014 Difference 2014-2012 
Basque Country 6.8 7.35 7.5 0.7 
Navarre 6.55 7.15 6.85 0.3 
Castile and Leon 6.9 6.65 6.65 -0.15 
Asturias 5.5 6.35 6.35 0.85 
La Rioja 6.7 6.85 6.2 -0.5 
Catalonia 5.9 6.35 6.15 0.25 
Cantabria 5.2 6.6 5.85 0.65 
Castile Mancha 5.9 6.25 5.7 -0.2 
Aragon 5.35 5.85 5.05 -0.3 
Extremadura 4.2 5.6 4.15 -0.05 
Andalusia 4.6 4.4 4 -0.6 
Balearic Islands 2.9 3.15 3.85 0.95 
Madrid 2.5 2.75 3.7 1.2 
Galicia 5.1 3.65 2.85 -2.25 
Canary Islands 1.8 2 2.6 0.8 
Murcia 3.6 2.8 2.1 -1.5 
Valencian Community 0.8 0.6 0.6 -0.2 
Sources: García Herrero G. A. and J. M. R. Navarro (2012); García et al. (2013); García et al. (2014). 
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Overall, both Catalonia and the Basque Country have established strong and 
distinctive welfare models, which substantially diverge from the residual and 
familialistic model that characterises most of the Spanish regions. Additionally, this 
chapter has demonstrated that the Catalan model is also qualitatively different from 
the Basque one. Whereas the latter is mainly based on the direct action of the public 
sector and involvement of social partners in social governance, the former is more 
‘market-oriented’ and based on competition, private initiative, and freedom of 
choice. These qualitative differences are mainly due to the fact that the PNV and CiU 
have not acted in a ‘vacuum’ but have been part of distinctive ‘policy communities’ 
and have established different types of regional coalitions with social and political 
actors.  
At the same time, it should be highlighted that the Basque model has also 
benefited from an ‘institutional’ advantage – its foral status and fiscal autonomy – 
which, particularly in an era of austerity, has resulted in a more generous and 
resilient welfare system than the Catalan (and Spanish) one. This also points to the 
more important role played by formal institutional asymmetries in determining 
different levels of welfare development across the Spanish regions, as already shown 





The Spanish Left: statewide political dominance and the regional challenge 
In the last decades the Spanish Left has been dominated by the Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (PSOE), which, since the transition to democracy, has represented the 
overwhelming majority of left-wing votes (Figure 7.1). Indeed, by the beginning of 
the 1980s other left-wing parties (in particular, the Spanish Communist Party) had 
substantially weakened, leaving the PSOE with no serious competitors. The PSOE is 
the oldest party of Spain (it was founded in 1879) and became the main 
representative of the working class in the late 19th century (Magone 2009). The party 
evolved slowly and also founded a trade union confederation (UGT, Unión General de 
Trabajadores).  
Most importantly, the PSOE has been the dominant party in Spanish Politics 
for most of the period after the transition to democracy. The party was in central 
government from 1982 to 1996, and again from 2004 to 2011. Particularly in the first 
period of government under the leadership of Felipe González, the Party experienced 
its ‘edad dorada’ (Marín Arce, 2000: 189) and was able to play a central role in the 











Figure 7.1. Electoral support for the PSOE as a percentage of the total support for left-
wing parties in Spain 
 
Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/ Author’s own calculation. 
 
The hegemony of the PSOE in statewide politics seems to have affected its attitudes 
towards decentralisation and federalism. Using the data provided by the Party 
Manifesto Project  (Volkens et al., 2013) it can be noted that in the 1970s, immediately 
after the collapse of the Francoist regime, PSOE support for decentralisation and 
federalism was much stronger than the average support of all other parties obtaining 
at least 4 per cent of the vote at the statewide level (Figure 7.2). For instance in 1976, 
the PSOE conference approved a resolution that tried to reconcile the cross-territorial 
nature of class politics with the need to build a federal state after decades of 
authoritarian centralism55. This attitude changed quite radically in the 1980s and 
1990s, when the party managed to consolidate its control of the central government 
and, therefore, started considering decentralisation as a potential threat to its political 
dominance. Socialist support for decentralisation increased again in the 2000s, after a 
period of opposition and under the new leadership of Josè Luis Zapatero.  
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 ‘El PSOE propugna la instauración de una República Federal de trabajadores, integrada por todos los pueblos 
del Estado español’ (‘Resolución sobre nacionalidades y regiones’ quoted in De Blass Guerrero [1978: 164], 
italics added).  
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As I will show in the following sections, the centralising tendencies of the 
PSOE in the period of construction and consolidation of Spanish institutions had a 
strong influence on its party organisation, its leadership, and its role in regional 
politics and policymaking. The PSOE was crucial in the construction of a statewide 
welfare system in Spain. At the same time, the existence of a centre-periphery 
cleavage constituted a challenge to this party and its attempts to hinder the 
emergence of region-specific welfare models, which risked threatening the territorial 
integrity of Spain. 
Figure 7.2. The support for decentralisation of the PSOE compared to average 
support for decentralisation of all other parties obtaining at least 4 per cent of the 
vote at the statewide level  
 
 










Party ideology and organisation 
 
The PSOE is a socially progressive party. Although in the 1970s it still defined itself 
as a ‘Marxist’ political party, by the end of that decade the PSOE ‘had emerged as one 
of Europe’s most moderate socialist parties far closer to the Northern European social 
democratic parties than to the parties of Mitterand and Papandreou’ (Share, 1985: 
82). This ‘social democratization’ of the party ideology paved the way for the election 
victory in 1982 under the leadership of Felipe González, which, in turn, marked the 
beginning of the long era of Socialist government that was only interrupted in 1996.  
The organisation of the party had to adapt to its centrality in Spanish politics 
and to the strengthening of its national leadership. As highlighted by Méndez Lago 
(2007: 95) 
 
Once it won the 1982 general elections, the PSOE enjoyed a huge number of 
resources with which to influence society. Having access to government meant 
having to fill many positions and having access to patronage. In short, it opened a 
pool of resources that went far beyond the existing and the potential party’s 
organizational resources, and diminished the necessity and the ‘profitability’ of 
investing in the party organization.  
 
Immediately after the collapse of Franco’s dictatorship, which was characterised by 
high levels of centralism, the PSOE decided to adopt a decentralised and regionalised 
organisation (Fabre and Méndez-Lago, 2009: 109). Formally, the federal features of 
the PSOE organisation have not changed over time and most of its internal offices are 
still called ‘federal’ and are open to territorial representation (Figure 3). Yet, one 
should distinguish between the formal organisational arrangements of a party and 
how, de facto, power is distributed across the various levels of its territorial 
organisation. Indeed, the PSOE inherited a rather weak party organisation, which 
counted only 2,548 members in 1974 and 9,141 in 1976 (Soto, 2005: 80). For this 
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reason, the ‘re-organisation of the PSOE was mainly conducted from the centre’ 
(Fabre, 2008: 169).  
Additionally, the need to be electorally competitive at the statewide level 
prompted González and the deputy leader of the party, Alfonso Guerra, to build a 
cohesive, disciplined party (Padró-Solanet, 1996: 465). Therefore, ‘the regional 
branches were also set up from the centre, once the provincial branches were 
organised to fight statewide parliamentary elections’ (Fabre, 2008: 161). Juliá (1997) 
also underlines that the reconstruction of the party took place before regional elites 
had time to develop, and provisions were made so that the central office of the party 
had the power to decide on political alliances, and to veto candidates on the lists for 
public office. PSOE elites were soon aware ‘of the need to centralize authority and 
create discipline within the party’ in order to assume the role of dominant, catch-all 
party of Spain (Share, 1999: 107). 
Overall, the organisation of the PSOE can be defined as highly ‘integrated’ 
(Thorlakson, 2009: 168). The only (partial) exception was the Catalan Socialist Party, 
which formally remained an independent party, although it was soon ‘treated like 
any other regional party branch’ (Fabre and Méndez-Lago, 2009: 110). In reality, the 
relationship between the central leadership and the Catalan leadership changed over 
time and was strongly influenced by internal party equilibriums.  
The next section focuses on the strategies that the PSOE adopted to 
accommodate (or contrast) territorial demands for institutional and welfare 
autonomy in Catalonia and the Basque Country, two regions in which the party 
played a much less dominant role than in Madrid and had to face the challenge of 
territorial parties. The results of this analysis suggest that for most of its time in 
central government, the PSOE tried to limit territorial divergence in social 
governance and, in some regional contexts, it was torn by the ‘dilemma’ between 
cross-territorial class politics and the support for regional identities. This analysis is 
then contrasted with the case of Andalusia, a region in which the PSOE has always 
212 
 
been politically dominant and has not been faced with significant territorial 
challenges. 
 




Source: Fabre (2009: 172). 
 
The PSOE and the regional challenge in the cases of Catalonia, the Basque 
Country and Andalusia 
 
As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, immediately after the collapse of the 
Francoist regime, the PSOE actively supported the establishment of a federal system, 
which would acknowledge the existence of territorial identities. Yet the party soon 
realised that granting special powers only to those regions in which territorial 
mobilisation was strong would have undermined the integrity of the Spanish system. 




Reflecting the redistributive inclination of the left, the PSOE felt that any one 
region’s autonomy would have to be developed in accord with a nation-wide 
economic development plan that would meet the needs of Spain’s poorer regions.  
 
Additionally, the moderate support for decentralisation was accompanied by an 
opposing process of within-party centralisation promoted by González and the 
central leaders of the party. This process of internal centralisation seemed to be in 
stark conflict with the institutional development of the Spanish state in this period. 
Yet this contradiction was more apparent than real, since the strengthening of the 
party leadership also determined a marked shift in the party line. Felipe González’s 
administration, which governed with an absolute majority from 1982 to 1993, 
‘quickly adopted a conservative approach to institutional matters, while 
concentrating internal party power around the Council of Ministers’ (Hopkin, 2009b: 
192). Moreover, González’s charismatic and highly personalised leadership ‘made 
the PSOE a relatively centralised organisation through the 1980s, with the 
government dominating the party and regional party elites subordinated to the 
national leadership (Ibid.).  
The support for a highly integrated regional system started even before the 
PSOE gained control of the central government. Indeed, in 1981, the conservative 
government led by Adolfo Suárez, after having promoted the creation of the 
Autonomous Communities, also passed an Organic Law for the Harmonization of 
the Process of Self-government (LOAPA). In name of ‘harmonization’, the Act would 
take back powers granted in the statutes of autonomy that had already been 
approved. Moreover, it required the parliaments of the Autonomous Communities to 
have their laws ratified by the central government. Territorial movements strongly 
opposed this law but the PSOE, including the Catalan Socialist Party, supported it 
(McRoberts, 2001: 73). 
Once in power, the main programmatic goals of the PSOE were to promote 
substantial public investment policies improving fixed capital formation and human 
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capital formation (Boix, 1998: 155). The PSOE feared that excessive decentralisation 
would reduce the effectiveness of its (mainly supply-side) policies and undermine its 
control of economic resources (including social transfers) that could be used to 
stabilise cross-regional electoral support. Thus, even though in August 1983 the 
Constitutional Court determined that 14 of the provisions of the harmonization bill 
were unconstitutional, the González government continued to pursue the underlying 
objective of the law: to rein in the more ambitious Autonomous Communities such as 
Catalonia and the Basque Country. Additionally, the Constitutional Court argued 
that the LOAPA was not necessary since the government could achieve the same 
objective through the basic law. Therefore, by invoking its responsibility for ‘general 
interests’, the González government ‘passed laws to set standards and to intervene in 
areas of AC responsibility such as education, health care, economic development, 
and tourism’. Moreover, ‘the claims of ACs such as Catalonia that they had final 
authority over the powers listed in their statutes of autonomy were effectively 
negated’ (McRoberts, 2001: 73).  
González also tried to reduce the singularity of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country within the Spanish political order and, in the process, refuted the claim of 
‘historical regions’ (Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia) that they should enjoy 
special status. Since its election victory, the general aim of the PSOE was to 
standardise the competencies of all regional governments (Agranoff, 1993: 87), 
regardless of the existence of strong territorial identities. Therefore, special powers 
were also transferred to Valencia and the Canary Islands and Andalusia. Most 
importantly: 
In the case of health, combining four additional ACs (Andalusia, Canaries, Galicia 
and Valencia) with the Basque Country and Catalonia served the government’s 
purposes well. While helping these four additional ACs to take on health care, 
Madrid retained important controls over these activities. It was more manageable 
for Madrid to deal with six ACs collectively than it would have been to deal with 
the Basque Country and Catalonia alone (McRoberts, 2001: 74). 
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According to Agranoff (1993), by devolving the administration of health care to six 
Autonomous Communities, the PSOE tried to establish a system of cross-regional 
coordination, which, while acknowledging the demands coming from territorially 
mobilised regions, would remain under strong central control.  
Generally, ‘neither the PSOE nor the PP has been very sympathetic to the full 
extent of Catalan and Basque demands’ (Sorens, 2009:262). The hostility of the PSOE 
towards decentralisation in Catalonia and the Basque country is also motivated by 
the fact that the local branches of the PSOE have traditionally received a significant 
proportion of their support from ‘immigrants’ born elsewhere in Spain, who are 
overwhelmingly against Catalan or Basque nationalism (Ibid.). Additionally, Keating 
has argued that the originally conservative character of nationalism in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia has prevented the PSOE from fully supporting territorialism 
and decentralisation. Thus, the PSOE ‘adopted a formal position in favour of 
federalism in 1981, but showed little conviction in carrying it through’ (Keating, 2004: 
235).   
Although, as already mentioned, the PSOE formally recognises the total 
strategic and organisational autonomy of its Catalan branch, the PSC, in practice it 
does not consider that relationship as ‘federal’ in the same way as it has been against 
excessive federalisation of the Spanish state (Marcet and Casals 2011: 217). Hopkin 
(2003: 233) has argued that the Catalan Socialist Party has ‘generally fallen into line 
with the Madrid leadership on key issues’, including welfare policies.  
In this context, ‘the PSC-PSOE's dual nature as a regional party and an affiliate 
of a national party can explain many of the strategic and electoral dilemmas it has 
experienced’ (Roller and Van Hauten, 2003: 1). Given these intra-party tensions, it is 
not surprising that on the one hand the PSC-PSOE has always been the largest 
Catalan party in the general elections (until 2011) but, on the other, it has not been 
able to replicate this success in the electoral competitions at the regional level. 
Hopkin (2003: 233) argues that this is ‘widely seen as the consequence of the PSC’s 
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perceived closeness to the PSOE, which allows the Catalan nationalist parties to 
represent the PSC as a party more concerned with the interests of Spain as a whole, 
and themselves as more concerned with the interests of Catalonia’. Thus, in order to 
monopolise the pro-Catalan political field, the CiU began to portray the PSC as a 
mere ‘branch’ of the Spanish party (Ross, 1996: 498). 
The general perception that the PSC has mainly been a regional branch of the 
PSOE seems to be strongly reflected in its electoral results in Catalonia. As illustrated 
in Figure 7.4, in the 1980s the PSC-PSOE obtained, on average, more than 40 per cent 
of the Catalan vote in general elections but only 27 per cent of the vote in regional 
election. This discrepancy has remained constant over the last three decades – even 
in the 2000s when, for the first time, the PSC-PSOE managed to form a regional 
government with other centre-left parties.   
 
 
Figure 7.4. Electoral results of PSC-PSOE in General and Regional elections (results in 








The literature on Catalan politics has also shown that tensions between the central 
party elite and the regional party organisation emerged in the 2003-2010 period when 
the PSOE controlled both the central government (from 2004) and Generalitat (Marcet 
and Casals, 2011: 217). During this period the PSC-PSOE approved a change in the 
new statute of autonomy. However, Sorens (2009: 262) defines this as a ‘very modest’ 
change due to the pressures coming from the socialist government in Madrid.  
Additionally, it should be underlined that in Catalonia the PSC has mainly 
focused on the development of local rather than regional social services (Montagut et 
al. 2012). Indeed, since they have controlled the municipality of Barcelona for many 
decades and have instead played a much more marginal role in the Generalitat, the 
Socialists have often opposed the region-centric welfare model imposed by the CiU 
(see Chapter 6) and have tried to downplay the mediating role played by regional 
institutions in multi-level social governance. 
Also in the Basque Country the tension between territorial issues and 
statewide politics affected the strategies of the regional branch of the PSOE. The 
Basque PSOE had dominated the Left of this region since the late 1970s, but it soon 
met an obstacle: the articulation of Basque nationalist grievances as opposed to those 
of the working class. Indeed Clark (1984: 247) suggests that:  
 
 The Basques are a classic case of conflict between class and ethnicity. Many 
Basques of the national bourgeoisie see the basic social fault line as separating 
ethnic Basques from Spaniards. For them, metaphorically speaking, the important 
frontier is the Ebro River. Others, who are members of the working class, think of 
political struggle in terms of social and economic class, and perceive the world as 
divided between those who own property and buy labor, and those who own no 
property and who sell their labor to others. 
 
Thus, for a social-democratic party like the Basque PSOE it has been very difficult to 
reconcile territorial and class identities. Vazquez (2010: 79) suggests that immediately 
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after the transition to democracy the PSOE-PSE had to deal with two parallel, centre-
periphery clashes:  
 
One was in regard to the regional question and allocation of governmental power 
in the structure of the state apparatus. The other dealt with the party’s own 
restructuring battle, which would determine the degree of its internal federation. 
Proregional advocates, even referred to within the party as “the nationalists”, were 
in great part a product of the incorporation of non-PSOE socialist forces from the 
periphery; they became the base of ‘nationalist’ currents within the PSOE, 
entering into a rivalry with the ‘centralist’ and ‘worker’ currents. 
 
The fact that the centralist factions of the Socialist Party were also called ‘worker 
currents’ shows that traditional class issues were considered to be incompatible with 
the demands for territorial autonomy within the party and within the Spanish state. 
This also resulted in a division of the working class, since the PSE-PSOE had a close 
relationship with the statewide trade union UGT, which, however, was not nearly as 
strong as the more territorially-focused trade unions56 (Nordberg, 2007: 125). Thus, in 
the post-Franco Basque context, the PSE-PSOE was engaged in a political 
confrontation with the PNV on the issue of fiscal autonomy, since the latter 
supported the establishment of a special status for the region (Régimen foral), whereas 
the former ‘emphasized strengthening the [central] state’s tax planning and 
coordination as well as the financial balance between the regions’ (Nordberg, 2007: 
115). Generally, the Basque branch of the PSOE has been even closer to the party 
central office than the Catalan one57 and, as shown by Maddens and Libbrecht (2009: 
225), Basque Socialists have been even less supportive of regionalism than their 
Catalan colleagues.  
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 As shown in the previous chapter, the ELA trade union is the strongest trade union in the Basque Country 
and is closer to the Basque Nationalist Party.  
57
 Fabre (2011: 360) also shows that the PSE-PSOE is organisationally less autonomous than the PSC.  
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After the election victory in 1982, the idea that territorial issues could become 
a potential threat to statewide social solidarity and redistribution became even 
stronger within the PSOE. Socialist leaders were generally hostile towards social 
programmes unilaterally promoted by the PNV-led Basque government. For 
instance, in 1989 the Basque Country introduced a first version of ‘minimum income 
of insertion’ called Ingreso Mínimo Familiar (in 1990 it was renamed Ingreso Mínimo de 
Inserción). After the publication of a study on poverty, Basque institutions decided to 
develop an integrated plan against poverty, which also included income support. 
The central government controlled by the PSOE immediately opposed this initiative 
arguing that it would encourage social dependence and ‘parasitism’. Additionally, 
the socialist minister for social affairs, Matilde Fernández, accused the Basque 
government of trying to break territorial solidarity in Spain (Noguera and Ubasart, 
2003: 199).  
On another occasion, the Basque branch of the PSOE, which in the late 1980s 
joined the PNV-led government and controlled the Basque health care department, 
approved a decree that extended free (and public) health care assistance to poor 
citizens, thus actively implementing the universalistic principles that inspired the 
National Health System established in 1986 at the statewide level58. Yet this initiative 
was not limited to the Autonomous Community and was soon embraced by the 
central office of the PSOE, which approved a similar law (Ley de Presupuestos 
Generales del Estado para 1989) for the entire country (Gallego, 2003: 108). This shows 
that even when the PSOE promoted sub-state social policies, it tended to share them 
with statewide party elites, which, in turn, transformed them into statewide social 
programmes. Thus regional federations of the PSOE played the role of ‘transmission 
belts’ between the periphery and the centre (Agranoff 1993) and contributed to the 
process of homogenising social policies across the Spanish territory.  
                                                          
58
 The implementation of the Servicios Nacionales de Salud was decentralised and important powers were 




The case of Andalusia 
 
So far, I have focused on two regions in which the PSOE was not the dominant 
political force and had to oppose or adapt to the pressures of strong territorial 
movements. It should be noted, however, that the largest party of the Spanish Left 
has obtained its best electoral results in regions in which territorial mobilisation has 
been weak or absent. Andalusia can be seen as the best example of a Socialist 
stronghold (since 1982 the PSOE has uninterruptedly controlled the regional 
government) in which regionalist parties have not posed a serious challenge59. In fact, 
as underlined by Bukowsky (2002) this region was used by the Socialists to 
consolidate their control of central government and to counterbalance the demands 
for increasing autonomy coming from the so-called ‘historical’ regions (Catalonia, 
Basque Country and Galicia).  
Moreno and Trelles (2005: 525) argue that ‘by controlling a large Spanish 
Comunidad Autonoma, the Socialists have been able to pursue their autonomist 
philosophy without alienating either “centralist” or “peripheral” views within the 
party’. According to the two authors the dominance of the PSOE in this region has 
resulted in the promotion of some innovative social policies, focusing in particular on 
the minimum income scheme (which, however, was an initiative started by the 
Basque Country). They also show that social spending in the region has grown 
considerably over the last decades (particularly in the early 2000s). In the field of 
labour market policies, which are beyond the scope of this study, the central 
government led by PSOE developed a Plan for Agricultural Employment (Plan de 
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 The only regionalist party with some political relevance is the Andalusian Party (Partido Andalucista, PA), a 
social-democratic territorial party that in the period between 1980 and 2004 obtained between 3 and 10 seats 
in the regional council (out of 109 seats). Between 1996 and 2004 the PA was also junior partner in the PSOE-




Empleo Rural, PER) aimed at supporting temporary seasonal agricultural workers 
during the periods of unemployment. The PER is mainly targeted at workers in 
Andalusia and Extremadura. They are also given the opportunity to be involved in 
infrastructure projects promoted by municipalities in the two regions (Muñoz-
Repiso, 2000).  Yet it should also be underlined that, during the González era, 
following a mix of social-democratic and clientelistic practices, the PSOE-led central 
government allocated a large amount of economic resources to Andalusia (and also 
to Extremadura and Castile-La Mancha) and established centrally coordinated (and 
financed) social programmes against poverty and unemployment in peripheral 
regions (Hopkin, 2001). Thus social and economic policies were developed under the 
close scrutiny of the central leadership of the PSOE and, despite some relevant 
exceptions, they did not contribute to the construction of an autonomous and 
distinctive welfare model – as the data provided in Chapter 5 also seems to suggest. 
Even ‘territorially concentrated’ social programmes like the PER were promoted 
directly by Madrid and, rather than being regarded as sources of regional welfare 
building, are at the centre of an academic discussion on the link between public 
policies and political clientelism in the Andalusian Community (Egea, 2003). John 
(2001: 126) highlights the fact that although the Socialist Party in Andalusia initially 
had ambitious plans for autonomous economic development policies, ‘these policies 
have gradually moderated as regional elites have sought to integrate decision-making 
into the policies for the whole country’ (Italics added).  
Gallego et al. (2003: 228) classify the Andalusian welfare state as a system that 
recognises the primacy of the family dimension supported by some (rather limited) 
forms of public intervention. Martínez-Bujánan (2014: 112) also states that the 
Andalusian system is characterised by the family as the principle agent in the care 
provision supported by public administration with some cash benefits. This model 
can be defined as ‘statist-familialism’ (Purandaré, 2011: 232) or a ‘subsidized 
familistic model’ (Martínez-Buján, 2014: 112) and does not substantially deviate from 
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the Southern European model, in which Spain (but also Italy, Portugal, Greece and, 
partly, France) is often classified.  
Bukowsky (2002: 152) suggests that the Andalusian Socialists ‘used to their 
advantage the national political situation, gaining political benefits through close ties 
with the national PSOE government’. Regional policies were not aimed at reinforcing 
the distinctiveness of Andalusia from the rest of Spain but, rather, at strengthening 
the central government and the dependence of this region from the support of 
Madrid (which was essential, since the national leadership of the PSOE in turn 
needed the votes of Andalusia, the most populated Spanish region, in order to win 
the general election).  
This situation of dependency changed only when the PP won the general 
election and managed to control the central government between 1996 and 2004. 
Interestingly, in the years immediately after the collapse of the PSOE government, 
the number of beneficiaries of the above mentioned PER programme fell by more 
than 10 per cent60 (Muñoz-Repiso, 2000) and this seems to confirm the fact that the 
Andalusian welfare system heavily relied on the central intervention of a ‘friendly’ 
government.  
After 1996, the PSOE, which remained dominant in Andalusia, started 
investing political and economic resources in the promotion of more autonomous 
social programmes, which were in part different to the ones promoted by the 
conservative central government. Therefore, it seems that the main obstacle to the 
development of a region-specific welfare model in Andalusia was not only the 
economic backwardness of this region but also the fact that its dominant party could 
rely on close relationships with national leaders and on the resources that were 
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 On average, the number of PER beneficiaries in the triennium from 1993 to 1995 was 222,413. In the 
triennium after the 1996 general election (1997 to 1999) if fell by 12 per cent, to 195,602 beneficiaries (Muñoz-
Repiso, 2000: 14).  
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allocated from the centre. Bukowsky provides a clear picture of the changing 
dynamics in Andalusian policy making: 
 
Chaves, the PSOE-A president of the Junta since 1990, utilized his close relations 
with Prime Minister Felipe González and the national PSOE to be awarded 
several high-profile projects for Andalucía [...]. [yet] since the PSOE defeat at the 
national level, Chaves has used his regional government as both a ‘shop window’ 
for socialist policies, and as an opposition platform from which to attack the 
Popular Party, and, some argue, to serve his national political ambitions. For 
example, when the PP government implemented a plan to cut health costs by 
limiting the number of medicines that were available through the national health 
service, Chaves declined to apply this measure in Andalucía (even though the 
PSOE had drawn up a similar measure when it was in power), and continued to 
foot the bill for these medications. The Junta also decided to unilaterally 
undermine an all-party agreement not to implement competitive pension schemes 
among regions, and raised the payments received by the lowest-paid pensioners.  
 
In sum, in a context of political ‘fluidity’ and alternation in central government, the 
PSOE started to regard the regional level as a more autonomous policy dimension 
and as an opportunity to elaborate and implement more distinctive and innovative 
policies, which could even contrast with the ones promoted by Madrid. This has 
become even more evident in recent years. Having lost the election in 2011 and 
facing a set of austerity policies promoted by the conservative government led by 
Rajoy, the Andalusian PSOE further underlined the importance of fully 
implementing the Estatudo de Autonomia. In its electoral programme for the 2012 
regional election the PSOE saw the regional dimension as an opportunity to develop 
a distinctive social and economic model in Andalusia based on the principle of 
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concertación and cooperation between trade unions and employers organisations61 
and on the centrality of the public sector in welfare governance62.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the main party of the Left, the PSOE, has 
had a rather ambiguous position on the process of decentralisation and on the 
creation of region-specific welfare regimes. On the one hand, it supported the process 
of federalisation of Spain after the collapse of the Francoist Regime. On the other, it 
has opposed excessive fragmentation and differentiation in social governance at the 
sub-state level. This is mainly due to the fact that this party has controlled the central 
government for most of the time since the transition to democracy. Over the years, 
the PSOE organisation has been subject to tensions between territorial pressures and 
the need to promote statewide redistribution and equalisation of social conditions. 
This has prevented the party from becoming the driver of welfare building at the 
sub-state level, while playing a central role in social policy-making at the statewide 
level. 
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 ‘Frente a la imposición y falta de diálogo que caracteriza al PP, los y las socialistas de Andalucía vamos a 
garantizar la seña de identidad que el nuevo Estatuto de Autonomía para Andalucía imprime a la política 
económica: la concertación social con sindicatos y empresarios, un referente básico en la gobernanza de 
Andalucía.’ (PSOE-Andalucia Electoral Programme, 2012: 110). http://www.psoealmeria.com/upload/archivo-
Programa-electoral-Elecciones-Autonmicas-de-Andaluca-2012-4f55df701493c.pdf (date of access 29/09/2014). 
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 ‘Nuestra sanidad pública está cimentada sobre el valor de lo público, sobre los principios de universalidad, 
equidad, solidaridad y financiación pública mediante el sistema fiscal, por lo que los socialistas andaluces 
rechazamos cualquier reforma que implique que los ciudadanos y ciudadanas tengan que volver a pagar por los 






























Devolution, the territorialisation of party politics, and the transformation of 
welfare governance in Great Britain 
 
From unitary state to devolved state: the new governments of Scotland and Wales 
Despite being a union of three nations – England, Scotland and Wales – Great 
Britain developed as a relatively centralised country, in which the Westminster 
Parliament gradually assumed a central role in most of the relevant policy making 
processes. This has produced some confusion over the designation of Great Britain 
(and United Kingdom) as a state. Indeed, until the devolution process, Great Britain 
could be considered as a ‘unitary’ state but also as a ‘union’ state and the term nation 
could refer to both Great Britain as a whole or to each constituent nationality. In 1969 
a Royal Commission on the constitution was set up by Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
and chaired by Lord Kilbrandon. The commissioners stated that: 
 
The United Kingdom is a unitary state in economic as well as in political terms. It 
has, for example, a single currency and a banking system responsible to a single 
central bank. Its people enjoy a right of freedom of movement of trade, labour and 
capital and of settlement and establishment anywhere within the Kingdom. 
(Kilbrandon, 1973: 121). 
 
Until the late 1990s political autonomy was not granted to any of the constituent 
nationalities of the Kingdom. Of course, as underlined by Mitchell (2009), the 
creation of Great Britain (and the UK) came about through the amalgamation of 
previously autonomous or separate entities: ‘The manner in which these 
amalgamations occurred and the nature of the new political entities influenced future 
developments. Significantly the creation of the UK did not mean the eradication of its 
constituent elements’ (Mitchell, 2009: 4). Thus through the establishment of the 
Scottish Office in 1892, Scotland enjoyed some administrative autonomy. The Scottish 
228 
 
Office allowed for the preservation of Scottish distinctiveness while maintaining the 
essential supremacy of the Parliament. Yet: 
 
[I]t remained an essentially nineteenth-century institution. Although it allowed for 
Scottish distinctiveness, it failed to cater for Scottish democracy in the sense that 
it remained accountable to Parliament at Westminster, a UK rather than Scottish 
forum (Ibid. 39). 
Therefore, Scottish people could not make politically autonomous decisions and this 
prevented them from establishing policies and institutions that substantially 
diverged from the English ones. The situation was even less open to policy 
divergence in Wales, where ‘the Welsh Office lacked autonomy in important 
respects, most notably financial, which placed limits on the degree to which policy 
differences were possible’ (Ibid. 66). Generally, the political actors in the Scottish and 
Welsh offices were insulated from control and accountability since they answered 
only to Westminster, and these self-regulating elites were insulated from political 
control, as long as they stayed within the broad parameters of government policy 
(Keating, 2009b: 100). 
In the pre-devolution period England had a very peculiar status because it 
was the ‘core’ of the British state but, at the same time, was recognised as a 
distinctive nation within the Union. Unlike Scotland and Wales, England never 
questioned the political supremacy of the Westminster Parliament, which in fact was 
often considered as the strongest symbol of English (and British) identity. 
Additionally, England is by far the largest constituent nation of the Union and some 
have suggested the existence of cultural, political and economic differences even 
within the English borders. Yet: 
 
 [A] notable part of the rhetoric of Englishness in the twentieth century was the 
sense of cohesiveness, a refusal to countenance any significant political role for 
regions within England. Regional government was important in the provision of 
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public services but this developed piecemeal. Occasional calls to recognise 
economic disparities allowed for the mobilisation of elite opinion but this was 
rarely linked to the case for elected regional bodies (Mitchell, 2009: 110) 
Although some forms of ‘administrative devolution’ (Pilkington, 2002: 10) were in 
place at the beginning of the 20th century (with the creation of the Scottish and Welsh 
offices), Scotland and Wales were granted real political powers only in the late 1990s 
with the Devolution Reform. That reform was approved by the New Labour 
government after two referendums held in the two constituent nations. Legislative 
powers (‘legislative devolution’) were devolved to Scotland with the creation of the 
Scottish Parliament, which could make primary legislation in policy fields such as 
health care, social work, education and housing (Pilkington, 2002: 98). Scotland 
would be governed by a First Minister and a Scottish Executive (whose members are 
collectively referred to as ‘the Scottish Ministers’). 
On the other hand, in Wales the new elected assembly, the Welsh Assembly, 
was not granted primary legislative powers. Thus Wales was given ‘executive 
devolution’, which can be defined as the ‘transfer of various subordinate or 
secondary law making powers’, whereas Scottish ‘legislative devolution’ implied ‘the 
straightforward allocation of primary legislative functions’ (Rawlings, 2005: 5). The 
Welsh Assembly Government had to bid for Welsh bills or clauses at Westminster, 
‘competing with Whitehall departments as it had no legislative powers’ (Mitchell, 
2009: 161). Yet the law making powers of the Welsh Assembly were increased after a 
referendum held in 2011. Additionally, unlike Scotland, there is no clear distinction 
between the Welsh executive and assembly. Indeed, the First Secretary of the 
Assembly has a prime ministerial role and is the leader of the majority party in the 
Assembly (Pilkington, 2002: 130).  
Some minor differences between Scotland and Wales can also be noted in the 
devolution of public expenditure. In this case the ‘comparability percentages’ 
provided by Jeffery (2005: 31) can be used to see if public expenditure is fully 
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devolved to regional governments (the percentage is 100) or not (the percentage is 0). 
What emerges is that, for instance, health care spending is almost fully devolved to 
both Scotland and Wales. Scotland has more spending powers than Wales in the 
fields of education, culture, environment, transport, home office and legal 
departments, whereas Wales has more spending autonomy only in the field of local 
(i.e. sub-regional) government (Table 8.1). 
 
Table 8.1. Comparability percentages (percentage of spending directly allocated by 
regional governments) for 2004 Spending Review 
 Scotland Wales 
Forestry 100 100 
Education and Skills 99.8 93.5 
Health 99.5 99.5 
Culture, Media, Sport 95.4 99.5 
Local Government 65.7 100 
Environment and Rural Affairs 85.2 80 
Transport 71.3 63.8 
Trade and Industry 18.6 18.6 
Home Office 99.6 1.5 
Work and Pensions 6.4 6.4 
Legal Departments 96.1 0 
Chancellor’s departments 0.9 0.9 
Cabinet Office 2 2 
Source: Jeffery (2005: 31).  
 
By using their Regional Authority Index, Hooghe et al. (2010) show that in the last 
two decades the increase in regional authority has been more significant in Scotland 
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than in Wales. In Scotland the Regional Authority Index has increased from 1 in 1980 
to 16.5 in 2006 (the maximum is 24). Over the same period the RAI index has 
increased from 1 to 11.5 in Wales. The difference between the two regions/nations is 
due to the fact that Scotland enjoys more fiscal autonomy than Wales, although most 
of its policies are financed through grants transferred by the central government 
following the so-called Barnett formula63 (Bell and Christie, 2007). Additionally, the 
policy scope of the Scottish government is broader. In Table 8.2 an overview of the 
two models of devolution developed in Scotland and Wales is presented by referring 
to the summary provided by McEwen and Parry (2005: 42). Needless to say, England 
was not included in the table because it has not been given any substantial devolved 
power and is still fully governed by the Westminster Parliament. English local 
authorities and municipalities just play an administrative role in some areas of social 










                                                          
63
 The Barnett Formula ‘determines the changes in resources available to the Scottish Parliament, the National 
Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly based on a fixed share of any changes agreed between 
the Treasury and departments that operate in England (or in some cases England and Wales) in the value of 
“comparable programmes”. Northern Ireland’s allocation is based on GB expenditures. The share, which is 
updated regularly, is based on the size of the population in the relevant devolved authority as a percentage of 
that in England’ (Trench and Christie, 2007: 74).  
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Table 8.2. Models of devolution and policy making in Scotland and Wales 
 Scotland Wales 
Institutional design Conventional Westminster style 
legislature and executive 
(Scottish parliament and 
Scottish executive) 
Single corporate body fusing 
legislature and executive 
(National Assembly for Wales), 
but de facto separation into 
‘Presiding Office’ of the 
Assembly and the ‘Welsh 
Assembly government’ 
Legislative powers General legislative competence 
in non-reserved areas, inc. 
education, health, housing and 
personal social services, but 
exc. income maintenance and 
benefits 
No primary legislative 
competence, but can issue 
secondary orders under specific 
statutory powers in non-
reserved areas including 
education and health 
Fiscal powers Budgetary freedom within 
block grant and limited powers 
to vary income tax; tax and 
benefit structure reserved  
Budgetary freedom within 
block grant; no powers to vary 
income tax 
Civil service Civil servants part of the Home 
Civil Service; autonomy on pay 
and recruitment for non-senior 
grades as enjoyed by UK 
departments 
Civil servants part of the Home 
Civil Service; autonomy on pay 
and recruitment for non-senior 
grades as enjoyed by UK 
departments 
Source: McEwen and Parry (2005: 42) 
The structure of the rest of this chapter is different from the introductory chapters on 
Spain and Italy due to the absence of an ‘exploratory’ quantitative analysis64. In the 
next section, I link the territorial dimension and the devolution process to the 
transformation and restructuring of the British welfare system. Then I outline the 
political context in which institutional decentralisation emerged. First, I consider 
territorial mobilisation and the way it has affected the territorial reconfiguration of 
the British state. Second, I consider the role that the Left has played at the sub-state 
and statewide levels and how the Labour Party has changed its attitude towards 
                                                          
64
 Since the focus is on Scotland, Wales, and England it is not possible to perform quantitative analysis. 
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decentralisation in Scotland and Wales.  Finally, I provide a general assessment of the 
level of sub-state welfare development in Scotland, Wales and England since the 
beginning of the devolution process. This preliminary overview is the basis for a 
more in-depth analysis of the Scottish and Welsh cases in which I consider the effects 
of both territorial and left-wing mobilisations on regional welfare building.  
 
The welfare state of the UK: between functional and territorial restructuring 
The British welfare system has often been classified as ‘liberal’ (Esping-Andersen, 
1990) or market-oriented (Kazepov, 2010: 52). Yet this classification is too ‘static’ and 
does not acknowledge the fact that the social policy of Great Britain has followed a 
more dynamic trajectory, since it evolved  (or, rather, regressed) from a universalist 
and institutional redistributive model to a residual or liberal welfare model (Flora 1986).  
As underlined by Esping-Andersen, the starting point for liberal welfare 
regimes is the poverty question and this results in means-tested, rather than 
universalist or social status conserving, social schemes. Yet in the post-war period, 
important elements of universalism were introduced in the British social model with 
the so called ‘Beveridge Plan’ which established the introduction of a state 
guaranteed minimum standard of living for everyone, the introduction of the 
National Health Service (NHS), and a national policy for full employment 
(Kaufmann, 2013: 109). Thus, although Great Britain remained a liberal welfare 
regime with modest cash benefits, private pensions, and reliance on means-tested 
provisions, the post-war reforms ‘helped to create a sense of British social citizenship 
existing beyond regional and class divisions’ (Béland and Lecours, 2008: 107). 
The expansion of British welfare also had territorial implications. As 
underlined by McEwen and Parry (2005: 44): 
[T]he post-war welfare state established a new set of institutions which could 
serve a symbolic purpose in underlining the boundaries and identity of the United 
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Kingdom as a nation, as well as a state. The Labour government had emerged 
from ‘the people’s war’ with the pledge to build a ‘people’s place’ [...], and many 
of the institutions of the welfare state implicitly reinforced their national 
character. 
Thus the construction of the British Welfare system in the post-war period enhanced 
the institutional significance of the central governments and promoted the idea of a 
British national community ‘sharing burdens, risks and security’ (Ibid.: 45). In 
particular, the NHS became one of the most important symbols of national identity 
and unity – one may even say pride – across the whole British territory.  
During the long period of Conservative government between 1979 and 1997, a 
new neoliberal agenda sought to reduce social expenditure and redistribution. The 
retrenchment of the universalistic welfare system established in the post-war period 
faced considerable institutional and political barriers and policy outcomes were less 
significant than retrenchment rhetoric (Pierson, 1994). Yet Thatcher’s policies had an 
effect on territorial politics and strengthened the demands of Scotland and Wales for 
more autonomy. Indeed Margaret Thatcher and her successor, John Major, not only 
promoted a restructuring of redistributive policies, which would negatively affect the 
poorer regions of the country (including Scotland and Wales) but they were also 
hostile to the political expression of the multinational nature of the UK in any form of 
legislative devolution (McEwen and Parry, 2005: 47). Welfare retrenchment therefore 
had territorial consequences. The Thatcher era strengthened the link between left-
wing mobilisation against welfare retrenchment and territorial mobilisation against 
the centralising ambitions of the Conservative government. Additionally, it 
involuntarily contributed to opening a debate on the need to grant Scottish and 
Welsh nationalities the right to make political decisions about their preferred social 
models.  
When the New Labour government won the election in 1997, it followed the 
same path as its predecessors in terms of welfare and economic policies (Jenkins 
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2006). Tony Blair believed that state intervention and Keynesian policies belonged to 
the past and the new government ‘was convinced of the virtues of new public 
management and a market- and consumerist-driven notion of public sector delivery’ 
(McEwen and Parry, 2005: 49). Yet this model was applied only to England and New 
Labour also acknowledged the different political aspirations of Scotland and Wales 
in which there was a strong social-democratic consensus (Greer, 2004).  
The original intention lying behind devolution was to maintain a single 
welfare state, while allowing relatively minor variations in policymaking and 
implementation by the developed administrations. In fact, over the last fifteen years 
it has become increasingly evident that, although devolved institutions may be 
limited to being spending agencies rather than fully-fledged governments with fiscal 
and financial responsibility to match their legal powers, ‘those powers are 
sufficiently extensive that they can use them to create different sets of benefits from 
the welfare state’ (Trench, 2009: 125). Thus the devolution process that started in 1998 
introduced the possibility of increasing policy divergence. For instance, talking about 
health policy in the age of devolution, Greer (2013: 81) has argued that: 
 
Health policy is experiencing a curious double movement. On the one hand, in 
what it was long considered a highly centralized unitary state, the central UK 
government is showing steadily less interest in the health policies and outcomes of 
devolved Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. And on the other hand, within 
England and the individual devolved health systems, policymakers have created 
increasingly centralized systems that aspire to dislodge doctors and local boards 
from their positions of importance.  
 
This also suggests that a new ‘regional centralism’ has replaced statewide centralism 
in health care governance. Devolved governments of Scotland and Wales have also 
assumed a central role in policy making and management of other social services 
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such as childcare and elderly care (Greer, 2004: 45; Trench and Jarman, 2007: 115–
116).  
For these reasons, today it is no longer possible to talk about a British welfare 
system, since important areas of social policy have been devolved to the 
governments of Scotland and Wales. The following chapters try to address the way 
in which territorial and left-wing mobilisations have shaped new models of sub-state 
welfare in Scotland and Wales. Yet before moving to the case-specific chapters I 
present a brief overview of how centre-periphery and left-right cleavages developed 
in Great Britain and how they related to the devolution process. Following this 
analysis I provide a general assessment of the level of development of sub-state 
welfare models after devolution.  
 
The rise of regionalist parties in Scotland and Wales and its effect on the 
devolution process 
As mentioned in the previous section, during the Thatcher years territorial 
movements and parties, which sought to oppose the centralising ambitions of 
Westminster, strengthened and consolidated their role in the British political debate. 
Yet it should be underlined that the rise of territorial and regionalist parties occurred 
in the 1970s when the UK experienced a period of political and economic instability. 
As shown in Figure 8.1, until the late 1960s neither the Scottish Nationalist Party 
(SNP) nor Plaid Cymru (PC), the main regionalist parties of Scotland and Wales, 
managed to obtain more than 5 per cent of the vote in their constituencies. In the 
general elections of 1970 and 1974 the two parties made their electoral breakthrough. 
Particularly in 1974 the SNP challenged the primacy of Labour and Conservative 
parties in Scotland. A first election took place in February when the SNP doubled its 
share of the vote and obtained seven seats (in the previous election it had obtained 
only one seat). This election did not produce a clear majority in the Westminster 
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parliament (hung parliament) and another election had to be called in October of the 
same year. On this occasion, the SNP further improved its result obtaining 30.4 per 
cent of the Scottish vote against 24.7 per cent of the vote for the Conservative and 
36.3 for the Labour Party. Plaid Cymru experienced a less sudden and dramatic 
increase in electoral support, although it also became an important political actor in 
Wales at the beginning of the 1970s.  
 
Figure 8.1. The share of vote for Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru in Scotland 
and Wales between 1945 and 1997  
 
UK election statistics  
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-059.pdf  
 
The strengthening of territorial movements in Scotland and Wales had important 
implications in national politics. As shown in Figure 8.2, the saliency of issues related 
to decentralisation and centralisation was not very high in the post-war period, 
particularly in the period from 1945 to 1959. Yet it increased substantially in the early 
238 
 
1970s as a consequence of increasing territorial mobilisation and, with some ups and 
downs, it has remained higher than in the pre-1970s period.  
Figure 8.2. The saliency65 of decentralisation and centralisation issues in Great Britain 
from 1945 to 2010 
 
Source: Volkens et al. (2013). Author’s own calculation. 
 
Pressed by the increasing demands for autonomy coming from Scotland and Wales, 
the British Government decided to promote two bills, the Scotland and Wales Acts, 
which introduced some measures of self-government in Scotland and Wales through 
the creation of elective assemblies in both regions. The Scottish assembly would have 
been a true legislature, with functions in a significant number of defined areas, 
whereas the Welsh assembly would have mainly had executive powers working 
through committees (Trench, 2007:5). The bills, however, did not ‘affect the unity of 
the United Kingdom or the supreme authority of the Parliament to make laws for the 
United Kingdom or any part of it’ (Clause I of Scotland and Wales acts quoted in 
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 See Chapter 4 for measurement of saliency. 
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Bogdanor [1979: 164]). At the same time, it is important to note that no provision for 
England or English regions was proposed, since most English MPs were hostile to 
any form of devolution or regionalisation (Bogdanor, 1979: 206) and sub-state 
territorial movements were absent in the core nation of the United Kingdom.  
Both the Scottish and Welsh Acts included a requirement for post-legislative 
referendum, which needed to receive the support of more than 40 per cent of the 
total registered electorate. The referendums took place in 1979 and they were rejected 
in both regions. As shown in Table 8.3, in Scotland the Yes vote obtained slightly 
more than 50 per cent of the vote. Yet, the percentage of registered electorate that 
supported the referendum was below 40 per cent and the referendum did not pass. 
In Wales the result was even less in favour of devolution with an overwhelming 
majority of voters (almost 80 per cent) voting against the Wales Act. To quote Vernon 
Bogdanor, one of the most important scholars of British constitutional reforms, ’this 
result destroyed the credibility of devolution’ (Bogdanor, 2001: 190). 
The results of the 1979 referendums also pointed to the significant differences 
in territorial mobilisation existing in Scotland and Wales. Whereas in the former 
there was a large share of the electorate demanding more autonomy, in the latter the 
pro-devolution voters were a clear minority. This discrepancy in the intensity of 
preferences for devolution was also reflected by the higher electoral success of the 
SNP in comparison with Plaid Cymru.  
Referendums also took place in 1997 when the newly elected Labour 
government approved two acts devolving powers to Scotland and Wales. On this 
occasion no threshold of registered voters was set and the referendums passed in 
both regions. Yet it should be underlined that, as shown in Table 8.3, whereas in 
Scotland an overwhelming majority of voters supported the devolution process 
(74.3%), in Wales devolution was approved by only a very slight majority (50.3%). 
Additionally, turnout was significantly higher in Scotland (60.2%) than in Wales 
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(50.1%). Therefore, although support for devolution has substantially increased in 
both regions/nations, it has remained much higher in Scotland than in Wales. 
 
Table 8.3. Referendum Results in Scotland and Wales in 1979 and 1997 (percentage) 
 Scotland Wales 
 1979 1998 1979 1998 
Yes 51.6 74.3 20.3 50.3 
No 48.4 25.7 79.7 49.7 
Turnout 63 60.2 58.3 50.1 
Source: Dewdley (1997). 
 
The asymmetrical nature of British devolution strongly reflects the differences in 
demands for autonomy (or even independence) coming from the constituent nations 
of the Union. The strongest demand for autonomy has come from Scotland and this 
has resulted in higher levels of regional authority, as shown in the introduction of 
this chapter. In Wales territorial mobilisation has been weaker and this explains why 
the level of autonomy granted to Welsh regional institutions is lower. Additionally, 
social policy was more strongly linked to the devolution process in Scotland than in 
Wales (Surridge et al. 1998). By referring to pre-devolution polls, McEwen has 
underlined that the key factor strengthening the support for devolution in Scotland 
was the expectation that it would ‘improve the wealth and welfare of the people of 
Scotland’ (McEwen, 2002: 79). On the other hand, Welsh territorial movements 
traditionally placed more emphasis on cultural issues, the most important one being 
the protection of the Welsh language. Only when it became clear that such issues 
were not appealing to the broader Welsh electorate did Plaid Cymru and pro-
devolution campaigners start discussing the importance of creating a sub-state model 
of welfare that would promote openness, innovation and inclusiveness (Mooney and 
Williams, 2006: 610). 
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In England the almost total absence of territorial mobilisation66 has prevented 
the creation of any regional institution. Indeed, English regionalism was often called 
the ‘dog that didn’t bark’, meaning that, unlike other movements for political 
devolution in the UK, the English movement for devolution was ‘not very vocal’ 
(Deacon and Sandry, 2007: 20). Before winning the election, New Labour promised 
that they would ‘introduce legislation to allow the people, region by region [in 
England], to decide in a referendum whether they want directly elected regional 
government’ (Labour Party 1997). The process of regionalisation in England was 
meant to be a ‘quiet regional revolution’ (Tomaney and Hetherington, 2004: 121). 
According to Amin et al. (2003), the reform was so moderate that it would leave the 
London elite intact as a ‘classic centre of control’. In any case, these timid attempts to 
introduce small changes in the territorial distribution of power in England were 
interrupted abruptly in 2004, when the establishment of a regional assembly in the 
North East region (which was thought to be the most pro-devolution area) was 
heavily rejected in a referendum: 78 per cent voted ‘No’ in a turnout of 48 per cent 
(Mitchell, 2009: 210).  
In sum, in Great Britain the asymmetrical nature of institutional 
decentralisation has been primarily driven by territorial mobilisation. In this respect, 
British devolution is very different from Italian regionalisation, which has been a top 
down, rigid process granting the same formal autonomy to Lombardy and Latium 
even though the demands for autonomy were much stronger in the former than in 
the latter. It is also quite different from Spain, where the central government has tried 
to counterbalance the demands for self-government coming from sub-state 
nationalities by devolving some competencies and creating representative 
institutions even in those regions with no territorial identity.  
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 A partial exception can be found in Cornwall, where a ‘Cornish nationalist’ movement has campaigned for 





The Labour Party and the challenge of devolution 
At the time of its foundation, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Labour Party 
was not hostile to processes of political devolution. This is because it had needed to 
compete with the Liberals, which, for instance, were supporters of Home Rule for 
Scotland. Yet this initial commitment steadily dissipated as Labour replaced the 
Liberals as Britain’s main ‘progressive’ party from the 1920s onwards. Thus, ‘Labour 
rapidly adopted a centralist approach to governing – a national, rather than 
nationalist, perspective – whereby it both portrayed and perceived itself as a Party 
and (when in Office) a government for the whole United Kingdom’ (Dorey, 2008: 
203). Therefore, even though the Labour Party continued to represent the interests of 
the periphery – Scotland, Wales, but also the north of England, by the mid 1920s it 
had become a ‘centralising party’ that sought to help peripheral regions by relying 
on nationalisation and centralised economic planning (Bogdanor, 2001: 167).  
Volkens et al. (2013) have provided data on parties’ attitudes towards 
decentralisation by performing a content analysis of their manifestoes. Support for 
decentralisation is measured by subtracting the percentage of semi-sentences against 
decentralisation or in favour of centralisation (code 302) from the percentage of semi-
sentences in favour of decentralisation. Also these data suggest that in the post-war 
period the Labour Party was a centralist political force (Table 8.4). Indeed in the 
1950s and 1960s, both Liberals and Conservatives seemed to have had more positive 
attitudes towards devolution than Labour. In this period the Labour Party came to 
believe that the establishment of a universal welfare system and effective social 
policies also required centralisation. Therefore benefits should depend on need and 
not on geography. In a debate on devolution, the Labour MP Colin Phipps stated that 
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‘the underprivileged child in Eastbourne is as important as the child in Glasgow’67. In 
sum:  
 
For most of the post-war period, there was a cross-party consensus on the 
acceptance of the Welfare State and its ideals of uniformity and symmetry of 
welfare provision across the territory. The Labour Party in Scotland and Wales 
were strongly in favour of this and [...] many of their members originally opposed 
devolution on the grounds that it might endanger its consensus and the benefits 
their societies [...] received from it. (Loughlin, 2011: 48). 
 
This situation changed significantly in the 1970s, when the challenge of territorial 
movements in two Labour strongholds, Scotland and Wales, forced the Labour Party 
to change its position on devolution issues. Indeed, both the SNP and Plaid Cymru 
gradually positioned themselves to the left of the political spectrum (Massetti, 2011: 
41). Particularly the SNP threatened the primacy of the Labour Party in Scotland and, 
as underlined by Brand (1987: 4), ‘if the SNP replaced Labour as majority party in 
Scotland, the probability of Labour forming a British government would be seriously 
diminished’.  
The pro-decentralisation position of the Labour Party remained rather strong 
in the 1980s and 1990s during the long opposition to the government led by the 
Conservative Party, which instead became a centralising political force (Table 8.4). 
This explains why, once in power at the end of the 1990s, the Labour Party 
implemented important devolution reforms. Yet it should be noted that Labour 
support for decentralisation decreased substantially once the party consolidated its 
control of the national government. Indeed, in the 2000s both the Liberal-Democrats 
and Conservatives placed more emphasis than Labour on the promotion of 
decentralisation policies. 
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 House of Commons Debates, 5
th
 series, vol. 885, col. 1031, 3 Feb. 1975. Quoted in Bogdanor (2001: 169). 
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Table 8.4. The three main parties of Great Britain and their support for decentralisation by 
decade 
 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Labour  0.9 1.15 1.35 4.6 2.8 4.35 3.1 
LibDem 0.8 3 6 5.5 4.45 3.85 3.7 
Conservative 0 2.1 2.05 1.9 1.15 2.2 5.5 
Source: Volkens et al. (2013). Author’s own calculation. 
 
Changes in the attitudes towards decentralisation are also reflected in changes in the 
internal organisation of the Labour Party. After its foundation the Labour Party 
followed the model of the Trade Unions and adopted a centralised organisation. As 
pointed out by McKibbin (1974: 241–242): 
 
 Like the unions the Labour Party was national in its organisation and centralised 
in its institutions. It deliberately over-rode regional boundaries and local interests 
[...]. In its formal organisation, the Party had consistently imitated the great 
unions. With its national executive secretariat and pyramidal structure it was (and 
is) quite unlike any other British Party.  
 
However, the increasing saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage and, after 1997, the 
devolution process have produced some organisational adjustments within the 
Labour Party. The Scottish and Welsh branches of the Party have become more 
important in terms of policy elaboration, staffing and, quite importantly, candidate 
and leadership selection (Bradbury et al. 2000). Yet if on the one hand Welsh and 
Scottish party branches have increased their autonomy, on the other hand they are 
weakly represented in central office. Indeed, in the late 2000s the British Labour 
party was the only party than did ‘not provide for any representation of its Scottish 
and Welsh parties on its National Executive Office’ (Fabre and Méndez-Lago, 2009: 
105). Therefore, New Labour was a party in which relatively high autonomy of 
regional branches was combined with their low integration in statewide decision-
making bodies (Fabre, 2010: 360). ‘Centrally the party’s response to devolution has 
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been ad hoc piecemeal’ (Laffin et al., 2007a: 207). This ‘ambiguous’ situation has 
resulted in tensions between sub-state and statewide party offices, particularly in the 
period in which the Labour Party controlled both central government and the 
devolved governments of Scotland and Wales.  
Despite promoting the process of devolution in the late 1990s, the Labour 
Party did not seem unambiguously inclined to accept the emergence and 
strengthening of competing models of welfare at the sub-state level. Indeed, even 
after devolution, the Labour Party did not renounce its traditional idea of promoting 
a British system of welfare. The report published by the Blair government in 1998 
Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal68 still showed 
Labour’s ‘continuing interest to mobilize British national terminology and signifiers – 
even if this was an England-specific policy’ (Mooney and Williams, 2006: 615). 
Powell (2009: 172) argues that Labour has displayed ‘a Janus-face over national and 
local services’. Indeed, while it argues for devolution, decentralisation and the ‘new 
localism’ on the one hand, the Labour Party has increased the ‘national-ness’ of the 
NHS on the other. The persistence of centralising pressures became clear when 
Labour introduced the national service frameworks (NSFs) and the National Institute 
for Clinical excellence NICE, in order to increase the ‘national-ness’ of the service and 
reduce the ‘postcode lottery’ problem. Contradictions and inconsistencies also 
emerged in the governance of social policies in Scotland and Wales after devolution.  
 Before moving to the next section it is worth considering the case of England, 
where the Labour Party was not challenged by territorial movements.  As underlined 
by Dorey (2008: 281–282): 
 
[A]lthough the Labour Party has periodically felt obliged to respond (however 
reluctantly or desultorily) to demands for devolution emanating from Scotland and 
Wales, there has been no such electoral imperative or public pressure in England, 
                                                          
68
 The report can be found at http://www.lgcplus.com/bringing-britain-together-a-national-strategy-for-
neighbourhood-renewal/1450297.article (date of access 27/08/2014). 
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and as a consequence, English regionalism has remained the ‘poor relation’ of 
Labour’s approach to devolution. 
 
In the post-war period, the regional dimension in England was acknowledged by the 
Labour Party only for economic reasons. Regions could be good arenas for the 
promotion of economic regeneration and industrial expansion in economically 
depressed or socially deprived areas of Britain. Yet most Labour politicians 
supported the idea that the promotion of regional development should be state-
directed and centrally planned. Weak forms of administrative devolution should 
therefore be linked to a strong central government, which would distribute resources 
and plan statewide social programmes. This position did not change substantially in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, when Labour was excluded from central 
government, new proposals for an ‘alternative regional strategy’ (Prescott 1982) were 
made by some sectors of the Labour leadership. Yet the majority of Labour MPs and 
Shadow Ministers deemed these regionalist plans ‘to be of low political and electoral 
salience [...] and as such, English regionalism languished way down Labour’s policy 
agenda’ (Dorey, 2007: 293). 
Things changed slightly in the 1990s when the Labour Party underwent an 
important process of political renewal. Yet also in this case the support for an elected 
regional government in England was very moderate: 
 
Demand for directly elected regional government so varies across England that it 
would be wrong to impose a uniform system. In time we will introduce legislation 
to allow the people, region by region, to decide in a referendum whether they 
want directly elected regional government. Only where popular consent is 
established will arrangements be made for elected regional assemblies. (Labour 
Party 1997,  quoted in Daile: 377) 
 
Yet, as shown in the previous section, regional autonomy was rejected in the first 
referendum held in 2004 in the North East region, which was one of the Labour Party 
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strongholds and was thought to be the most supportive of devolution. This 
completely stopped the process of regionalisation in England and prevented the 
emergence of sub-state centres of political power that could promote region-specific 
policies.  
 
Assessing the level of development of sub-state welfare systems in post-
devolution Great Britain 
Before moving to the case specific chapters, I provide a general assessment of the 
level of development of sub-state models in Scotland, Wales, and England. This 
assessment is based on the three-dimensional measure of welfare development that 
includes spending, legislation and implementation of social schemes. Of course, the 
low number of regional case studies in Great Britain (only three if we consider 
Scotland, Wales and England) does not allow for a quantitative analysis as has been 
offered in the Italian and Spanish cases.  
 
Spending 
In terms of welfare generosity, figures suggest that since 1999 Scotland has 
had the highest level of spending in the sectors of health and personal social services, 
which are under the control of devolved governments. The data provided by Birrell 
and summarised in Table 5 show that both Scotland and Wales have promoted a 
much more generous social system than England. Although the amount of English 
spending is indicated in the table, it should be underlined that the figure does not 
refer to ‘regional’ spending since there are no regional authorities with spending 
powers in the field of health care and social assistance in England. Local authorities, 
such as ‘unitary authority councils’, ‘metropolitan borough councils’, ‘London 
borough councils’ and ‘county councils’, have some spending power and have some 
welfare functions but, as shown in the next section, their spending is not supported 
by a sub-state legislative framework. Generally, they are institutional entities that are 
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simply too small to promote the emergence of autonomous models of welfare with 
highly distinctive characteristics. Additionally, since the Thatcher era the role of 
English local authorities has been significantly reduced through a process of 
(re)centralisation, which was then intensified with the introduction, during the New 
Labour government, of the central government’s performance, indicator-based, top-
down ‘performance management’ (Wollmann, 2004: 646). This process seems to have 
particularly affected ‘elected local government’, which have also been increasingly 
replaced by ‘non-elected (single purpose) bodies and (single purpose) service 
providers’ (Ibid. 662) 
 
Table 8.5. Expenditure on health and personal social services per head in Scotland, 
Wales, and England 
 1999 2006-2007 Average 0-1 score 
Scotland 1,197 2,313 1,755 1 
Wales 1,116 2,096 1,606 0.92 
England 963 1,915 1439  0.81  
Source: Birrell, 2009: 162. 
 
Legislation 
As mentioned above, in the case of England the score assigned to sub-state 
legislation is 0 because no piece of social legislation has been approved by sub-state 
authorities. Again, Scotland has the highest score (1) because since 1999, having 
primary legislative powers, it has approved a large number of laws69 on social care, 
housing, and health care, some of which will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. Lastly, Wales could not approve primary legislation until the 2011 
referendum and had to agree with the British parliament in order to introduce 
moderate changes in social governance. However, with the 2011 referendum Wales 
                                                          
69
 All passed laws can be found at http://www.legislation.gov.uk. 
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was also granted primary legislative powers in devolved areas. Thus, for instance, in 
2014 the Welsh assembly could pass an Assembly Act on ‘Social Services and Well-
Being’, which reformed and integrated the system of social services in Wales. I 




Various data regarding the coverage, efficiency and quality of health and social 
services can be used to estimate to what extent social schemes are effectively and 
extensively implemented in Scotland, Wales, and England. Table 8.6 includes data on 
the number of GPs, hospital beds, and hospital staff per 100,000 inhabitants, cost-
weighted activity (which measures the efficiency of the system), and quality of health 
care. The table also includes data on childcare (children looked after by local 
authorities) and elderly care (care home places and domiciliary care). Scotland scores 
better than the other two nations on seven out of ten indicators. In particular, 
Scotland seems to have better performances than Wales and England in the number 
of hospital staff, hospital beds, childcare and in the overall quality of the health 
system as measured by the Quality of Governance survey. Wales has the largest 
number of emergency admissions per 100,000 inhabitants and the largest number of 
care home places per 1,000 inhabitants aged above 65. Lastly, England has the 
highest cost-weighted activity per hospital medical staff member. This latter figure 
seems consistent with the more market-oriented model of welfare adopted in 
England, which aims to minimise costs and improve productivity. 
What emerges from this preliminary assessment is that, overall, 
implementation of health and social policies seems to be more developed in Scotland 
than in Wales and England. However, differences seem much less significant than 
across Italian or Spanish regions (although some indicators used to assess cross-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Overall development of sub-state welfare models 
 
The multiplicative index is now used to assess the general development of sub-state 
models of welfare in Scotland, Wales and England (Table 8.7). Since England does 
not have a regional administration that produces sub-state legislation, its overall 
score of sub-state welfare development is 0. The absence of institutional devolution 
in England, which is a pre-condition for territorial policy divergence, means that 
today the social model existing in England coincides with the British social model 
described by welfare literature, which focuses on the ‘nation-state’ as the main level 
of analysis. The liberal, market-oriented model promoted and strengthened by the 
Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s has not been substantially changed 
in the Labour era. Generally, in England, policy outcomes in social policy carry on from 
statewide, pre-devolution legacies. As pointed out by Greer (2004: 126), ‘English 
experience since devolution [...] provides strong, suggestive evidence that the old 
“UK” policy community, like the “UK” departments and “UK” Parliament, is an 
English, metropolitan social institution’. Therefore today, rather than talking about a 
UK-wide social model, it would be more correct to talk about an English welfare 
system since, as I show in the next two chapters, distinctive social policies have been 
promoted and implemented in Scotland and Wales since the beginning of the 
devolution process. 
Scotland is the best performing on all three dimensions and therefore it 
obtains the score 1. On the other hand, Wales has an intermediate score of 0.42. This 
suggests that sub-state welfare development has been much stronger in Scotland 
than in Wales. These differences have emerged despite the fact that both Scotland 
and Wales are ‘peripheral’ regions, considerably smaller than England, and, 
therefore, both potentially subject to externalities coming from decision making in 
Westminster (Keating 2012). Moreover, both regions have traditionally been less 
socio-economically developed than England (although significant differences in 
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terms of social needs and demographic characteristics also exist across the English 
regions [Ross Mackay 2001]).  
The argument of this study is that divergence in the level of development of 
sub-state welfare systems in Great Britain is primarily due to the effect that different 
levels of territorial mobilisation (higher in Scotland than in Wales) have had on the 
institutional autonomy of devolved administrations. In particular, the government of 
Scotland has been able to obtain more legislative and financial tools than the Welsh 
government and, consequently, it could rely on such tools to advance its project of 
sub-state welfare building. 
 
 
Table 8.7. Development of sub-state welfare systems in Scotland, Wales, and England 
 Spending Legislation Implementation Overall  
Scotland 1 1 1 1 
Wales 0.92 0.5 0.92 0.42 
England 0.81  0 0.85 0 
 
 
The next chapters show in more detail how territorial mobilisation, interacting with 
left-wing mobilisation, has shaped the politics of welfare in Scotland and Wales. 
Moreover, they provide more information on the qualitative differences between the 
British (or, more correctly, English) liberal model of welfare and the more social-
democratic, public-oriented models that are emerging, albeit at different paces, in 





Chapter 9  
Scotland: where territorial politics and social democracy meet 
Converging paths of territorial and left-wing mobilisations in Scotland 
Mitchell (2009: 9) has underlined that ‘the union of Scotland and England involved 
the creation of a new state without the eradication of pre-existing nations’. Therefore, 
Scotland was allowed to keep some of its traditional institutions and norms. Yet in 
the 20th century, processes of economic and political centralisation substantially 
reduced the autonomy of Scottish political actors. Strong standardising pressures 
and the increasing scope of government intervention, particularly in the field of 
social policy, tended to reduce the peculiarity of Scottish institutions and policies. 
Thus the autonomy of the Scottish Office and Secretary of State was limited to 
matters, such as the reform of local government, ‘where English ministers did not 
particularly care what happened in Scotland, and where there seemed no 
implications for policies across the border’ (Bogdanor, 1999: 113). In the words of a 
former Scottish Office civil servant: 
It was [...] possible to create a semblance of Scottish distinctiveness and 
autonomy which went beyond the reality. The same process made it possible to 
enforce uniformity, or near uniformity, beyond what was necessary or desirable, 
when there seemed a risk that a distinctive Scottish line might raise embarrassing 
questions for another Minister concerned with the same field of policy elsewhere 
(Ross, 1981: 9).  
Centralisation and processes of homogenisation were increasingly opposed by 
territorial movements and, particularly by the Scottish National Party (SNP). The 
first organisation to demand the complete independence of Scotland was the Scots 
National League (SNL), which was founded in 1919 and merged with the Scottish 
Home Rule Association (SHRA) in 1928 to form the National Party of Scotland 
(Newell, 1998: 106). Eventually that political movement evolved into the SNP in 1934. 
Yet the first electoral breakthroughs of the Party occurred in the 1960s when the 
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support for the two statewide parties, the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, 
started to decline. As shown in the previous chapter, in the 1970s the SNP obtained 
its best results and this also resulted in the first attempts to promote some forms of 
political devolution.  
Immediately after its foundation the SNP did not have a clear ideological 
stance and, in fact, it emphasised its inclusive nature as a ‘broad church’. However, 
already in the 1960s the party had started to define itself as ‘left-of-centre’. During 
the Thatcher era, although there was still resistance within the party to defining the 
SNP as ‘leftist’, the social-democratic identity of the party was further strengthened. 
According to McEwen (2006), the diminished scope of the British welfare state was 
central to the resurgence of sub-state nationalism. The process of welfare 
retrenchment (or restructuring) promoted by the Conservative government not only 
challenged the idea of UK-wide social solidarity and the role of central government 
as a driver of redistribution but also influenced the position of the SNP on the left-
right scale. Indeed, the campaigns for devolution and constitutional change 
promoted by the Scottish territorial movement mainly ‘took place against the 
backdrop of welfare retrenchment’ (McEwen, 2006: 15).  
The shift of the SNP to the left is also explained by Lynch (2009: 620) in terms 
of changing dynamics of party competition in Scotland. Indeed: 
 
[T]he adoption of an ideological position was not always uncontroversial but 
became easier due to party system change (the electoral decline of the 
Conservatives in Scotland from the 1960s), as the SNP came to focus much of its 
attention on Labour as its primary competitor. This strategy became successful in 
the 1980s and 1990s as voters began to recognize the SNP as a left-of-centre 
party, with quite similar policy preferences to Labour. 
The election of ‘the self-confessed socialist’ Alex Salmond as party leader in 1990 
shifted the party firmly to the left. ‘SNP policies under Salmond included a 
commitment to nuclear disarmament and progressive personal taxation to 
redistribute wealth from rich to poor’ (Hepburn, 2010: 61). Thus by the early 1990s, 
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the SNP had established itself as being on the left of Scottish politics (Mitchell et al., 
2012). The social-democratic position of the SNP was clearly linked to territorial 
factors, since the party sought to exploit Scottish hostility towards the central 
government dominated by the Tories. At the same time, the party wanted to fight 
Labour on the grounds that Scotland was ‘a working class area’ (Hepburn, 2010: 61, 
italics added). 
In the same period the ‘traditional’ left-wing mobilisation represented by the 
Labour Party became increasingly influenced by territorial issues. This was partly 
due to the fact that the Labour Party became electorally more successful in peripheral 
regions such as Scotland and Wales than in England. As shown in Figure 9.1, 
whereas in the immediate post-war period Labour and Conservative parties obtained 
similar electoral results in Scotland, from the mid-1960s their successes started to 
diverge. By the beginning of the 1980s the Labour Party had clearly become the 
dominant party of Scotland, winning a disproportionately large share of Scottish 
seats in the general elections. On the one hand, the Conservative party became an 
increasingly English party (particularly during the Thatcher era).  
In this context, Scotland became more integral to Labour’s strategic calculations 
[...]. It was [...] tempting for Labour to play the ‘Scottish card’, although this did 
not immediately take place because the party was wedded to the principle of 










Figure 9.1. The strength of statewide parties in Scotland (1945-1997) 
 
Source: Newell (1998: 108) 
 
The increasing electoral strength of the Scottish Labour together with the rise of 
territorial mobilisation mentioned above determined a change in the party attitudes 
towards devolution and decentralisation. In the immediate post-war period, 
ideological and economic reasons meant that devolution was not a notable policy 
objective of the Labour Government led by Clement Attlee. On the contrary, it was 
assumed that nationalisation, Keynesianism and a universal welfare state model 
would benefit all parts of Britain. ‘Any grievances harboured by the Scots in 1945, 
Labour assumed, would dissipate once the benign effects of the Attlee Government’s 
economic, industrial and social policies became evident’ (Dorey, 2008: 209).  
The issue of devolution assumed increasing significance for the Labour Party during 
the 1960s when Harold Wilson became leader. Regionalism started to be seen as an 
instrument aimed at reversing the decline of the British economy. Moreover, the 
Labour party had to respond to the challenge posed by the SNP, which argued that 
Scottish economic decline was mainly due to economic mismanagement by the 
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Westminster-based government and that ‘this problem could only be remedied by 
granting the Scottish people greater autonomy, if not independence’ (Dorey, 2008: 
213).  
The territorial challenge became even stronger in the 1970s, when electoral 
support for the SNP significantly strengthened. The Labour government formed in 
the mid-1970s had a very small majority and also relied on the support of nationalist 
groups. This also resulted in the Scotland and Wales Acts and in the referendums 
that rejected both projects of decentralisation. The rejection of the two referendums 
was also determined by the internal divisions of the Labour party, which in Scotland 
and Wales was split into unionist and pro-devolution factions, the former being 
stronger than the latter. Yet the pro-devolution factions increased their influence in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, when central government was constantly occupied by the 
Conservative Party led by Margaret Thatcher. Over this period, a social-democratic 
consensus emerged in Scotland and its political landscape was increasingly 
dominated by parties that positioned themselves on the left of the political spectrum. 
The sum of the votes for centre-left parties – including the Labour, SNP and also the 
Scottish Lib-Dems – reached 80.7 per cent of the Scottish vote (Leeke, 2003: 13). Thus 
Scotland, instead of following England by swinging to the right, developed a 
specifically Scottish consciousness (Bogdanor, 1999: 194), which mixed territorial 
identity and social-democratic ideas (Béland and Lecours, 2008: 123). Greer and 
Jarman have argued that this social-democratic consensus supported an original 
policy style: 
 
[B]ased on universalistic, directly provided undifferentiated public services that 
use networks rather than competition and are governed based on a high degree of 
trust in the professionalism of providers.  
 
Thus during its long period in the political wilderness, the Labour Party had to 
reinvent itself and gradually committed to political devolution in Scotland (Loughlin, 
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2011: 49). This change in Labour’s position has been commonly referred to as the 
‘tartanisation’ of the Labour Party (Geekie and Levy, 1989; Levy 1990). Newell (1998: 
110) summarises this transition in three main stages. The first stage corresponds to 
Labour’s approval, in 1988, of the document ‘A Claim of Right for Scotland’ 
published by the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly and setting out proposals for the 
establishment of an all-party Scottish Constitutional Convention (McCreadie, 1991: 
51). This document was regarded by the Labour Party, which had previously rejected 
similar proposals, as ‘a major contribution to thinking on constitutional change in 
Scotland’ (Deacon, 1990: 68). The second stage was Labour’s defeat in the Glasgow 
by-election of 1988, which was won by the SNP. The third stage corresponds to 
Labour’s actual participation in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, in which the 
party essentially ‘adopted the SNP’s position that political sovereignty resides not in 
the Parliament, but in the people of Scotland’ (Newell, 1998: 111). Even the Scottish 
Trade Union Congress (STUC), which in the post-war period was not supportive of 
devolution for fear of jeopardising social rights, played a very important role in the 
(re-)emerging Home Rule Movement. For the STUC, the devolution campaign 
‘became a central aspect of the left-wing struggle against Thatcherism’ (Béland and 
Lecours, 2008: 119). Therefore, although the STUC never supported independence, 
‘intense social mobilization created strong ties between the Scottish labour and the 
nationalist movement’ (ibid.).  
To sum up, during the 1980s and 1990s the link between territorial and left-
wing mobilisation became significantly stronger (Keating, 2004). On the one hand, 
the SNP shifted to the left and tried to combine its demands for independence with 
the promotion of social rights, which were threatened by the conservative policies of 
Westminster. The SNP also understood that in order to be electorally successful, it 
had to directly appeal to the Scottish working class that was strongly supportive of 
the Labour Party. On the other hand, the Labour Party moved from a pro-union to a 
pro-devolution position in a context of long-term exclusion from central government 
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and increasing electoral challenges posed by the centre-left SNP. Therefore, whereas 
Labour added a territorial dimension to its class-based ideology, the SNP became 
both nationalist and social-democratic. Yet this converging trend did not reduce 
political competition between the two political forces, which instead intensified after 
the devolution process (Hassan, 2009). It is also worth mentioning the role played by 
the Scottish branch of the Liberal Democratic Party, which traditionally supported 
home rule for Scotland and, at the same time, was more left-wing than the statewide 
leadership. 
Thus, since the 1990s territorial and class cleavages have increasingly come to 
complement each other (Bennie et a. 1997: 21). As suggested by Stolz (2009, 43): 
A dichotomously split electorate divided its electoral support between three 
mainstream left-of-centre, Scottish-oriented parties – Labour, the Liberal 
Democrats and the SNP – on one side, and the staunchly unionist, right-wing 
Conservative Party on the other. (italics added). 
This contributed to the emergence of a ‘social-democratic’ consensus linked to 
increasing demands for Scottish autonomy coming from the SNP, Labour and 
LibDems and opposed by the Conservatives. It can thus be hypothesised that in 
Scotland, territorial and left-wing mobilisations have had a ‘combined’ effect on the 
emergence of a sub-state welfare regime that became increasingly divergent from the 
‘British model’.  
Scottish politics after devolution 
In 1999 the first election for the Scottish Parliament took place. A new regional party 
system has emerged since then. As shown in Figure 9.2, political competition at the 
regional level has been characterised by the overlapping of the left-right and centre-
periphery cleavages. Thus, in the post-devolution period, political dynamics that had 
already emerged in the 1980s further developed. All left-wing parties have been in 
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favour of political devolution (and for the SNP, even independence) of Scotland70, 
whereas the Conservative Party is the only one located on the centre-right and more 
hostile to decentralisation, although its position became more moderate over time 
(Stolz, 2009: 44; Fabre and Martinez-Herrera, 2009: 244). The two main parties, the 
SNP and Labour, therefore competed to obtain the support of the same electorate.  
Figure 9.2. Locating post-devolution Scottish parties on the two-dimensional political 

















Source: Stolz (2009: 44). The map has been slightly modified since Stolz’s version does not graphically show the sizes of 
the parties represented. Thus, in this map I also illustrate the size of electoral support enjoyed by each party in Scottish 
politics (a larger circle means stronger support).  
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 Also two smaller parties, the Scottish Green Party (SGP) and Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), are ideologically on 















The electoral system adopted for the Scottish Parliament has further contributed to 
the consolidation of a political landscape that was very different from that of 
Westminster. The additional member system (AMS) is roughly similar to the one 
adopted in Germany, in which a first-past-the-post system typical of Westminster is 
combined with a proportional top-up. The overall result is ‘close to fully 
proportional’ and this means that it was very difficult for a party to obtain an overall 
majority (Pilkington, 2002: 103). As shown in Table 9.1, in 1999 and 2003 the Labour 
Party obtained the largest share of seats but, failing to obtain an absolute majority, it 
had to form coalition governments with the Liberal Democrats. In 2007, the SNP 
obtained the relative majority of seats and managed to form a ‘minority’ government. 
Only in 2011 did the SNP obtain the extraordinary result that allowed the formation 
of a one-party, majority government. Funnily enough, this happened when, for the 
first time since WW2, a coalition government including the Conservative Party and 
Liberal Democrats was established in London. 
Table 9. 1. Scottish Parliament elections from 1999 to 2011. Seats gained by each party 
(% of seats in brackets) 
 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Labour Party 56 (43%) 50 (39%) 46 (36%) 37 (29%) 
Scottish National 
Party 
35 (27%) 27 (21%) 47 (36%) 69 (53%) 
Liberal Democratic 
Party 
17 (13%) 17 (14%) 16 (12%) 5 (4%) 
Conservative Party 18 (14%) 18 (14%) 17 (13%) 15 (12%) 
Scottish Green 
Party 
1 (1%) 7 (5%) 2 (2%) 2 (2%) 
Scottish Socialist 
Party 
1 (1%) 6 (3%)   
Independent/Other 1 (1%) 4 (3%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 
Source: Electoral Commission http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/  
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Politics in devolved Scotland can thus be divided into two periods. In the first period 
(from 1999 to 2007) the Labour Party was the dominant political force, forming 
coalition governments with the Liberal Democrats (see Table 9.2) and trying to 
respond to the challenges posed by the SNP as the main opposition party. In the 
same period Scottish Labour also had to bargain with the central leadership of the 
Party, which controlled the national government. In this context the Scottish Labour 
Party had the difficult task of mediating between territorial challenges and 
centralising pressures coming from London when elaborating and implementing 
Scottish social policies. The second period (from 2007 to date) is instead characterised 
by the increasing success and political centrality of the SNP, which has managed to 
replace Labour as the dominant political force in regional politics. These changes in 
Scottish political dynamics have had a significant impact on the policies promoted by 
the Scottish governments as the next sections of this chapter aim to show. 
Table 9.2. Governments of Scotland since 1999 
First Minister Term of office Parties in Government 
Donald Dewar (LAB) 1999 – 2000  Labour, LibDem 
Henry McLeish (LAB) 2000 – 2001  Labour, LibDem 
Jack McConnell (LAB) 2001 – 2003  Labour, LibDem 
Jack McConnell (LAB) 2003 – 2007  Labour, LibDem 
Alex Salmond (SNP) 2007 - 2011 SNP (minority) 
Alex Salmond (SNP) 2011 - present SNP (majority) 
 
The first phase: Labour political supremacy (1999–2007) 
As mentioned above, until 2007, the strongest party in Scotland’s system was the 
Scottish Labour Party, which won 56 and 50 out of 129 seats in the first two Scottish 
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elections. Even though a new ‘Third Way’ rhetoric was adopted by Tony Blair at the 
statewide level, Scottish Labour ‘did not drop references to the positive role that 
could be played by the state to foster equality and economic solidarity’ (Béland and 
Lecours, 2008: 124). An example of this focus on public intervention is provided by 
the following message by the Labour First Minister Jack McConnell and included in 
the 2003 Party Manifesto:  
Government should be on your side. Not secretive or remote, not expedient nor 
wasteful. Not acting for self-interest, but committed to the national interest. On the side 




Generally Scottish Labour has devoted particular attention to health care, poverty, 
housing, elderly and childcare and has sought to occupy a great part of the centre-left 
in Scotland. This clearly left-wing strategy was also pursued by maintaining a strong 
relationship with the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) (Irvine, 2004). This 
reinforced link between the Labour-led government of Scotland and the STUC was 
confirmed by Rozanne Foyer, Assistant General Secretary of the STUC, who, soon 
after devolution, affirmed that:  
In Scotland, we had five meetings with ministers in twenty years, now we have 
about five meetings a month with ministers in the Scottish Executive, about 
transport, health, local government and education (quoted in Murray 2003: 163). 
Devolution also seemed to impact on the relatively centralised structure of the 
Labour Party, since the Scottish party branch was granted increasing levels of formal 
autonomy. One may therefore expect that, as another consequence of intra-party 
decentralisation, policies promoted by the Scottish government and those promoted 
by the Labour party in London would start to diverge substantially. Yet, Hopkin 
(2009b: 187) has argued that ‘what is striking about devolution is how little the 
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 Scottish Labour Party (2003), On your side: Scottish Labour Manifesto, p. 1.  
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power transferred to sub-national elites affected the broader dynamics within the 
British Labour Party’. According to him, the Labour Party remained a vertically 
integrated and highly coordinated party organisation in which the statewide 
leadership was able to heavily influence sub-state policy making. The need for 
coordination and central supervision of devolved policies was reinforced by the fact 
that the Labour controlled both central and devolved governments. This seems to 
confirm the idea that when controlling central government, left-wing parties are 
quite hostile to sub-state policy divergence. Boyes et al. (2001:59) even suggest that 
with Labour-dominated governments in London and Edinburgh the risk was that 
Scotland remained ‘a passive recipient of policies designed in Westminster, mainly 
silent in response to reforms MSPs broadly support and critical of anything 
contentious’. At the same time, Scottish Labour had to face the pressures coming 
from the social-democratic SNP and also from its governmental ally, the Liberal 
Democrats, who were strongly committed to devolution and were equally sensitive 
to social issues.  
The issue of ‘long term’ elderly care can be regarded as a good example of the 
dilemmas faced by the Scottish Labour Party when dealing with social policy 
legislation at the sub-state level. The origins of Scotland’s distinctive long-term care 
programme lie in the so-called Sutherland Report, which, in the pre-devolution 
period, advocated the creation of a system of free universal care for old people. 
However, the Blair government rejected the proposal in favour of a more modest, 
means-tested programme. This decision went against Scottish First Minister 
McLeish’s commitment to deliver free personal care for the elderly. Therefore 
tensions emerged between the leaders of the Scottish and British Labour Party 
(Béland and Lecours, 2008: 135). Eventually, universal long-term care for the elderly 
was introduced but this mainly derived from what Parry (2002: 322) defines as 
‘coalition pressure’ coming from Scottish Labour’s Liberal Democrat partners in the 
governing coalition. Indeed, as underlined by Mitchell (2009: 137), Labour’s need to 
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form a coalition in a new political system that was less majoritarian than the 
Westminster one, ‘would prove to be a major determinant of policy innovation and 
divergence’. The main opposition party, the SNP, also strongly supported the 
development of a more generous welfare scheme and, by relying on the more 
consensual nature of Scottish politics, it ‘forced’ the Scottish Labour Party to ignore 
the preferences of the statewide party leadership. As underlined by Béland and 
Lecours (2008: 136), ‘in a concrete manifestation of its institutional autonomy, the 
Scottish Parliament did enact that policy [i.e. free, long-term elderly care] in the name 
of Scotland’s distinct social model’ (italics added). Yet, according to Mooney and Poole 
(2004), without the pressure of coalition partners and opposition, Scottish Labour 
would have been very reluctant to challenge the national leadership. Hassan and 
Shaw (2012: 187) confirm this analysis and argue that the ‘paradox of free personal 
care is that if the decision had been left solely to the [Labour] party it would have 
never been adopted’. 
Despite the ‘hierarchical’ links between the Scottish and British Labour 
parties, the peculiar characteristics of the Scottish party system and the pressures 
coming from socially progressive territorial movements had a strong effect on the 
evolution of the Scottish welfare model, which followed a path of increasing 
divergence from the English, pro-market model. Indeed, Greer (2004) has underlined 
that in England the Labour party could not radically change the market-based model 
of welfare that emerged in the early 1990s because it was challenged by the right-
wing opposition of the Conservatives, who were still electorally strong in English 
constituencies. On the other hand, in Scotland the ‘policy community’ was clearly on 
the Left and such progressivism was also linked to ‘territorial’ demands for 
distinctive policy making at the regional level. Thus the Scottish Government has 




 [A] shared agenda with the Westminster government (albeit framed as social 
inclusion rather than exclusion) to a more clearly defined Scottish agenda, with 
more distinctive localized policies and a greater willingness to blame Westminster 
fiscal and social security for failures to address poverty in Scotland (Scott and 
Wright, 2012: 443).  
 
Particularly in the health care sector, the first coalition executive in Scotland moved 
quickly to end the NHS internal market that was created during the Thatcher era. 
Scotland moved to ‘a flatter integrated structure than England or Wales’, with a 
single tier of organisation comprising 14 area health boards, to assess need, plan 
provision, allocate resources and deliver services (Birrell, 2009: 56). The 2004 NHS 
Reform Act, promoted by the Labour-LibDem coalition, also promoted a community-
based, decentralised but, at the same time, highly coordinated system ‘to provide a 
focus for the integration of primary care and acute services, to feed local needs into 
health board planning and to resource allocation and develop joint working with 
local authority social services’ (ibid.). More importantly, the new Scottish model 
rejected the command and control management approach typical of the English 
model and, instead, promoted public participation in a unified structure of primary 
and secondary care based on the use of networks and partnerships (Stewart, 2004). 
Indeed, unlike in England, ‘a market oriented approach never received serious 
consideration by Scottish Labour’ and, more generally, ‘there was no appetite for 
private involvement in the delivery of public services’ (Hassan and Shaw, 2012: 164). 
In sum, also as a result of the pressures of coalition partners and the SNP opposition, 
none of the ‘market oriented’, institutional innovations introduced by New Labour in 
England – foundation hospitals, star ratings, payment by results, a growing role for 
private providers, enhanced patient choice and incentivisation – were adopted by the 
Scottish Labour Party (Ibid. 168). The result is that today, in Scotland and in England, 




[H]ave started from the same place insofar as the founding values are concerned 
but which have moved in significantly different directions, both in terms of the 
coding of those values into policies and in terms of how those values have been 
adapted and revealed in the process of making policy (Kerr and Feeley, 2007: 34). 
 
To this general picture of public-based social model, it should be added that, as 
shown in the previous chapter, public spending per head in Scotland has been 
substantially higher than in the UK average and this is despite the fact that ‘it is not 
in line with its levels of need’ (McLean et al., 2009: 159), which are lower than in 
some parts of England and Wales.  
Eventually, the increasingly divergent trajectory followed by Scottish policies 
(not only in the field of welfare), seemed to further strengthen the distinctiveness of 
the Scottish model and, at the same time, undermine the hegemonic position of the 
Labour party in the Scottish Party system. The Labour party was increasingly seen as 
a ‘British’ party, under the control of the British leadership and not fully committed 
to defending Scottish interests. Moreover, the persisting tensions between local and 
central leaders had a negative impact on the cohesiveness and electoral effectiveness 
of the Labour party organisation. Divergence between electoral results in general 
elections and Scottish elections has increased, as shown in Figure 9.3, and this seems 
to suggest the emergence of ‘split’ attitudes in the Scottish electorate. Greer (2004) 
underlines that: 
 
Scottish voters appear to have developed a tendency to dual voting – electing 
Labour effectively to defend their interests in Westminster but often expressing 
themselves by supporting other parties in Scottish elections.  
 
For instance, in the 2010 general election the Labour Party obtained 42 per cent of the 
Scottish vote, whereas in the 2011 Scottish election it obtained only 31.7 per cent72. At 
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the same time, the SNP obtained only 19.9 per cent of the Scottish vote in the 2010 
general election and 45.4 per cent in the Scottish election in the following year! Thus, 
on the one hand, Scottish voters still support the Labour party in statewide British 
politics. On the other hand, when it comes to devolved politics, they have turned to 
the SNP – a political force that has sought to strengthen the link between progressive 
values and the territorial distinctiveness of the Scottish community.  
 
 
Figure 9.3. Support for Scottish Labour and the SNP in statewide (Westminster) and 
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The second phase: the SNP Government (2007 – present)  
In 2007 the SNP managed to win the relative majority of seats in the Scottish 
parliament. This victory came after a period of reorganisation during the previous 
years. Indeed, in the 2003 Scottish election the SNP faced an electoral setback and 
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seemed to lose its support among left-wing voters, who instead chose the Scottish 
Socialist Party. On this occasion, the Labour Party also lost six seats due to the rise of 
the Greens and Scottish Socialists, but, ‘scenting blood, the media focused on the 
SNP’ (Mackay, 2009: 83). The crisis of the SNP led to the election of Alex Salmond as 
leader of the party. Salmond had already led the party in the 1990s but had been 
forced to stand down as SNP leader in 2000 after facing internal criticism following a 
series of high profile fall-outs with party members (Britten, 2000).  
Under the renewed leadership of Alex Salmond, the SNP gradually became 
the ‘natural’ ruling force of Scotland. The SNP’s success was mainly owed to the 
perception that it was ‘good for Scotland’ and likely to form a competent government 
(Mitchell at al., 2012: 142). Moreover, victory for the SNP came at a time of 
‘widespread disillusionment with New Labour, as much in London as in Edinburgh’ 
(Mooney et al. 2008: 386, italics added). Yet, although in 2007 the party won the 
Scottish election, it failed to achieve the absolute majority of the seats. The Labour 
Party would not accept to become a junior party of its main competitor and the 
Liberal Democrats also refused to form a coalition with the winning party. Moreover, 
it was the SNP’s policy not to deal with the Tories, leaving the Nationalists with the 
prospect of leading the first minority government since devolution (Mackay, 2009: 
86). Therefore, in order to pass legislation the SNP had to bargain with opposition 
parties and this confirmed once again the more ‘consensual’ nature of Scottish 
politics in comparison with the Westminster model.  
Just after the 2007 election Alex Salmond unveiled his ‘Independence White 
Paper’ and launched Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation73. In this first 
programmatic document, Salmond aimed to show that during its years of opposition 
the SNP had changed and abandoned the old fundamentalism demanding 
‘independence, nothing the less’. Instead, confirming the will to reach a Scottish 
consensus, he stated that:  
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As First Minister of Scotland, it is my responsibility to explore and lead 
discussion on the options for constitutional change. I lead the first Scottish 
National Party Government to be elected in a devolved Scotland, so I will put the 
case for independence, its benefits and opportunities. However, I also recognise 
there is a range of other views in our country, and represented in the Parliament. 
(p. V) 
 
The White Paper also addressed the issue of devolution in social policies and 
underlined the importance of expanding Scottish authority in the governance of 
social insurance and benefits, which were still mainly controlled by the central 
government: 
 
There could be a degree of devolution in tax and benefit arrangements for social 
security. The Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government could assume the 
responsibility for the rules concerning eligibility for some benefits or tax credits. 
United Kingdom benefits and tax credits could be supplemented by Scottish 
schemes to promote particular social objectives, such as additional support for 
families, the best start for children, help for certain groups to move from inactivity 
into work, or a Scottish Social Fund to help low income families access low or no-
interest loans. Currently recipients of benefits or tax credits can be penalised if 
they receive additional support, but the Scottish Parliament could be given the 
power to legislate in such matters. It would then be possible to ensure that 
schemes to assist people, for example, allowances for studying or for child care, 
do not simply result in a loss of other benefits or tax credits. (p. 13) 
 
Yet such expansion in welfare competencies could only be achieved if the Scottish 
Government could ‘be fully responsible for the financial implications of its decisions 
in this area.’ Indeed: 
 
Any devolution of responsibility for elements of social security would best be 
accompanied by some further devolution of taxation powers [...] rather than 
relying on existing resources to meet additional costs. It would also be important 
to consider the arrangements for delivering these services, for example, the 
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arrangements under which the United Kingdom Benefits Agency could administer 
any separate Scottish benefits or pension regime. (p. 13) 
 
Immediately after devolution, the SNP aimed to present itself ‘as a champion of pre-
Blairite, if not “Old Labour”, understanding of social democracy’ (Maxwell, 2009: 
128). As a consequence, in 2007 the SNP-led Scottish Government announced a set of 
new policies in the field of health and social care that would be even more radical 
than the ones proposed by Scottish Labour in previous years. Indeed, despite the 
constraints imposed by Westminster, the SNP proclaimed its willingness to advocate 
a role for the state as the main producer and deliverer of social services and to reject 
the English model increasingly based on private finance initiatives and privatised 
forms of delivery (Mooney et al, 2008: 390). 
The commitment of the Scottish government to social policy innovation was 
reinforced by the following policy statements: Equally Well (2008), presenting the 
government’s proposals to tackle Scotland’s health inequalities; Achieving our 
Potential: A Framework to Tackle Poverty and Income Inequality in Scotland (2008); and 
The Early Years Framework (2009). The first statement dealt with problems of health 
inequality, which were also regarded as a threat to ‘sustainable economic growth’ in 
Scotland. Thus an action plan was set and it mainly involved the public sector (so, 
again, the centrality of public intervention was underlined) but also highlighted the 
importance of creating ‘strong joint working between the NHS, local government, the 
Third Sector and others within community planning partnerships’ (p. VI). In the 
second statement, the link between social equality and sustainable economic growth 
was stated once again. As underlined by Nicola Sturgeon, Deputy Prime Minister of 
Scotland: 
 
The overarching Purpose of this Government is to create a more successful 
country, with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish, through increasing 
sustainable economic growth. Delivering on that Purpose will mean delivering 
greater Solidarity in Scotland – a fairer distribution of wealth which we believe is 
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key to tackling poverty. That is why we have set a national target to increase the 
proportion of income received by the poorest 30% of households by 2017. (p. 1) 
 
In order to reach this ambitious target the SNP government aimed to build a Scottish 
‘coalition for change’, which would involve public and third sector actors. Thus it 
seemed evident that the ultimate goal of the government was to create a broad 
‘developmental coalition’ (Keating, 1997) linking social and territorial solidarity in a 
framework of region-building. Lastly, in the Early Years Framework, the SNP 
government sought to develop a set of integrated social policies (‘coordinated 
approach’) supporting children in the early years of their life in order to reduce social 
inequality: 
 
 This framework seeks to maximise positive opportunities for children to get the 
start in life that will provide a strong platform for the future success of Scotland. 
We know that children are the future of Scotland and we know that early years 
experiences provide a gateway to learning and skills that will power Scotland’s 
knowledge economy. Equally importantly, it seeks to address the needs of those 
children whose lives, opportunities and ambitions are being constrained by 
Scotland’s historic legacies of poverty, poor health, poor attainment and 
unemployment. 
 
The SNP also adopted a radical strategy of citizen’s involvement in the governance of 
health services (Greer et al. 2014). Thus it proposed the introduction of directly 
elected health boards, which ‘were seen as giving power back to local people and the 
single biggest way possible to re-energise public engagement with the health service’ 
(Birrell, 2009: 65). The experiment, however, did not prove successful, since the 
turnout in pilot elections held in Fife and Dumfries and Galloway in 2010 was very 
low. Thus the plan had to be abandoned in 201374.  
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Generally, despite ambiguously supporting some liberal economic policies to 
foster economic growth75 (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2009; Mooney et al 2005), the SNP-
led Scottish government looked to the social-democratic welfare state of 
Scandinavian countries, rather than the liberal social system of England, as a model 
to adopt and implement in Scotland (Maxwell 2009 ; Milne 2014). The creation of 
cross-national, Nordic ‘macro-region’ linking Scotland to Scandinavia is increasingly 
seen as viable option by the SNP leadership. In the months that preceded the 
campaign for the independence referendum, the Scottish government underlined the 
importance of strengthening the cooperation with Sweden, while loosening the ties 
to England (Scotland’s Future, 2014: p.  174). In general, Scottish nationalists argue 
that a possible Scottish independence would not mean ‘isolation’76 and the European 
Union, which actively encourages cross-border cooperation, would be a good context 
to develop extensive relations with neighbours outside the United Kingdom.  
However, in the first years of SNP government, it soon became increasingly 
evident that the full establishment of a generous and universalistic system of social 
protection would not be possible while Scotland was still subject to financial 
pressures coming from London (pressures that have increased since the beginning of 
the economic crisis in 2008) and could not control cash benefits and public insurance 
schemes. Additionally, the formation of a centre-right government in London made 
the development of an increasingly divergent welfare model more difficult to achieve 
without further institutional adjustments.  
Especially after the electoral victory of the SNP in 2011, when the party 
obtained the absolute majority of seats in the Scottish parliament, there have been 
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strong political-led suggestions that ‘greater devolution or independence would lead 
to more inclusive and egalitarian welfare provisions and social relations’ (Scott and 
Wright, 2012: 449). As a consequence, Scottish political parties’ attitudes towards 
Scottish territorial status have started to diverge substantially. On the one hand, the 
SNP returned to its pro-independence position, arguing that the Scottish model was 
becoming increasingly incompatible with the English model and could not be 
developed to its full potential within the constraints imposed by London. Therefore it 
called for a referendum on independence that took place in September 2014. The 
issue of National Health was central in the pro-independence campaign, which 
launched the slogan ‘NHYes’, meaning that a yes to independence would have a 
positive effect on the development of a Scottish health system. As one of the 
campaign leaflets stated: 
 
In England the Westminster government is privatizing the NHS by stealth. The 
Scottish government is committed to protecting our health service. But a No vote 
[to independence] on September 18
th
 could have a devastating knock on effect. 
Under the present Westminster controlled system, spending cuts in England 





On the other hand, during the referendum campaign, the Scottish Labour Party and 
the other statewide parties argued that the development of a Scottish model was 
compatible with British institutions and it would therefore be sufficient to achieve 
more autonomy within the United Kingdom.  
Eventually the independence option was rejected by 55 per cent of the voters 
in the 2014 referendum. Yet the issues raised during the referendum campaign and 
the fact that almost half of the Scottish population supported independence show 
that linking social policy to region-(or nation)building – thus putting an end to 
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statewide, homogeneous social solidarity – may seriously challenge territorial 
integrity in multi-national or regionalised countries.  
 
Closing the boundaries?  
The debate on Scottish independence has placed increasing emphasis on the actual 
and potential level of ‘boundedness’ of the new welfare system of Scotland. 
Although this study mainly focuses on assessing and explaining the ‘structuring’ of 
sub-state welfare models, one may wonder whether Scottish social policies are 
increasingly linked to residency requirements, that is, if they are moving towards a 
system which is less ‘porous’ and less open to other British nationals. In the fields of 
health and social care this does not seem the case.  For instance, in Scotland’s Future: 
Your guide to an independent Scotland, the SNP-led government stated that even if 
Scotland decided to leave the United Kingdom, 
Independence will not affect the day-to-day management of the NHS in Scotland, 
nor how people access NHS services. Similarly, it will not mean ending current 
cross-border arrangements with health services in the rest of the UK, which have 
continued even though the NHS in Scotland already operates independently. (p. 
12, italics added) 
 
Therefore, even in an independent Scotland the NHS would remain connected to the 
UK-wide system, although it would be structured in a different way, and access to its 
services would remain open to all British (and EU) citizens. In general, it seems that, 
so far, the Scottish political elite has devoted more attention to the structuring of a 
distinctive social model, without clearly defining its territorial limits. Of course, also 
the lack of fiscal autonomy and the dependence from transfers coming from London 
(Keating, 2009: 121) have prevented the Scottish government from implementing any 
policy that would be exclusively targeted at Scottish residents. In the future, should 
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Scotland achieve more fiscal autonomy and decide to have a more restrictive 
approach to access to social benefits, one may expect that the closing of the 
boundaries would mainly be based on ‘territorial’ factors (i.e. ‘residency 
requirements’) than on ethnic aspects (i.e. language or ethnic characteristics). This is 
because Scottish nationalism is more ‘civic’ than ‘ethnic’ and, therefore, is ‘a collective 
enterprise based upon common values and institutions, and patterns of social 
interaction’ (Keating, 1997b: 690). 
In other policy areas that are linked to social policy, attempts to better define 
the borders of the Scottish system have been made. For instance, in the field of 
education the example of university fees is quite emblematic and may constitute the 
first nucleus of a truly ‘bounded’ set of Scottish policies. Interestingly, whereas 
higher education is free for Scottish and EU students, those coming from other 
regions of the UK have to pay fees. In order to qualify as a Scottish student and be 
exempted from paying tuition fees, the student must have lived in Scotland for at 
least three years prior to the first day of the first academic year of the course. 
Additionally, the fact that EU students, unlike their British colleagues, enjoy the same 
rights of Scottish students also seems to point to the strong links that may exist 
between sub-state and European dimensions of governance and that bypass the 
‘homogenizing’ authority of the nation-state. 
The difference in Scottish university fees is also the result of diverging policies 
in the post-devolution period. Whereas Westminster decided to increase fees in 1998 
and 2010, Holyrood refused to do so78. In turn, the rising of English university fees 
has resulted in a defensive strategy, pursued by the Scottish government, aimed at 
limiting ‘the possibility of English, Welsh and Irish “fee refugees” overwhelming 
Scottish universities’ (Mycock, 2012: 60). These developments may ‘have implications 
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for the “social union”’ with a limitation and fragmentation of citizens’ social rights 
across the whole British territory and the emergence of ‘exclusory modes of 
citizenship’ (Ibid.) that are not based on class or ethnicity but mainly on territoriality. 
 
Conclusion 
In Scotland, left-wing and territorial mobilisations have been closely interlinked and 
have both contributed to the emergence of a sub-state welfare system that has 
increasingly diverged from the English (and British) one. Both the Labour Party and 
SNP campaigned for the devolution of substantial policy making (but also fiscal) 
powers to Scotland. Moreover, despite controlling both central and regional 
governments, after the devolution reform the Scottish Labour Party was strongly 
influenced by region-specific political dynamics and promoted policies, like free 
elderly care, which were instead opposed by the central party leadership. Moreover, 
the competition with the SNP on territorial and social issues has resulted in a more 
public-based, community-centred health care system, which is very different from 
the market-based model that is still in place in England. 
 The process of Scottish welfare building seems to have strengthened the sense 
of Scottish distinctiveness and has made regional Labour leaders’ attempts to 
coordinate with the statewide leadership less and less successful. Labour has thus 
been replaced by the SNP as the hegemonic political force in Scottish politics. This 
has further increased the importance of social policy as an instrument of region- and 
nation-building. The SNP has sought to go well beyond the governance of health care 
and social services by establishing a full-fledged welfare regime inspired by the 
social democratic model of Scandinavia rather than by the liberal model of 
England/Great Britain. These ambitions seem to have become increasingly 
incompatible with the British institutional model and have made the issue of Scottish 













Wales:  moderate territorial mobilisation in a context of social democratic 
consensus 
 
Converging paths of territorial and left-wing mobilisations in Wales 
Welsh devolution has been defined as a ‘pale version’ of that in Scotland. 
Historically, ‘religion and language, rather than the apparatus of the state, made 
Wales different’ (Mitchell, 2009: 8). These two issues were central when Plaid Cymru, 
the main territorial movement of Wales, was founded in 1925 under the leadership of 
Saunders Lewis, a poet and writer, who sought to create a single-issue pressure 
group ‘concerned solely with the defence and promotion of the Welsh language and 
culture in the face of accelerating Anglicization of South Wales’ (Christiansen, 1998: 
125). The original list of goals ‘excluded self-government’ (McAllister, 1982: 206), an 
issue that, according to the party leader, created disagreement within the party’ 
(Davies 1979). Under Lewis, Plaid Cymru adopted a traditionalist, almost 
reactionary, ideology that looked back at the medieval, pre-Reformation, pre-English, 
pre-industrial Wales (ibid.). This was also combined with hostility towards the 
secularism and progressivism of Labour.  
Territorial mobilisation remained quite weak and lacked an ‘institutional 
focus’ (Bogdanor, 1999: 145) until the 1960s, when a new campaign in support of the 
Welsh language and culture was launched. This time, however, particular emphasis 
was not only placed on cultural issues but also on institutional issues and, 
particularly, on Welsh self-government. Thus in the 1960s Plaid Cymru became a 
more ‘mature political organisation’, ‘a regionalist party rather than a cultural 
movement’ (Christiansen, 1998: 126). This change in the party strategy also produced 
its first electoral successes. In 1966, for the first time, Plaid Cymru won a 
parliamentary seat in the Carmarthen by-election. In the 1970s the electoral results of 
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the party further increased, although it ‘failed to emulate the SNP and its percentage 
of the vote remained static’ (Bogdanor, 2001: 156). However, Westminster politicians 
and commentators ‘believed that there was increasing support for nationalism in 
Wales as well as in Scotland’ and they talked about ‘the rise of nationalism in 
Scotland and Wales’. At the same time, the modernised Plaid Cymru started 
presenting itself ‘as a progressive, forward-looking force in Welsh policy’ 
(Christiansen, 1998: 129). New issues became central in the party platform: 
environmentalism, industrial policy, disarmament and, of course, decentralisation.  
Yet, unlike the SNP, Plaid Cymru did not have a clear position on the 
territorial status of Wales. Indeed, it adopted a ‘nebulous constitutional terminology’ 
(Elias, 2009: 69) by simply calling for Welsh ‘self-government’ rather than 
independence. Indeed, the position of the first leaders of the party was that Wales 
should not fight for ‘independence’, but, rather, ‘seek some other form of 
constitutional existence that would endow Wales with “freedom”’ (Jones, 2009: 134). 
In the decade preceding the devolution referendum of 1997, Plaid Cymru’s 
commitment was to a Europe comprehensively transformed into a ‘Europe of the 
Regions and Historic Nations’. Only in 2003 did the party proclaim ‘Independence’ 
as its long-term constitutional aim for Wales (Ibid.: 131). Thus territorial mobilisation 
in Wales has generally been much more moderate than in Scotland and this is also 
clearly shown by the different results of the devolution referendums which took 
place in both regions in 1979 and 1998.  
As in the case of the SNP, the left-wing turn of Plaid Cymru became even 
more evident during the conservative (and centralistic) Thatcher government. In 1984 
the new president of Plaid Cymru, Dafydd Elis Thomas, promoted the idea of 
‘progressive nationalism’ (Elias 2009). Cooperation with the Green Party and the 
social-democratic SNP was strengthened and this further confirmed this new 




[E]ither act as a constituency representative in Wales, essentially as a party of 
Welsh-speakers, or develop a strategy aimed at electoral efficiency through 
broadening its support beyond the Welsh language community to appeal to the 
wider electorate (Lynch, 1995: 197).  
 
Plaid Cymru tried to solve this dilemma by developing ‘a leftist appeal’ (Lynch, 1995: 
198) and re-launching itself as 'challenger' party in the early 1980s (Rochon, 1985). 
Therefore, it tried ‘to move away from mobilizing the electorate of Welsh-speakers 
alone’ and started to challenge the Labour Party ‘over its ideology, programme and 
role as the defender of Wales against the Conservative government’ (Lynch, 1995: 
198). From 1959, Plaid Cymru began a gradual process of social-democratisation but, 
at the same time, it tried to distinguish its new commitment to socialism from that of 
the Labour Party in Wales by advocating ‘community socialism’. This again 
symbolised Plaid’s ideological dilemma: ‘the party needed a form of socialism that 
had to be distinctively Welsh and distinguishable from that of Labour’ (McAllister, 
2001: 171). The latter was seen as too ‘centralist’ and difficult to reconcile with 
demands of self-government. Yet, in the long term, Plaid Cymru did not manage to 
erode any significant part of Labour support and it soon moved on to explore the 
opportunities for electoral alliances with the Welsh Green Party. Thus the party 
remained on the left but it further developed its ‘post-materialist’ profile.  
Overall, at the beginning of the devolution process in 1999, Plaid Cymru had 
‘matured’ into a well-organised party as the figures provided by McAllister (2001: 61) 
and summarised in Table 10.1 show. Party membership more than doubled, grass-
root organisation strengthened and party finances improved considerably. Moreover 








Table 10.1. The organisational development of Plaid Cymru from 1945 to 1999 
 1945 1999 
Membership 6,000 16,000 
Turnover £ 2,904 £500,000 
No. of Branches 150 220 
Paid Staff 3 60 
MPs 0 4 
Local Councillors 0 206 
Source: McAllister (2001: 61).  
 
Whereas Plaid Cymru broadened its political horizons by including social-
democratic and environmentalist issues in its platform, the Labour Party moved in a 
convergent direction by becoming more sensitive to Welsh territorial identity. It 
should also be underlined that, before becoming a strong, statewide party and 
governing force in Westminster, the Labour Party was not hostile to Welsh self-
determination. Indeed, so long as Labour was remote from the exercise of political 
power at the central level it did not take a clear position on Welsh nationalism. ‘Any 
inconsistency between support for Welsh home rule and other elements in the 
programme were not a matter of pressing political concern to a political party still on 
the political periphery’ (Jones, 1984: 183). 
Yet, although in the early 20th century the Labour party inherited the political 
position of the Liberal party promoting ‘Welsh solidarity’, it soon adopted a new 
class-based philosophy, the ‘one of secular Socialism, British rather than Welsh in 
content’ (Pelling, 1968: 112–113). More generally, for most of its political history, the 
Labour party has held an ambiguous and ambivalent attitude towards Welsh 
devolution. Indeed, the Labour Party has tended ‘to view demands for Welsh 
devolution as being of (even) less significance than devolutionary pressures 
emanating from Scotland’ (Dorey, 2008: 241).  
Ambivalence turned into almost open hostility towards Welsh self-
determination when the Labour Party became a governmental force. Particularly 
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after WW2, the Labour Party became mainly concerned with economic and social 
issues and adopted a ‘centralist’ political position, highlighting the importance of 
class rather than territorial solidarity. In this context, the Labour Party’s demands for 
‘home rule’ and constitutional reform, based on the recognition of Welsh ethnic 
distinctiveness, became much weaker. In fact, in a parliamentary debate, Aneurin 
Bevan, the Labour Minister of Health of the Attlee Government argued against those 
that supported Welsh self-government as a solution to resolve social problems and 
stated that: 
Is it not rather cruel to give the impression to the 50,000 unemployed men and 
women in Wales that their plight would be relieved and their distress removed by 
[...] constitutional change? It is not socialism. It is escapism. This is exactly the 
way in which nation after nation has been ruined in the last 25 to 50 years, trying 





The Labour party also opposed excessive support for the Welsh language. For 
instance, even in 1978, Neil Kinnock, Welsh MP and future leader of the Labour 
Party, argued that non-Welsh speaking schoolchildren in Welsh-speaking areas were 
subject to what he defined as ‘linguistic racialism’ (Drower 1984). 
In the mid-1970s, due to the rise of regionalist parties, Welsh devolution 
became a central issue in the political debate. The Welsh Labour party was not 
unanimous in its support for decentralisation. In the summer of 1974, the Welsh 
Council of Labour stated that it was supportive of a directly elected forum in Wales 
but ‘it still did not believe it should be vested with legislative powers’ (Dorey, 2008: 
256). Yet some Labour MPs in Wales remained opposed even to the prospect of an 
elected Welsh assembly, which would undermine the roles played by the Welsh 
Secretary of State and the Welsh Office. Generally:  
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These criticisms reopened the fundamental divide within the Labour Party in 
Wales between those who saw no contradiction between socialism and their 
Welsh national identity, and others who were primarily motivated by a 
materialistic belief in the pre-eminent power and influence of the British State 
(Jones and Keating, 1982: 187). 
 
This lack of unanimity and enthusiasm towards Welsh self-determination influenced 
Labour’s devolution proposals in the 1970s. The White Paper Democracy and 
Devolution Proposals for Scotland and Wales produced by the Labour Government in 
1974 illustrated the extent to which the national aspirations of Wales were viewed 
differently by the Labour Party, ‘for the Welsh were to be offered an elected 
Assembly whose powers would be significantly less than those to be granted to the 
Scottish Assembly’ (Dorey, 2008: 257). The Welsh Assembly would not have a 
primary law-making role but would be confined instead ‘to exercising certain powers 
of the Secretary of State for delegated legislation’. It would also have ‘responsibility 
for […] executive functions exercised by nominated bodies […] and certain functions 
by the Secretary of State’ (Wilson, 1979: 48).  
The failure of the referendum in 1979 confirmed the hostility of a large part of 
Welsh Labour towards the devolution process. In the 1983 programme only Scottish 
devolution was explicitly mentioned (Labour Party Programme quoted in Dale, 1999: 
277). Indeed, for most of the Labour Party, the issue of Welsh devolution ‘fell into 
abeyance during the first half of the 1980s’ (Dorey, 2008: 260) and this was also due to 
the strengthening of the more leftist and statist wing of the party (the ‘Bennite Left’). 
However, in the late 1980s, when Labour lost the general election for the third 
time in a row, a number of important Labour figures who had opposed devolution in 
1979 changed their minds. Ron Davies, MP for Caerphilly, can be mentioned among 
the Labour converts. He argued that the pro-devolution positions were strengthened 
‘by the impact of successive election losses and facilitated by the pressure for local 
285 
 
government reform’ (Davies, 1999: 4, italics added). The transformation of the Welsh 
Labour party was certainly less radical than that of the Scottish party and occurred 
through a heated internal debate (Andrews 1999). The debate culminated in a 
document, Shaping the Vision, which proposed an assembly with secondary 
legislative powers but also suggested that there might be scope for primary powers 
to reform local government and legislating for the Welsh language (Mitchell, 2009: 
159). When Labour finally won the general election in 1997, it passed the 
Government of Wales Act, which was a compromise between the different factions of 
the party and confirmed the idea that the new Welsh Assembly would only have 
secondary legislative powers. The Assembly Government: 
 
[H]ad to bid for Welsh bills or clauses at Westminster, competing with Whitehall 
departments as it had no primary legislative powers. Problems would arise when 
different parties were in power in London and Cardiff. (Mitchell, 2009: 161, 
italics added).  
 
To summarise, territorial mobilisation in Wales was much weaker than in Scotland. 
Plaid Cymru, the main regionalist party of Wales, positioned itself to the left of the 
political spectrum, just like the SNP, but failed to become a real challenger of the 
Labour Party, which changed its position mainly because of its long-term exclusion 
from central government in the 1980s. This resulted in a more moderate attitude of 
the Labour Party towards decentralisation and, consequently in a more limited 
process of devolution in which the division of competencies between regional and 
central governments were less clear than in Scotland (Keating, 2012: 219).  
 
Welsh politics after devolution: a dominant party system 
In the first election for the Welsh Assembly the Labour party obtained the relative 
majority of the seats. Like in Scotland, the voting system adopted in Wales was a 
mixed majoritarian-proportional model and made it very difficult for a single party 
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to gain the absolute majority of the seats (Table 10.2). As in Scotland, a territorial 
movement emerged as the second largest force. Surprisingly, the result of Plaid 
Cymru in the first election was even greater than that of the SNP! Indeed, the first 
Welsh elections after devolution were defined as a ‘quiet earthquake’ (Trystan et al. 
2005). Yet after the 1999 election, the political dissimilarity between the Welsh and 
British party systems decreased, as a consequence of the declining support for Plaid 
Cymru and strengthening of the Conservative Party (Detterbeck, 2012: 97).  
Table 10.2. Welsh Assembly elections from 1999 to 2011. Seats gained by each party 
(% of seats in brackets) 
 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Labour Party 28 (47%) 30 (50%) 26 (43%) 30 (50%) 
Plaid Cymru 17 (28%) 12 (20%) 15 (25%) 11 (18%) 
Liberal Democratic 
Party 
6 (10%) 6 (10%) 6 (10%) 5 (8%) 
Conservative Party 9 (15%) 11 (18%) 12 (20%) 14 (23%) 
Independent/Other --- 1 (2%) 1 (2%) --- 
Source: Electoral Commission http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/  
 
Overall, as shown in the two-dimensional map in Figure 10.1, the Welsh party 
system is also characterised by a social-democratic consensus in which centre-left 
political forces – the Labour Party, Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats80 – have 
constantly gained around 80 per cent of the total vote. As in the case of Scotland, in 
Wales the left-right cleavage overlaps with the centre-periphery one. Indeed the 
centre-right Conservative Party has been the party with the lowest level of support 
for devolution. 
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devolutionist for over a century’.  
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Figure 10.1. Locating post-devolution Welsh parties on the two-dimensional political map 





















Since 1999 the Labour party has won all Welsh elections. It has ruled in minority 
governments or coalition governments (Table 10.3). From 2007 to 2011, it even 
formed a coalition with Plaid Cymru, which, unlike the SNP, adopted a less 
confrontational strategy of alliances on the left. Yet, although once in government 
Plaid Cymru’s ministers have sought ’to portray an image of competence’ (Elias, 












Indeed in the 2011 Welsh election, Plaid Cymru was usurped by the Conservative 
Party in its position as second largest party of Wales. 
 
Table 10.3. Governments of Wales since 1999 
First Minister Term of office Parties in Government 
Alun Michael (LAB) 1999-2000 Labour (minority) 
Rhodri Morgan (LAB) 2000-2003 Labour, LibDem 
Rhodri Morgan (LAB) 2003-2007 Labour (minority) 
Rhodri Morgan (LAB) 2007-2009 Labour, Plaid Cymru 
Crawyn Jones (LAB) 2009-2011 Labour, Plaid Cymru 




Additionally, it can also be noted that whereas in Scotland the SNP managed to 
become the largest political force at the sub-regional level (in the so called ‘Unitary 
Authorities’), in Wales Plaid Cymru has controlled a much smaller share of local 
representation than the Labour party (Table 10.4). Thus, on the one hand, the SNP is 
in a good position to advance a distinctive model of social governance, which 
involves not only regional but also local authorities. On the other hand, in Wales it is 
the Labour party and not Plaid Cymru that, by controlling both regional and local 








Table 10.4. Political composition of Scottish and Welsh ‘Unitary Authorities’ in 2014 
(the largest percentage in each region is written in bold) 
 
 Labour SNP Plaid Cymru Conservative LibDem Other 
Scotland  32.6% 33.8% --- 9.4% 5.7% 18.5% 
Wales 46.2% --- 13.6% 8.4% 5.6% 26.2% 
Source: These data have been collected by Keith Edkins and are available online at 
http://www.gwydir.demon.co.uk/uklocalgov/makeup.htm (date of access 11/08/2014). 
 
 
Therefore, since devolution the Labour Party has clearly dominated Welsh politics. 
This has also occurred in a context of increasing autonomy of the Welsh Labour party 
from the central party leadership. Thus Welsh leaders have been able to play an 
important role in the formulation of Welsh-specific party policies and electoral 
programmes. Yet, that autonomy was strictly regulated and supervised by the 
London leadership in the years of Labour government in Westminster. Indeed, the 
Westminster government adopted ‘a permissive attitude to policies pursued in 
Scotland and Wales as long as they threaten[ed] no major political embarrassment’ (Laffin 
et al., 2007b: 100, italics added).  
Whereas in Scotland there were significant tensions between central and 
regional leaders on the issue of free personal care for the elderly, in Wales such 
tensions did not emerge and coordination between Cardiff and London governments 
prevailed, since the distinctive policies promoted by the former could be integrated 
in Westminster legislation by the latter. This was also due to the institutional settings 
that did not give primary legislative powers to the Welsh Assembly, thus forcing the 
Welsh leadership to bargain and reach a compromise with the British government. 
Additionally, pressures for radical policy innovation coming from territorial 
movements were much stronger in Scotland than in Wales and this allowed the 




Yet things changed in 2010, when a new centre-right government was formed 
in London and coordination between Welsh and British governments became 
increasingly difficult. As I show in the last part of this chapter, since then the political 
discourse of Welsh Labour became more aggressive and Welsh-focused. It also 
underlined the threat posed by the conservative central government to the Welsh 
social model. In this context, the Labour party, together with Plaid Cymru, started a 
political campaign to increase the policymaking powers of the Welsh Assembly that 




Development of Welsh social policy since devolution: a moderate process of 
welfare and region building 
 
Welsh labour politicians have had ‘a positive incentive to favour policies that are to 
the left of England’. This is because, as shown in the previous section, in Wales there 
appears to be very little support for Conservative policies. Yet, although the party 
system of Wales ‘promotes distinctiveness and a degree of leftism relative to 
England’, it is combined with ‘institutional and organizational weaknesses that make 
it risky to develop new policies’ (Greer, 2004: 145). The lack of ‘policy capacity’ has 
made it more difficult for the Welsh devolved government to achieve ‘a welfare 
improving policy mix’ (Kay 2003). Generally, whereas in Scotland ‘sub-state 
nationalism’ and historical legacies were strong enough to lead to a process of 
significant institutional devolution, which gave primary legislative powers to the 
Scottish parliament, in Wales ‘culturally focused’ and weaker territorial mobilisation 
seems to have had a much less substantial influence on the process of institutional 
decentralisation in this region.  
However, despite the weak autonomy granted to Wales, the Labour-led 
government has tried to introduce some important reforms in the Welsh social 
system. In the health care sector, for instance, the guiding themes of reform were 
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‘new public health, localism, and trust in the public sector’ (Greer, 2004: 156). In 
particular, the emphasis on the public sector and localism seems to reflect the social-
democratic consensus that exists among the main political and social actors (as in 
Scotland). Rhodri Morgan, First Minister of Wales from 2000 to 2009, claimed that the 
actions of the Welsh Assembly owed ‘more to the traditions of Titmuss, Tawney, 
Beveridge and Bevan than those of Hayek and Friedman’. He emphasised the 
importance of universalism, equality of outcomes and ‘the individual as citizen 
rather than consumer’81, a position that highlighted ‘a tension with the more neo-
liberal tendencies of New Labour’ (Mooney and Williams, 2006: 617). 
The National Health plan for Wales, Improving Health in Wales82, was one of the 
first important political actions of the Welsh government and aimed to introduce a 
more community-based and public-based model of social governance. The sub-state 
dimension was seen as an opportunity to:  
 
[E]nsure that the relative under-development of primary care in Wales over the 
past 20 years will be reversed. There will be systematic investment in staff 
development, capital projects and organisational development. Reward systems 
will be put in place to attract the highest calibre professionals into the sector and 
to place a value on the continuity and the stability of the service. (p. 4) 
 
Generally, the health reforms outlined a ‘radical departure in the organization of 
health service’ from the English model’ (Osmond, 2001: 19). The Welsh government 
also introduced lower prescription charges than in England (Osmond, 2003: 28), thus 
confirming the willingness of the Welsh government to promote a more inclusive 
and universalistic social system. 
 The health reforms were accepted by British ministers and were incorporated 
within Westminster legislation. Yet, noticeably, opposition to the health sector 
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 Rhodri Morgan’s 2002 speech to the University of Wales quoted in Mooney and Williams (2006: 617). 
82
 http://www.wales.nhs.uk/publications/primcare_e.pdf (date of access 26/09/2014). 
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reform came from Welsh members of the British parliament, who were ‘critical of a 
reorganization at a time of lengthening hospital waiting lists’ (Laffin et al., 2007b: 
100). Relationships between Labour MPs in Westminster and the Labour-controlled 
Welsh assembly ‘became so poor at one stage that a joint group of Labour AM83 and 
MPs was formed in 2004 to try to smooth out differences’ (Deacon, 2006: 172). 
Additionally, as underlined by Greer (2004: 157), the lack of institutional capacity 
‘can undo the best intentioned reforms’. In particular, the idea to create a 
community-based health care system with the creation of county-level boards could 
not be fully implemented in the Welsh context, which lacked an autonomous 
administration comparable to the Scottish one.   
As shown in Table 10.5, the Welsh health care system stands somewhat in 
between the Scottish and English ones. For instance, after devolution the 
organisation of health care in Scotland became highly integrated, with ‘a uniform 
system of local partnerships with social services’, whereas England ‘has a more 
fragmented and diffuse pattern of relationships’ (Birrell, 2009: 67). In Wales, the 
pursuit of integration has been slower, although in 2007 the Welsh Assembly 
Government recognised the need to strengthen cooperation within the health care 
system and between health and social care. Indeed, in the strategy document Fulfilled 
lives, supportive communities84, the Government stated that: 
 
The evolving plans for reconfiguring health services to form inter-connected 
networks create new requirements for wide area collaboration in commissioning 
services. Similarly, in redesigning the management of chronic conditions there 
will be a greater need within localities to deliver more integrated care across 
health and social services. (p. 5).  
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 Members of the Welsh Assembly. 
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 http://wales.gov.uk/dhss/publications/socialcare/strategies/fulfilledlives/fulfilledlivese.pdf?lang=en (date of 
access 19/08/2014).  
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Also in the field of internal competition and purchaser/provider split, Scotland broke 
with the English pro-market system more quickly than Wales. In Wales local health 
boards could still commission services from NHS trusts although ‘in practice 
commissioning was from the local trust, with little involvement of alternative 
providers and in reality no market choice existed for the majority of care’ (Birrell, 
2009: 59). Only in 2008, with the adoption of the One Wales85 agenda, did the 
Assembly Government announce that it would ‘move purposefully to end the 
internal market’ (p. 9).  
 
Table 10.5. Variation in health care governance across Wales, Scotland, and England 
 Wales Scotland England 
Health Configuration, 
integration of services 









Change to no divide No divide Divide 
Source: Birrell, 2009: 59. 
 
It should also be added that both Scotland and Wales tried to promote distinctive 
forms of citizen involvement in the governance of health care. Again, as shown in the 
previous chapter, the SNP government of Scotland adopted a radical strategy of 
direct election of local health boards, which, however, proved less successful than 
expected. The Welsh government led by the Labour Party has followed a more 
moderate path and decided to retain and further empower Community Health 
Councils (CHCs), which were abolished in England in 2003. CHCs were not directly 
elected but were formed of Local Authority representatives, nominees from local 
Third Sector bodies, and members appointed by the Minister in response to public 
adverts. In 2010 the number of CHCs was reduced but according to the One Wales 
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programme they would have a strengthened role in scrutinising both the planning 
and the delivery of health services (Birrell, 2009: 65).   
Lacking primary legislative powers, the Welsh assembly could not introduce 
ambitious reforms like the one on free personal care promoted by the Scottish 
government. Yet, for instance, a ‘Welsh voluntary sector scheme’, which had a 
statutory basis in the Government of Wales act, was established and today it is 
claimed to be unique in the UK and ‘probably in the world’. The aim of this scheme 
was ‘to create a closer working relationship between the voluntary sector on equal 
footing with the local government and business sector’ (Birrell, 2009: 48). This 
framework of cooperation was clearly inspired by the idea of ‘plural’ (but integrated) 
social governance supported by the Welsh Labour party in government. 
In addition, the Welsh government has tried to promote and implement 
innovative policies in the field of early childhood education and care (ECEC). Even 
though Wales was bound by the same Treasury constraints as England and had 
weaker formal policy capacities than Scotland, it managed to implement important 
changes in the governance of ECEC. Prior to political devolution, Welsh ECEC 
provision ‘was fairly typical of the UK in general’ (Wincott, 2006: 295), and, therefore, 
reflected a more liberal idea of targeting the poor, rather than promoting universal 
rights. Since devolution, however, ’the Welsh Assembly government has made very 
successful use of its limited powers to redesign ECEC provision in radically 
innovative ways’ (Ibid.). In particular, it introduced the Welsh Foundation Phase 
Curriculum, which aimed at recasting the relationship between preschool and the 
first three years of primary school and promoting a more homogeneous and 
universalistic approach to childcare. ‘Integrated Children’s Centres’ were created and 
cooperation between different social and educational departments of the government 
was strengthened (Wincott, 2005: 82). However, given the lack of fiscal-policy tools, 
the Welsh administration mainly focused ‘on the design and philosophy of ECEC’ 
(ibid. 85). Moreover, whereas ‘the Scottish Executive embarked on an ambitious, 
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large-scale and formal process’, in Wales ‘the “joining-up” of early-years policy had 
been informal (at least where it has been successful)’ (ibid. 87). 
As shown in the previous chapter, welfare generosity, expressed in social 
spending, has been lower in Wales than in Scotland. In fact, the data provided by 
Birrell (2009) suggest that the difference in spending between Scotland and Wales has 
increased from 1999 to 2006/2007. If in 1999, social spending in Scotland was 7.2 per 
cent higher than in Wales in the 2006/2007 biennium the difference almost reached 10 
per cent. This may be explained not only by political decisions taken by the Scottish 
government, such as the establishment of universal and free elderly care, but also by 
Welsh institutional disadvantage. Scholars have underlined that in recent years 
Wales has suffered from what has been defined as the ‘Barnett squeeze’, that is, an 
inherent tendency of the UK-wide formula of public expenditure ‘to bring spending 
per head in Wales ever closer to the average spending per head in England’ 
(Dakeford 2012: 456). Data provided by Schmuecker and Adams (2005) seem to 
confirm this. As shown in Table 10.6, if we assign the score 100 to the UK spending 
average, in 1999-2000 Welsh identifiable public spending on services per head was 
114 and it declined to 111 in just 6 years. On the contrary, Scottish spending 
remained stable at 118.   
 
Table 10.6. Wales and the ‘Barnett Squeeze’. Index of identifiable public expenditure 
on services per head in the devolved territories and England (UK= 100) 
 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2005-05 
Wales 114 114 112 113 112 111 
Scotland 118 118 119 118 119 118 
England 96 96 96 96 96 97 






After 2010: beyond coordination with London 
 
In 2007, the Labour Party agreed to form a coalition with Plaid Cymru. In the 
coalition agreement, the One Wales agreement, it was established that a referendum 
would be called in 2011 to decide whether the Welsh Assembly would have full 
legislative powers. Initially, for many Welsh Labour MPs ‘the referendum 
commitment was a bitter pill to swallow’ (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012: 77). However, 
‘Labour’s defeat in the 2010 UK general election [...] strengthened the hand of Labour 
devolutionists’ (ibid. 95). More powers to Wales meant that a Labour-led Welsh 
government did not need to reach consensus with a conservative government on 
important issues such as health care, social assistance and education. This was even 
more important in a period of austerity in which the Cameron government in 
London introduced significant cuts to the welfare system that would significantly 
affect Wales (Drakeford, 2012: 463). Therefore, in 2010 Labour support for further 
devolution in Wales became significantly stronger. This had a positive effect on the 
referendum outcome, which saw the ‘yes’ vote winning by a large margin (63.5 per 
cent), although turnout was quite low at 35 per cent. 
Following this result, the National Assembly for Wales now enjoys primary 
legislative powers in policy areas such as health and social care. Additionally, in the 
2011 Welsh election the Labour Party obtained the fourth consecutive victory and, 
controlling exactly half of the Assembly seats, it could form a new minority 
government. In the Programme for Government86 published in 2011, the First Minister 
of Wales, Rt Hon Carwyn Jones stated that the New Labour Government would 
place particular ‘emphasis on social, economic and environmental well-being for 
people and communities, embodying our values of fairness and social justice’. 
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Looking at the policies implemented in London, the Labour Programme Delivering 
for Wales87 highlighted that:   
 
Wales has not faced the policy chaos that the Tory-Lib Dem UK Government is 
imposing on the NHS in England. There has been ‘no pause’ in health policy and 
our Welsh Labour Government remains focussed on providing the best possible 
NHS for the people of Wales. We ended the inefficiencies of the internal market 
in NHS Wales and unlike the Tories we will not privatise NHS services. The NHS 
is safe with Welsh Labour. Unlike England the commitment is to maintain the 
health AND social care budgets. In England the Tories have slashed the budgets 
of local councils meaning cuts in social care that will, in turn place additional 
pressures on the budget of the NHS. The lack of focus and growing financial 
pressure in England has resulted in waiting times coming under pressure. (p. 9). 
 
One of the important legislative initiatives of the New Labour-led government of 
Wales in the post-referendum period was the Social Services and Well-being Act88, 
which followed the White Paper Sustainable Social Services for Wales: A Framework for 
Action89. This document highlighted the importance of improving accountability and 
integration of social services. Again, the role played by local authorities and 
voluntary organisations was considered crucial. Indeed the following statement was 
included in the White Paper: 
 
We will support the wider development of the community leadership role of local 
government. We also see public health services playing a key role. We expect the 
full engagement of the third sector in the provision of community-based support 
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 Delivering for Wales  can be found at http://www.welshlabour.org.uk/uploads/Delivering_for_Wales.pdf 
(date of access 23/08/2014).  
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 http://wales.gov.uk/docs/dhss/publications/110216frameworken.pdf (date of access 23/08/2014). 
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services, particularly in the context of the development of social enterprises in 
Wales.  
 
The Social Services and Well-being Act also provided a broad, integrated definition of 
well-being, which includes many aspects of an individual’s life, from health to 
education and training, and from social care to working conditions. According to the 
Act: 
 
“Well-being”, in relation to a person, means well-being in relation to any of the following— 
(a) physical and mental health and emotional well-being; 
(b) protection from abuse and neglect; 
(c) education, training and recreation; 
(d) domestic, family and personal relationships; 
(e) contribution made to society; 
(f) securing rights and entitlements; 
(g) social and economic well-being; 
(h) suitability of living accommodation. 
 
This is in line with the most current notions of welfare, which is not only seen as 
‘protection’ from negative market externalities but also an as active, all-
encompassing and ‘enabling force’ (Blunkett 2000) in a context of transforming 
economic systems.  
Recent developments in Wales suggest that the local Labour leadership has 
strengthened its Welsh focus and has pushed for more policy-making autonomy and 
even more distinctive social policies. Wales is now ruled by a party that is in 
opposition at the statewide level and is faced with a conservative central government 
that is implementing austerity measures. After 13 years of coordination with the 
Labour-led government in Westminster, regional political elites have started 
developing more autonomous strategies and this could be the beginning of a more 
comprehensive process of welfare building at the sub-state level. At the same time, 
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the failure of territorial forces to reach levels of mobilisation and electoral support 
similar to those that can be found in Scotland (in 2011 Plaid Cymru was electorally 
defeated, while the SNP managed to win the absolute majority of seats in the Scottish 
Parliament) seems to rule out the possibility that policy divergence would be 




















This study has shown that it is increasingly difficult to consider the welfare systems 
of decentralised European countries as territorially homogeneous. Countries such as 
Italy, Spain, and Great Britain have undergone a radical process of territorial 
reconfiguration in the governance of new social policies and this challenges 
mainstream welfare classifications that focus on the nation-state as the main 
(sometimes the only) level of analysis (‘methodological nationalism’). The large 
amount of quantitative and qualitative data presented in the various chapters of this 
research point to the fact that regions have become important arenas of welfare 
building and restructuring. A consequence of this is the increasing territorial 
variation in the level and type of development of welfare systems. This is why it is 
important to look not only at statewide but also at sub-state political dynamics when 
studying the transformation of welfare systems in multi-level settings.  
 
 
Territorial Mobilisation and Sub-State Welfare Development in Italy, Spain and 
Great Britain 
 
The main finding of this study is that in Italy, Spain, and Great Britain territorial 
mobilisation has favoured the process of welfare-building at the sub-state level. 
Empirical evidence points to the fact that, in all three countries, regionalist and ‘sub-
state nationalist’ parties have promoted the construction of region-specific social 
models regardless of their ideological orientation. Therefore, it can be argued that when 
social policy is subject to multi-level dynamics, the centre-periphery cleavage may 
significantly affect social policy making and implementation. Using a three-
dimensional measure of welfare development that combines spending, legislation 
and implementation, it has been shown that the higher the level of territorial 
mobilisation, the more developed the sub-state system of social protection will be.   
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Yet the way in which territorial mobilisation has impacted on regional social 
policy has been different across the three countries examined. In Italy territorial 
parties have not had a very strong effect on the establishment of formal institutional 
asymmetries across regions. A rigid, dual system of ‘ordinal’ and ‘special status’ regions 
has been in place since the post-war period and it has been very difficult, if not 
impossible, for ‘territorially mobilised’ regions to directly participate in the 
bargaining process to decide their institutional status. Therefore, the intervening effect 
of formal asymmetries in regional autonomy on the development of regional welfare 
systems has been quite weak in Italy. Yet even in a context of constitutional rigidity, 
territorial movements have been able to use formally homogeneous regional powers 
in different, ‘creative’ ways. Thus an ordinary status region like Lombardy has been 
able to develop a stronger model of welfare than other ordinary status regions such 
as Piedmont, Liguria, or Latium. Significant differences in welfare development can 
also be noted across special status regions, with South Tyrol and the Aosta Valley 
having much higher levels of welfare development than other special status regions 
such as Friuli or Trento, not to mention Sicily and Sardinia. I define this as a direct 
effect of territorial mobilisation on sub-state welfare development, since it has 
occurred regardless of (or controlling for) formal differences in the level of (formal) 
fiscal and policy making autonomy across regions.  
In Spain, institutional arrangements for regional authorities have been subject 
to moderate flexibility. Territorial movements may bargain the level of autonomy of 
individual regions directly with Madrid. However, the central government also 
created regional institutions where territorial demands were weak or totally absent 
in order to balance the demands for autonomy coming from the historical regions. 
Instead of a dual system like the Italian one, the Spanish system has therefore 
established a more heterogeneous set of autonomy options, which range from high 
fiscal policymaking and fiscal autonomy in the Basque Country to the more ‘basic’ 
levels of autonomy that can be found in Castile and Leon. In this context, territorial 
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mobilisation has had both direct and indirect effects on sub-state welfare 
development. Catalonia, for instance, despite not having significantly more powers 
than other ‘ordinary’ Autonomous Communities, has been much more active in the 
construction of a regional social system. 
Lastly, Great Britain shows the most flexible system of institutional 
reconfiguration. In this context, the degree of regional autonomy strongly reflects 
levels of territorial mobilisation. Thus, differences in autonomy between the 
devolved governments of Scotland and Wales and the absence of regional 
institutions in England can be largely explained by variation in territorial demands, 
which are stronger in Scotland, weaker in Wales and almost completely absent in 
England. Consequently, differences in welfare development mainly derive from the 
intervening effect of formal institutional asymmetries. Scotland has had the highest 
level of welfare development, Wales has followed a more moderate and gradual 
path, whereas in England, the absence of legislating regional authorities has not 
allowed the emergence of a system of social governance that can be distinguished 
from the ‘British’ one.  
 
 
Left-wing Mobilisation and Sub-State Welfare Development in Italy, Spain, and 
Great Britain 
 
The other important finding of this study is that centre-left parties that primarily 
emerged from the political mobilisation of the ‘class cleavage’ have responded to the 
territorial challenge in different ways, depending on the role they have played in 
central government and on their relationship with territorial movements. Generally, 
the link between party competition and welfare development in multi-level settings 
seems much more complex than is argued by power resource theories, which 
emphasise the role of left-wing parties as the driving force of welfare building and 
describe centre-right forces as ‘reactive’ to left-wing mobilisation in their attempt to 
introduce social reforms.  
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In Italy the Left played a marginal role in central government for most of the 
post-war period, and even after the collapse of the Berlin Wall it has rarely been the 
dominant force in statewide policy making.  In particular, the former Communist 
Party, which then underwent a process of moderation and social-democratisation, 
was ‘forced’ to focus on the regional level to advance its political project. The regions 
of the so called ‘red belt’ became the privileged arena for the development of social 
policies that were alternative or better developed than the ones promoted by the 
statewide dominant coalition led by the Christian Democrats. In particular, Emilia 
Romagna and Tuscany were considered by the Communist Party and its political 
successors as a laboratory of policy making and an example of good left-wing 
government. This occurred despite the fact that in such regions territorial 
mobilisation was relatively weak.  
In Spain, on the other hand, the main party of the Spanish Left, the PSOE, 
became the dominant party in central government in the early 1980s. Since then it has 
been out of power only from 1996 to 2004 and from 2011. In this context, the PSOE, 
despite formally supporting regionalism, has sought to create a cross-territorial 
system of social protection. By controlling the central government, the PSOE has 
tried to limit excessive fragmentation in welfare governance, which could undermine 
territorial equality, and through its party structure has promoted a process of 
standardisation of sub-national welfare programmes. Particularly during the long 
government of González, centralising pressures within the organisation of the PSOE 
resulted in political actions that tended to place particular emphasis on territorial 
uniformity and integrity, thus balancing the calls for increasing autonomy and policy 
distinctiveness coming from territorial movements. Of course, in some cases (e.g. the 
Basque Country) the regional arena was used by the PSOE as an opportunity for 
policy experimentation. However, the party used its statewide organisation and its 
links between regional and central governments to ‘disseminate’ new regional 
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policies across the whole Spanish territory, thus favouring a process of territorial 
standardisation and convergence.  
Finally, in Great Britain the Labour Party played a central role in the 
construction of a statewide welfare system in the post-war period. In the 1940s, 1950s 
and 1960s the Labour Party argued that nationalisation and centralisation were the 
main solutions to problems of inequality and poverty. Territorial issues were 
regarded as a threat to class solidarity and the peripheral regions of Great Britain 
could rely on centrally coordinated regional policies in their struggle against poverty. 
Yet in the 1970s the strengthening of regionalist parties in Scotland and Wales, two 
strongholds of the Left, forced Labour to reconsider its position on decentralisation 
and promote devolution reforms. The long period of conservative government in the 
1980s and 1990s further strengthened the territorial orientation of the Labour Party. 
At the same time, territorial movements in Scotland and Wales moved to the left as a 
consequence of the hostility towards the centralist and neoliberal reforms of 
Thatcher, which negatively affected the peripheral regions of Great Britain. 
Moreover, the Scottish and Welsh movements realised that they needed to appeal to 
Labour voters in order to obtain a considerable and stable electoral success. 
Therefore, in Great Britain territorial and left-wing mobilisations moved in 
convergent directions and both contributed to the development of sub-state welfare 
models.  
 
Summary of empirical results: the effects of territorial and left-wing mobilisation 
on the level of sub-state welfare development 
Having analysed the effects of territorial and left-wing mobilisations on welfare 
development separately, it is now possible to provide an overall picture of the 
politics of sub-state welfare in the three countries analysed in this study. 
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 In the Italian case the development of regional welfare systems has followed two 
parallel paths. On the one hand regionalist parties have been able to establish region-
specific social models even in a context of rigid institutional asymmetries separating 
ordinary and special status regions. On the other hand, left-wing parties, excluded 
from or playing a marginal role in central government for most of the post-war 
period, have also used the regional dimension to promote alternative social policies. 
Figure 11.1 summarises the way territorial and left-wing mobilisations have 
impacted on regional welfare development. The strength of the relationship between 
variables is indicated by the thickness of the arrow. 











In Spain regionalist parties were able to promote the development of region-specific 
welfare models both directly and indirectly through the establishment of formal 
institutional asymmetries, given the moderate flexibility of the constitutional 
framework regulating the relations between the centre and periphery. On the other 
hand, the Spanish Left dominated by the PSOE, which has been in central 










 Left-wing mobilisation 
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the emergence of ‘strong’ models of regional welfare that could compete with 
statewide welfare programmes and threaten uniformity in the provision of social 
services. The effect of territorial and left-wing mobilisation on regional welfare 
development in Spain is summarised in Figure 11.2. 
 















Finally, in the case of Great Britain, the combination of territorial and left-wing 
mobilisations have resulted in the emergence of distinctive welfare models in 
Scotland and, to a lesser extent, Wales. Given the very flexible constitutional 

















institutional asymmetries reflecting different levels of territorial mobilisation (Figure 
11.3). 












Emerging Welfare Regimes at the Sub-State levels: a qualitative assessment of 
their distinctiveness 
 
The analysis of sub-state welfare development can be performed in two steps. The 
first one, discussed above, focuses on the level of development of social policies at the 
sub-state level by considering the co-existence of three important dimensions of 
welfare development: spending, legislation and implementation/delivery of services. The 
second one is more qualitative and concerns the different forms that sub-state welfare 
development may take. 
Once highly developed models of welfare have been detected, it is possible to 
study their characteristics and see to what extent they diverge from each other and 
from the statewide model of welfare. For instance, in the Italian case the model of 
welfare governance that emerged in the so-called ‘Alpine’ regions is different from 













‘Southern European’ welfare model, a category that is often used to describe the 
Italian welfare system as a whole. The same can be said in the case of Catalonia and 
the Basque Country, which have followed distinctive trajectories of welfare 
development. This is because territorial movements do not act in a vacuum but their 
vision of social governance is influenced by the regional system in which they 
emerge and develop. In sum, they are part of a broader policy community and they 
establish different alliances with institutional, political and social actors.  
The study of the Italian regions indicates the emergence of at least three 
models of welfare, which, despite being highly developed, integrated, and 
sustainable, are structured in significantly different ways and are based on different 
conceptions of social justice. The model that emerged in the ‘Alpine’ regions, such as 
South Tyrol and the Aosta Valley, can be defined as ‘family-oriented’ (rather than 
‘familistic’), paternalistic, generous, linked to the professional status of the 
beneficiaries, and mainly public-based. On the other hand the welfare model of 
Lombardy is more market-based and region-centric. In Lombardy, private actors are 
fully involved in the governance and provision of social and health care services and 
citizens are seen as ‘customers’ with full freedom of choice when selecting welfare 
providers. Finally, the red regions, governed by ‘regionally-focused’ centre-left 
parties, have promoted a more universalistic and public-based system, which also 
aims to involve municipalities and local authorities in a highly integrated system of 
social protection.  
Significant differences can also be found when comparing Catalonia and the 
Basque Country. In both regions, centre-right and conservative territorial parties 
have been dominant in regional governance. Yet party system dynamics and 
different relationships with social actors have resulted in two distinctive models of 
welfare. The Catalan one, like the Lombard one, is more open to competition among 
providers and to the participation of private actors in welfare governance. On the 
other hand, the Basque Nationalist Party, unlike Convergence and Union, has 
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presented itself as a cross-class party, and has promoted the creation of Basque trade 
unions and established governing alliances with centre-left parties. This has resulted 
in a more public-based and universalistic system of social governance.  
Finally, in Great Britain the devolved governments of Scotland and Wales 
have used their autonomy to create systems that diverged from the liberal model 
adopted in England. In both regions the main political and social actors can be 
located on the centre-left of the political spectrum and a social democratic consensus 
has therefore prevailed. However, due to higher levels of territorial mobilisation and 
decision-making autonomy, the effects of such consensus on social policies has been 
much more visible in Scotland than in Wales. The former region has promoted a 
system of health care and social assistance, which is integrated, public-based and 
community-based. This model is radically different from the more fragmented, 
competition-based and market-oriented system that has been adopted in the 
administration of English social services. The Scottish government has been able to 
pass advanced legislation, which sometimes went against the preferences of the 
London government. The most notable case is the one regarding universal elderly 
care, which was passed by the Labour government of Scotland in a context of 
increasing pressures coming from coalition allies and from the opposition of the 
Scottish National Party.  
Table 11.1 provides a summary of the various typologies of strong welfare 
systems that have been analysed in this study and compares them to the statewide 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The importance of history and policy legacies 
The empirical chapters of this study have mainly focused on the development of sub-
national welfare systems in the last three decades. In the preliminary quantitative 
analyses presented in each country-specific part, both independent and dependent 
variables are average values that mainly refer to the period from 1980 to 2010. 
However, one cannot neglect the existence of policy legacies, institutional factors and 
historical traditions that precede the period analysed here and that might have 
affected political dynamics and more recent policy outcomes.  
Already in the qualitative chapters, it has been underlined that regionalist 
parties and regional branches of statewide parties do not act in a vacuum but are part 
of a ‘policy community’ (Hall 1993). The policies that they promote are influenced by 
the alliances that they establish with other political/institutional, economic and social 
actors.  Additionally, although less systematically, it has been shown that regionalist 
parties may embody historical traditions or rely on institutional legacies. For 
instance, in Catalonia, CiU has often referred to the traditional role played by 
religious and private organisations in the provision of social assistance and the new 
policies promoted by this party are inspired by this tradition. At the same time, the 
social, cultural and political legacy of the ‘Alpine macro-region’ was well represented 
by the regionalist parties of South Tyrol and Aosta Valley. Finally, to show the 
importance of institutional legacies, I have argued that Scotland can rely on more 
institutional resources than Wales, not only because it enjoys more formal autonomy 
in the post-devolution era, but also due to its historical status as an old independent 
kingdom, which, after the creation of the Union, remained a semi-autonomous centre 
of political power (at least until the ‘centralising’ phase in the post-war years).   
Madama (2010) has argued that the level development of social assistance 
services (she did not consider health care policies) in Italian regions may be linked to 
pre-existing institutional setups influencing political dynamics, which in turn affect 
more recent processes of welfare building (Figure 11.4). Therefore, despite agreeing 
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with the statement that politics matters in the development of social policies (as this 
study does), she suggests that one should also look at the context in which political 
parties compete.  
 





Source: Madama (2010: 206). Author’s translation. 
 
In particular, Madama has underlined the importance of policy legacies, 
operationalised as levels of social spending and coverage at the beginning of the 
process of regionalisation. Policy legacies are seen as an important contextual 
variable that shapes more recent dynamics of welfare politics. By relying on her 
policy legacy index (see Madama, 2010: 206), I present the results of a regression 
model based on the data already used in chapter 2 (Table 11.2). It can be seen that the 
policy legacy variable is quite important, having a standardized coefficient of 0.32. 
This means that more recent processes of sub-state welfare building are facilitated 
when highly developed networks of social assistance are already in place.  Yet, even 
adding this new variable, the ‘territorial mobilisation’ (standardised) coefficient 
remains the largest one. The ‘left-wing mobilisation’ variable is still more important 
than other region-specific variables but its coefficient is smaller than in the previous 
analysis. This may be due to the stronger policy legacy of the Italian ‘red’ regions 
that, as highlighted by Ciarini (2012), dates back to the first experiments of 












Table 11.2. Adding the ‘policy legacy’ variable to the model explaining variation in 
welfare development across Italian regions.  





Policy Legacy .33 
Territorial mobilisation .78 




Index of socio economic 
development 
.11 
Population ageing .08 
Population Size  .06 




As in the previous quantitative analyses, because of the large number of independent 
variables and the relatively small number of cases (21), a more parsimonious model 
has been built by following a ‘stepwise’ procedure (also used by Madama[2010: 208]). 
Only the three independent variables having the strongest partial correlation with 
welfare development are left in Table 11.3. It can be noted that this reduced model 
has the same ‘explanatory power’ as the previous one (r-squared=0.9). Additionally, 
territorial mobilisation confirms its importance as the main determinant of welfare 
development in Italian regions, followed by the policy legacy variable, which 









Table 11.3. Parsimonious model including the three main independent variables 
 
Variables Standardised Coefficient (β) 
Territorial mobilisation 0.77 
Left-wing mobilisation 0.15 




When talking about the importance of the institutional context, one should also add 
that there might be a certain ‘endogeneity’ in the model proposed in this study. 
Indeed, the strength of regionalist parties may be a driving force in the creation of 
sub-state social programmes. At the same time, the structuring of region-specific 
social policies may in turn become and institutional variable, which, by reinforcing 
regional distinctiveness, contributes to the consolidation and expansion of support 
for regionalist parties (Figure 11.5). For instance, the existence of ‘feedback effects’ 
(Thelen, 1999) from ‘institutionalised’ policies to party politics is evident in the 
Scottish case, where the SNP has based its recent electoral successes on the set of 
distinctive social policies promoted and implemented during its governmental 
experience. Future studies and more elaborated statistical models should try to better 
investigate, and disentangle, the relationship between regional institutional variables 
(including formal asymmetries in levels of autonomy) and political dynamics.  
 

















Territorial dynamics and welfare in other European countries 
 
As already mentioned in the first chapter, welfare politics has been subject to 
territorial dynamics mainly in those countries that are characterised by ‘taxation-
based’ heath care systems and have developed a competitive form of decentralisation 
(with high self-rule and low shared-rule). In other European countries the effect of 
territorial politics on welfare development has been mediated and limited by 
different welfare legacies (the ‘path dependence’ effect, which is also mentioned by 
Keating [2013: 153] in his study on policy variation at the regional level) and by an 
institutional framework that favours a more cooperative or hierarchical relationship 
between central and regional authorities.  
Germany is an interesting example of a cooperative federal system, in which 
regional authorities are encouraged to participate in a collective bargaining process 
with central government. These mechanisms of horizontal and vertical coordination 
seem to have led to a standardisation of welfare policy (Mathias 2005), even though 
cases of territorial mobilisation have not been totally absent, as the examples of 
Bavaria (Hepburn 2008) and East Germany (Hough and Koss 2011) show. Moreover, 
significant parts of the insurance-based health system of Germany, ‘such as the 
quality standards and financing of medical service delivery [...] through social 
insurance, the main structures of professional governance and (partially) supervision 
of health insurance organizations, are determined at the national level’ (Mätzke, 
2013: 191). Of course, this does not mean that the government of the German Länder 
have no influence on some aspects of social policy. For instance, Turner (2011) has 
underlined that in the fields of childcare and family policy, changes in the 
composition of regional governments result in qualitative shifts in the types of 
policies promoted. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the German Länder 
have promoted the creation of distinctive and comprehensive welfare systems that 
might compete with or even aspire to replace the national one.  
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As underlined by Cole (2005: 85), in France ‘the underpinning institutional 
variables are not conductive to territoriality’. Regions lack substantial powers and are 
subject to competition coming from the traditionally strong central government and 
from lower layers of government, such as the départments and the municipalities. 
Additionally, the structure of the French welfare system is based on the principle of 
social partnership, in which vertically organised employers’ organisations and trade 
unions ‘dominate the social funds (caisses) that manage the various branches of the 
welfare system’ (ibid.). Even after the French government decided to create the 
Agences Régionales de Santé (ARS) in 2010, following a pro-decentralisation, multi-
level rhetoric, the central state has been able to play a larger role than even before. As 
argued by Jones (2013: 225), the room for autonomy and innovation of regional 
agencies is so minimal, while vertical oversight is so strong, that this reform has 
greatly strengthened central control over health policymaking.  
Generally, because of institutional characteristics and legacies of the welfare 
systems of France and Germany, it is not possible to detect significant effects of 
territorial politics on sub-state welfare development. Some empirical results suggest 
that variation in welfare provision in these two countries is lower than in Spain and 
Italy. Figure 11.6 shows that the sum of coefficients of variation90 in long-term care, 
hospital personnel, and hospital beds is much higher in Italy and Spain than in 
France and Germany. Germany, despite being a federal system (albeit a cooperative 
one), shows overall levels of variation that are even lower than those of a highly 







                                                          
90
 Coefficients of variation are calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of each variable.  
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Figure 11.6. Sum of coefficient of variations in long-term care and hospital beds and 





Belgium is as another interesting case in Europe since it has experienced a substantial 
process of decentralisation, caused by the strengthening of territorial mobilisation at 
the sub-state level. At the same time, its welfare regime, based on the centrality of 
statewide social security and the existence of an insurance-based health care system, 
is more similar to the French and German ones.   
Since the 1980s, Flemish territorial movements have challenged the status quo 
and have called for a ‘federalisation of the Belgian social insurance system’ (Béland 
and Lecours, 2008: 146). Yet, so far, such demands have not been satisfied and, 
surprisingly, the welfare state of Belgium is still relatively centralised. This may be 
due to the fact that, as already mentioned in the case of France and Germany, 
insurance-based health systems are less subject to territorial pressures. Moreover, 
although the political system of Belgium is split along linguistic lines (Flemish and 
Francophone), social partners have remained organised on a statewide basis and 
have opposed the demands of territorial movements for regional differentiation. This 
is mainly because they play an ‘active role in managing the social insurance system’ 
(Ibid.: 146). Additionally, whereas the Flemish political class is overwhelmingly in 
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favour of welfare decentralisation, Francophone parties have always exercised their 
‘veto power’ over any reform. Thus, ‘only the national (federal) entities are 
competent for social insurance’ (in which health care is also included). Also in the case 
of social aid, ‘the laws that grant minimum revenues remain federal while the 
communities are competent for granting complementary aids’ (Dandoy and 
Baudewyns, 2005: 150). Beyers and Bursens (2011: 45) have underlined that central 
institutions in Belgium are quite ‘sticky’ in terms of social policy and, despite the 
emergence of a ‘layered welfare state’ (Cantillon et. Al, 2011), social policy at the sub-
national level has remained mainly ‘complementary’. 
The three examples presented in this section show that although, after the 
crisis of Keynesianism, there has been a general demand for more regionally 
differentiated social systems, the responses to that demand have not been 
homogeneous across European countries. We have seen that in Italy, Spain, and 
Great Britain, territorial politics has significantly shaped welfare development and 
has even contributed to the fragmentation of social rights. On the other hand, France, 
Germany, and Belgium have all been able to preserve a more centralised and 
homogeneous system of social protection – despite showing different levels of sub-
state territorial mobilisation. In France a consolidated tradition of centralism and 
vertically organised social partners could not be radically subverted by new multi-
level dynamics, also due to the absence of significant territorial movements. 
Germany, despite being a federal country with important territorial cleavages 
(North-South, East-West), could rely on an institutional system that encouraged 
cooperation and coordination among the Länder. Lastly, in Belgium social partners 
and veto players in central government have shielded the statewide welfare system 
from the attacks coming from territorial movements, which have demanded more 
decentralisation of social policies. However, what these three countries really have in 
common is a welfare legacy in which the health care sector is controlled by (public 
and private) insurance agencies and social partners, rather than public institutions 
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(Costa Font and Greer, 2013; Maino and Pavolini, 2008). Being organised on a 
‘functional’ rather than ‘territorial’ basis, the actors involved in the governance of 
insurance-based health systems have contributed to hindering the process of welfare 
territorialisation.  
 
Regional welfare in an age of economic austerity 
 
This thesis has mainly focused on the emergence and consolidation of sub-state 
welfare regimes that occurred at the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st 
century. Yet recent economic developments have challenged the role of regions as 
providers of social protection. Two opposing pressures have emerged in recent years. 
On the one hand, central governments facing increasing financial pressure and 
suffering from declining levels of systemic competitiveness have sought to re-
centralise powers that were devolved in the 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, 
territorial mobilisation and demands for autonomy or even independence have 
intensified, which is also a consequence of the increasing inability of central 
governments to effectively manage the economy and control public finances. 
The case of Italy is quite emblematic. Indeed, the current political debate is 
focused on the possible reformulation of the 2001 constitutional reform, which 
devolved significant powers to regional governments. In a context of increasing 
fragmentation of services and policies and lack of coordination among regions, the 
Italian parliament and government are trying to establish a more cooperative 
framework of relations among regions and between regions and central government 
with the creation of a territorial Senate. Moreover, the government has sought to 
limit regional control over a series of policies that were devolved in the early 2000s 
and to promote a more harmonised system of regional spending.  
At the same time, some data suggest that with the economic crisis the 
divergence between territorially mobilised regions and other Italian regions may 
have increased in a context of substantial cuts in central government transfers to the 
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regions (Lynch 2014; Bolgherini 2014). For instance, Table 11.4 shows that in the post-
crisis period (2009-2012) per capita social spending91 in those regions in which 
territorial movements control at least 10 per cent of the regional representation has 
increased at a much faster rate than in the other regions. Whereas in the pre-crisis 
period (2005-2008) per capita spending of territorially mobilised regions was on 
average 33 per cent higher than spending in the other regions, that difference has 
increased to 43 per cent in the post-crisis period, reaching the highest peak since the 
beginning of the time series in the late 1990s! The significance of these figures is even 
more evident when they are compared with spending differences between the poorer 
regions of the South and the wealthier regions located in central-northern Italy (Table 
11.5). In this case, sub-state spending differences have remained stable in the post-
crisis period. These preliminary, partial results seem to suggest that the effect of 
territorial mobilisation on sub-state development may have actually become stronger 
in a context of economic austerity and that regionalist parties have sought to exploit 
the difficulties experienced by national governments in order to further advance 










                                                          
91
 Aggregate spending in health care, social assistance, housing, and employment policies.  
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Table 11.4. Regional welfare spending: comparing Italian regions with low levels 
of/no territorial mobilisation and regions with medium-high levels of territorial 



























1461 1809 2146 2485 
Source: Ministry of economic development http://www.dps.tesoro.it/cpt/cpt.asp 
 
Table 11.5. Regional welfare spending: comparing southern Italian regions and 

























1423 1624 1879 2116 
Source: Ministry of economic development http://www.dps.tesoro.it/cpt/cpt.asp 
 
At the same time, it should be underlined that Italy’s largest territorial movement, 
the Northern League, has undergone a radical process of organisational and 
ideological transformation in recent years, as a consequence of a leadership crisis and 
systemic political and economic changes. Today the territorial focus of this 
movement has shifted from the sub-national to the supra-national level. Indeed, the 
League is less and less a ‘macro-regionalist party’ mobilised against the national 
centre and is transforming into a ‘national-populist’ party mobilised against an 
                                                          
92
 Regions with low/no territorial mobilisation: Piedmont, Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, 
Latium, Abruzzi, Molise, Basilicata, Campania, Puglia, Sicily, Sardinia. 
Regions with medium-high territorial mobilisation: the Aosta Valley, South Tyrol-Bolzano, Trento, Friuli Venetia 
Giulia, Lombardy, the Veneto.  
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emerging European centre and its policies. This may suggest a reconfiguration of the 
centre-periphery cleavage that, in the new European Union, is no longer confined 
predominantly to conflicts between regional and national/central actors but seems to 
increasingly characterise political dynamics in the European arena. This may 
contradict the findings of the Europeanisation literature that only a few years ago 
saw the possible emergence of more functional, left-right, rather than territorial, 
political competition at the EU level (Caramani 2011). 
In the case of Spain, it has already been underlined that the current economic 
crisis has affected the autonomy of regions in the promotion of social schemes. At the 
same time, this seems to have increased the importance of institutional asymmetries 
in the way regions have responded to the crisis. Regions belonging to the ‘common’ 
fiscal regime have been under increasing pressure from the central government and 
have been forced to implement drastic cuts in welfare provision. As shown at the end 
of Chapter 6, the welfare systems of Catalonia and the Basque Country have been 
subject to different constraints. Indeed, on the one hand, the Basque Country has 
exploited its fiscal autonomy to maintain or further expand a regional network of 
social protection. On the other hand, Catalonia has been significantly hit by the crisis 
of Spanish finances and the CiU-led government has been forced to implement a 
systematic agenda of cuts in public expenditure, ‘standing out as a champion of 
austerity measures that would be later introduced elsewhere’ (Rico and Liñera, 2014: 
260).  
The increasing fiscal constraints imposed by the central government have 
weakened moderate pro-autonomy positions in Catalonia and, today, demands for 
full Catalan independence have become significantly stronger. The CiU, which in the 
past did not make the issue of secession a matter of debate, adopted an openly pro-
independence platform by promoting referendums and participating in public 
demonstrations (Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013). The general feeling among Catalan 
territorial movements is that one of the wealthiest regions of Spain, which is also 
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characterised by strong cultural distinctiveness, has been exploited by the Madrid 
government and would be better off if it became a fully independent political entity. 
In sum, both socio-economic and, more traditional, cultural issues have been central 
in the recent pro-independence campaign. 
Lastly, the austerity policies implemented by the British government and the 
end of the Labour government in Westminster (and in Scotland) have increased 
territorial tensions and pressures for policy divergence within Great Britain. The case 
of Scotland is quite emblematic, since the SNP-led government has used anti-
austerity and pro-welfare arguments to promote its campaign for Scottish 
independence. Although independence was rejected by 55 per cent of Scottish voters, 
the NO campaign won thanks to promises of extensive institutional autonomy of 
Scotland within the United Kingdom. Generally, differences in welfare governance 
between Scotland and England have become even more evident in the post-2010 
period and this seems to have had an effect on perceptions of Scottish distinctiveness 
and on the need to protect the Scottish model from English (or British) intervention, 
either through full independence or through further devolution. Even in Wales, a 
‘nation/region’ characterised by more moderate levels of territorial mobilisation, the 
new economic and political circumstances have made the issue of sub-state welfare 
building more central in the political debate and have strengthened territorial 
factions within the Welsh Labour party.  
Of course, in almost all European countries new parties and political 
movements have emerged and strengthened in the era of economic austerity. Such 
political forces, which mobilise against the political establishment and against 
European institutions, cannot be easily associated to the left-right and centre-
periphery cleavages. Perhaps it is too early to study the effect of new political actors 
not only on sub-state welfare politics but also on welfare politics in general. The new 
political struggle over European governance may be regarded as a new step in the 
territorial reconfiguration of social rights, which, however, is difficult to assess at this 
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stage. The question is whether a new centre-periphery cleavage will emerge at the 
European level and whether this will result in the strengthening, stagnation, or full 
collapse of a European social dimension, which, so far, has struggled to emerge.  
Conclusions and future implications 
 
This study has pointed to a fundamental phenomenon emerging in contemporary 
democracies: the redefinition of the concept of social citizenship. Whereas in the 19th 
and most of the 20th century, social citizenship was shaped by processes of political 
nationalisation, standardisation and state-building, today it is increasingly subject to 
different processes that transcend the nation-state either at the sub-state or supra-state 
levels. This has become more evident in countries that have undergone significant 
processes of decentralisation and regionalisation. For many years welfare scholars 
neglected these new aspects of social governance and classified welfare regimes by 
considering the nation-state as the only level of analysis. This made sense in the case 
of studies like Esping-Andersen’s seminal study on the ‘the three words of Welfare 
Capitalism’, which mainly referred to the period of emergence and structuring of 
national welfare regimes. In that period, even in decentralised and federal systems, 
processes of ‘de-territorialisation’ and standardisation of social protection occurred 
(Obinger et al. 2005). In the last few decades, however, opposite pressures have 
challenged the primacy of statewide institutions and actors as administrators and 
providers of welfare. Even though some countries, like France and Germany, seem to 
have resisted such pressures thanks to their institutional arrangements regulating the 
relationships between centre and periphery and among social partners, other 
countries have undergone radical processes of territorialisation.  
Today it is difficult to detect similar patterns of social governance and visions 
of social justice across the regions of Spain, Italy and Great Britain. In a context of 
increasing centrality of service-oriented policies, the way health and social services 
are administered and provided by sub-state actors may have a significant effect on 
social equality and citizens’ well-being. A phenomenon of disaggregation of territorial 
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solidarity seems to have occurred in these countries and, taken to the extreme, this 
has even undermined political unity and strengthened secession demands. In this 
context, the importance of territorial mobilisation as a driver of welfare development 
and differentiation in multi-level settings has significantly increased. Those regions 
in which identity and territorial solidarity prevail may have an advantage when they 
are left alone to deal with new needs and social problems.  
At the same time, this study suggests that left-right politics may still play a 
role in welfare building, although this role is less central than suggested by classic, 
power-resource theories. Of course, regions may become new arenas for social 
democracy and the extension of social rights in a context of welfare retrenchment 
occurring at the statewide level. This is particularly true in those contexts in which 
centre-left parties are systematically excluded from or play a marginal role in 
national government. At the same time, principles of territorial equality, uniformity 
of social protection and cross-territorial solidarity, which inspired class mobilisation, 
may be seriously challenged by multi-level dynamics. Thus, decentralisation may be 
at the same time an opportunity and, like globalisation and supra-national 
phenomena, a challenge to the policies promoted by centre-left parties.  
In the 1990s the regional dimension started to be considered as a possible 
alternative to the nation-state in a context of the increasing inability of national 
governments to respond to global challenges and promote cross-territorial 
redistribution. The question is whether the current crisis has undermined or 
reinforced the role that regions came to assume at the turn of the 21st century. One 
may wonder whether some regions have been able to build social systems that are 
sustainable and can resist the pressures exerted by national and supranational actors. 
At the same time, it would be interesting to see whether the idea of a ‘Europe of 
Regions’ promoted at the end of the 20th century is still considered as a viable option 
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